David Matthew Kilrain vs. City of Santa Barbara, et al

Case Number

22CV01222

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 09/13/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Plaintiff’s Motion To Set Aside And Vacate Final Ruling And To Reinstate Case And Grant Leave To Amend Complaint

Tentative Ruling

For Plaintiff David Matthew Kilrain: Self-represented

For Defendants the City of Santa Barbara, Ariel Calonne, Mike Wiltshire, Erik Engebrestson, Monica Broumand, Janette Prusinski, Nichole Grisanti, Naomi Kovacs, Julie Ruggieri, and Jessica Gray: Sarah J. Knecht, Tom R. Shapiro, Office of the City Attorney

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Plaintiff David Matthew Kilrain to set aside and vacate final ruling and to reinstate case and grant leave to amend complaint is denied.

Background

On March 30, 2022, self-represented Plaintiff David Matthew Kilrain filed his original complaint in this action against Defendants City of Santa Barbara (the City) and Lisa Ann O’Niahll (O’Niahll). After the Court sustained the demurrers of the City and O’Niahll, Kilrain filed a first amended complaint (FAC) on August 22, 2022, adding Ariel Calonne (Calonne), Mike Wiltshire (Wiltshire), and Monica Broumand (Broumand) as Defendants. The City, Calonne, Wiltshire, Broumand, and O’Niahll each filed demurrers to the FAC, which were sustained with leave to amend.

On December 22, 2022, Kilrain filed a second amended complaint (SAC) alleging a single cause of action for “intent to inflict emotional distress” against the City, O’Niahll, Calonne, Wiltshire, and Broumand, and adding Erik Engebrestson (Engebrestson), Jessica Gray (Gray), Janette Prusinski (Prusinski), Nichole Grisanti (Grisanti), Naomi Kovacs (Kovacs), and Julie Ruggieri (Ruggieri) as Defendants. On March 8, 2023, the Court sustained O’Niahll’s demurrer to the SAC without leave to amend. Finding that the SAC sufficiently pleaded a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court overruled the City, Calonne, Wiltshire, and Broumand’s demurrer to the SAC.

On March 23, 2023, the City, Calonne, Wiltshire, Broumand, Engebrestson, Gray, Prusinski, Grisanti, Kovacs, and Ruggieri (collectively, the City Defendants) filed an answer to the SAC generally denying its allegations and asserting three affirmative defenses.

On May 3, 2023, the City Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (the first motion) on the grounds that in the SAC, Kilrain failed to allege compliance with the provisions of Government Code section 810 et seq. (the Government Claims Act or Act). Kilrain opposed the first motion.

In its Minute Order dated June 7, 2023, the Court granted the City Defendant’s first motion with leave to amend solely to permit Kilrain to allege facts demonstrating compliance with the Act’s claim presentation requirements or facts demonstrating a legally sufficient to excuse compliance. On June 20, 2023, Kilrain filed a third amended complaint (TAC).

On June 27, 2023, the City Defendants filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings (the second motion) on the grounds that the TAC failed to allege facts demonstrating either compliance with the Act’s claims presentation requirements or a legally sufficient excuse from compliance with the Act’s requirements. Kilrain opposed the second motion.

On August 2, 2023, the Court issued its Minute Order (the Minute Order) granting the second motion on the grounds that Kilrain did not allege compliance with the Act’s claim requirements or a legally sufficient excuse from compliance. Because Kilrain conceded that he did not submit a claim in accordance with the Act’s requirements and did not offer allegations to show in what manner Kilrain could further amend the TAC to allege facts that demonstrate substantial compliance or a legally sufficient excuse from compliance, the Court denied Kilrain leave to amend.

On August 8, 2023, the Court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the City Defendants and against Kilrain (the judgment). The City Defendants filed a notice of entry of the judgment on August 11, 2023.

On August 15, 2023, Kilrain filed an amended motion to set aside and vacate the Minute Order, to reinstate the case, and to grant Kilrain leave to amend the TAC (the present motion). In support of the present motion, Kilrain declares that he filed this action solely as a self-defense mechanism due to crimes being committed against him and not to receive money, that he mistakenly included a claim for money damages due to a belief that damages were an essential element of Kilrain's claim, that he never heard of the Act when he filed this action, and that Kilrain will “only pursue justice and not request any financial damages” should the Court set aside the Minute Order. (Kilrain Decl., ¶¶ 7, 11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 25.)

The City Defendants oppose the present motion.

Analysis

Kilrain purports to bring the present motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), on the grounds that Kilrain mistakenly requested financial damages in this action when his primary reason for filing the complaint was to pursue justice and to “teach the Illuminati that they are not allowed to control public employees and to teach the public employees that they are not allowed to take orders from the Illuminati.” (Motion at p. 4, ll. 11-17.) (Note: Undesignated statutory references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.) Kilrain requests that the Court set aside and vacate the Minute Order pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b), and grant Kilrain leave to amend the TAC to remove the claim for monetary damages. (Id. at p. 6, ll. 20-23.)

Section 473, subdivision (b), authorizes a Court to vacate an order or judgment taken against a party as a result of that party’s excusable mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b); County of San Bernardino v. Mancini (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1095, 1102.) Here, Kilrain opposed the second motion conceding that he did not present a claim as required by the Act. In the opposition, Kilrain effectively asserted that he substantially complied or was legally excused from complying with the Act’s claim presentation requirements. (See Minute Order [discussing Kilrain’s contentions in opposition to the second motion].) Kilrain also requested leave to amend which the Court denied. (Ibid. [discussing Kilrain’s request for leave to amend].) Kilrain has not demonstrated how the Minute Order or judgment further discussed above were entered based on any mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect on the part of Kilrain. For these reasons, section 473, subdivision (b), does not apply to the present motion.

Kilrain effectively requests that the Court reconsider and revoke its Minute Order to the extent that the Court therein denied Kilrain leave to amend the TAC. Accordingly, the Court will deem the motion as one brought under section 1008, which provides that “[w]hen an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a Court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or Court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).) A motion for reconsideration of an order under section 1008, subdivision (a), must raise new factual allegations or demonstrate a “change in circumstances or law that would call into question the Court’s ruling….” (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1338.)

In the Minute Order, the Court addressed Kilrain’s contentions regarding his purported intent behind filing the present action. (See Minute Order.) Kilrain’s present motion also demonstrates that he was aware of his intent behind filing this action at the time he filed the original complaint. (See Kilrain Decl. at ¶¶ 11-13 [stating reasons Kilrain initially filed this action].) In addition, while Kilrain now argues that he did not know of the Act’s requirements, Kilrain has not provided any explanation for why he did not offer this information or any proposed allegations regarding his lack of knowledge of the Act either in his opposition to or at the hearing on the second motion. (See Yolo County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Myers (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 42, 50 [party seeking reconsideration must provide an explanation for failure to produce evidence earlier].)

Furthermore, though Kilrain asserts that the Court should reconsider its Minute Order based on Kilrain’s lack of knowledge of the Act’s requirements,

“ ‘ignorance of a law is no excuse for a violation thereof…’ [Citations.]” (People v. Snyder (1982) 32 Cal.3d 590, 593; accord, Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 396 [also noting that ignorance of a civil law does not excuse its violation].) Kilrain was presumably aware of the status of his knowledge or lack thereof regarding the Act’s requirements at the time he filed his opposition to the second motion. (Ibid.) Kilrain fails to provide any explanation for his failure to raise this argument earlier.

Kilrain also contends that the Court improperly dismissed this action with prejudice under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.). However, the Court granted the second motion without leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 483, subdivisions (c)(3)(B) and (h)(3), and not pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which do not apply here. The judgment was entered in accordance with the second motion in favor of the City Defendants. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (h)(3).) Kilrain has failed to demonstrate how the judgment entered in favor of the City Defendants was improper on this or any other legal grounds.

For all reasons discussed above, Kilrain has failed to show any new or different facts, circumstances, or law that warrant reconsideration of the Minute Order. Therefore, the Court will deny Kilrain’s motion.