Kristin Fraser et al vs LG Electronics USA Inc et al And Related Cross Complaints

Case Number

22CV00171

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 11/29/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Inzunza’s Motion for Bifurcation

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs Kristin Fraser and Jason Lloyd [“Plaintiffs”] are represented by Brett C. Templeman, Benjamin L. Baumer

Plaintiff Garrison Property and Casualty [“Garrison”] is represented by Kellie L. Terhufen

Defendant L.G Electronics [“L. G. Electronics”] is represented by Cameron W. Thomas, William A. Bossen

Defendant Inzunza Trucking Corp (“Inzunza”) is represented by German A. Marcucci, Dominique Sicari,

Cross Defendant Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC [“Lowe’s” and sometimes “Lowes”] is represented by Joan E. Cochran, Lisa Kralik Hansen, Deborah A. Smillie

Issue

Inzunza’s Motion for Bifurcation.

Ruling

Inzunza’s motion for bifurcation is DENIED. The matter will be tried in a single jury trial, with a subsequent judicial determination of contractual indemnity issues, and/or any other issues not resolved by the jury trial, at the conclusion of the jury trial.

Analysis

Inzunza’s Motion for Bifurcation

Filed 11/7/23; 18 pages; read and considered; summarized; moves pursuant to Code of Procedure § 598 to bifurcate trial of the liability claims in this action from Lowes contractual indemnity claims against Inzunza. Liability in this case is disputed. It is Inzunza’s position that it is not liable for the damages claimed by Plaintiffs. Lowes alleges it is owed contractual indemnity by Inzunza for Inzunza’s installation of a clothes dryer that was the alleged cause of a fire at Plaintiffs’ residence; Lowes has been the driving force behind allegations related to Inzunza’s installation of the dryer being the cause of the fire at Plaintiffs’ residence; Lowes and Plaintiffs thereby have the burden of proof to prove their prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence that Inzunza’s installation was in fact the case of the dryer fire.

Plaintiffs and Lowes should be put to that burden of proof before any contractual indemnity issues are tried. Therefore, bifurcation in the manner requested is appropriate in this case because it would streamline proceedings, will be conducive to judicial economy and efficacy, and would avoid undue prejudice.

The Motion is also brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128(a)(3), which gives this Court the authority to provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it.  It would be a waste of precious judicial resources to try Lowes contractual indemnity claims with liability in one trial were the jury to decide there is no liability on the part of Inzunza. 

Supported by Points and Authorities; Inzunza will argue at trial that they did comply with the additional insured requirements set forth in the Agreement, and DSI consented to such provisions. Trying these contractual indemnity issues be at the same time as liability could mislead or confuse the jury and result in a Jury finding that Inzunza is liable solely on Lowes’ contractual indemnity claims rather than a finding based on facts and law as to Inzunza’s negligence in the installation of the Dryer, and therefore would be highly prejudicial to Inzuzna.

The Court should bifurcate this action to try the issue of liability because judicial economy and the convenience of the litigants and their witnesses would be served by doing so. Bifurcation in this case has a plain potential to render at least half of the anticipated trial unnecessary.

Severance or bifurcation of the liability issues from the issues of damages is the most efficient means of resolving the instant action.

It is anticipated that Lowes will attempt to cloud the clearly uncertain liability issues with evidence of unrelated contractual indemnity claims in an attempt to cloud the mind of the jury. To preserve scarce judicial resources and ensure that Inzunza will not be prejudiced by the contractual indemnity issue, this Court should bifurcate the trial and hear liability issues first. The likelihood of prejudice if the Court tries liability and indemnity damages together is almost guaranteed; prior to putting on any evidence of contractual indemnity issues, the parties to this action should be required to prove liability against Inzunza.

The order of bifurcation makes sense in this action because there is no overlap between the witnesses testifying as to liability issues and the witnesses testifying on contractual indemnity issues (other than the PMK for Inzunza). Hearing the liability issues first will save judicial resources.  Liability in this case is disputed.  Inzunza’s liability in this matter is tenuous at best.  Plaintiffs and Lowes have the burden of proof to prove their prima facie case by a preponderance of evidence, and Plaintiffs and Lowes should be put to that burden of proof before any contractual indemnity phase is tried. Lowes is the driving force that Inzunza’s installation of the Dryer was the cause of the fire at the Property while Inzunza’s expert witnesses will testify that the installation of the Dryer was not caused by the installation of the Dryer.

To require the issues of liability and contractual indemnity be tried separately will streamline the trial, and the issues of undue prejudice will be avoided by, and judicial efficacy will be served by bifurcation. Granting this motion will enable the jury to decide whether Inzunza is liable. 

If there is no liability, the Court will not have wastefully expended its scarce resources in hearing Lowes contractual indemnity claims that ultimately have no bearing on the outcome of this case, but which, instead, only creates prejudice to Inzunza.

Supported by the Declaration of Dominique Sicari.

Opposition

Garrisons’ Opposition

Filed 11/17/23; 10 pages; read and considered; summarized; Garrison believes that judicial, witness and jury efficiency would dictate that liability and damages proceed with one jury and one verdict.

Garrisons argues persuasively that the Court’s authority to bifurcate issues is set forth in subdivision (b) of C.C.P. section 1048 which states: “(b) The Court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.” That in the matter before this Court, Inzunza has failed to show that a determination of liability in Inzunza’s favor, would have any bearing on the contractual indemnity issues to be decided by the Court as a matter of law.  The only effect of a liability determination as to the question of fact of Inzunza negligence prior to the time that all parties are allowed to present their entire case, is to disrupt the judicial proceedings, the parties, the Court and witnesses resulting in prejudice to all parties.  Determinations of any indemnity claims upon conclusion of the trial could be made after conclusion of the case in chief, or through alternative dispute resolution, or any other means most convenient to the Defendants without having to waste the time and money of three Plaintiffs and their Plaintiff’s counsel. If the motion is construed to sever trial of liability and damages, Plaintiffs Fraser, Lloyd and Garrison would be unduly prejudiced by splitting this case into two trials, regardless of whether the same jury hears both trials or if separate juries are empaneled for each trial.    

Plaintiffs’ Opposition

Filed 11/17/23; 10 pages; summarized; Based on Inzunza’s logic in its Motion for Bifurcation, the Plaintiffs (including Garrison) should be subjected to an indemnity determination (that is irrelevant to Plaintiff's case) before putting on its damages case which may not be relevant to Inzunza's case.

Plaintiffs argue persuasively that assuming arguendo that a jury might be confused in the manner Inzunza suggests, Inzunza's proposed bifurcation schedule doesn't make sense from a practical or judicial economy perspective where the Court could determine the indemnity issue after liability and damages are decided; the Plaintiffs can be excused and Inzunza can make its case to the Court (if in fact it needs to) without burdening the Plaintiffs (including Plaintiff Garrison) with issues that do not concern them; the bulk of trial will be spent on liability issues; it simply does not make sense to bifurcate and require: 1) Plaintiffs, three Defendants and their individual attorneys combined to state ten, instead of five, opening statements, 2) ten, instead of five, closing arguments, 3) the Court instructing jurors twice, and 4) two sets of jury deliberations. Bifurcation will result in a significant increase in expense to the parties, as well as time burden on Plaintiffs, this Court and jurors.

Plaintiffs’ argument is supported by Points and Authorities: C.C.P. § 598 requires a showing that bifurcation will promote the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the economy and efficiency of handling litigation. Defendant has failed to present any evidence that these criteria will be established if bifurcation is ordered. To the contrary, a bifurcation will be more expensive, inefficient, inconvenience witnesses and unnecessarily delay justice for the parties.

Lowes’ Opposition

Filed 11/17/23; 52 pages; summarized; contends the Motion to Bifurcate is based on a misstatement of applicable law and pure speculation; bifurcation is not warranted as any alleged concerns may be easily addressed through jury instructions and bifurcation will only serve to unnecessarily complicate a straightforward trial and determination of the issues. The contractual duty to indemnify issue left to be resolved at trial is based upon the same hold harmless provision and is a question of law for the Court’s determination.  In contrast, the issue of whether Inzunza was negligent in installing the dryer is a question of fact for the jury.  Trial of these issues does not involve complex claims. Inzunza argues the jury could be “misled” or confused into mistakenly conflating the indemnity issue with the liability issue; the jury could mistakenly find Inzunza liable for damages based not on the evidence relating to the cause of the fire but because an indemnity agreement exists. Such speculation is an insufficient ground to justify holding essentially two trials in this matter.  Any such concerns are easily addressed by jury instructions clearly delineating the issues to be determined by the trier of fact.  In addition, because the contractual indemnity issue is a matter of law to be determined by the Court, the potential for any jury confusion is highly unlikely. California Courts have long enforced indemnity language even where the indemnitor is not found negligent.  Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 52 Cal.2d 411, 416 (1959); Cont'l Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mech. Servs., Inc., 53 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 (1997).   

Supported by the Declaration of Joan Cochran; Attached Exhibit A; a copy of the Court’s Minute Order entered on August 9, 2023, granting the Motion for Summary Adjudication of Lowe’s based upon the contractual defense owed by Inzunza to Lowe’s under the contractual indemnity provision of the Independent Hauler’s Contract and based on Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc., 44 Cal4th 541 (2008). Exhibit B; the Independent Hauler’s Contract between Inzunza and DSI setting forth the contractual defense and indemnity obligations owed by Inzunza as a customer of DSI. Exhibit C; a copy of Lowe’s Service Orders.

Supported by the Declaration of Jon Barrett; the Head of Transportation HSE & Final Mile at Maersk, the world’s largest container shipping company. On or about June 27, 2019, DSI and Inzunza entered into a broker/independent carrier agreement for the delivery and related transportation/delivery services of consumer items for DSI’s retail clients and their customers, whereby Inzunza agreed to provide a defense and indemnity to DSI and Lowe’s, as DSI’s client, with respect to all claims and suits resulting from Inzunza’s performance under the agreement; attaches a copy of the agreement as Exhibit B; attaches a copy of Lowe’s Service Order as Exhibit C.

Inzunza’s Reply

Filed 11/22/23; 22 pages; read and considered; summarized; argues that Inzunza’s motion to bifurcate the determination of liability from Lowes’ contractual indemnity claims at trial should be granted in its entirety.  

That the oppositions filed by both Plaintiffs and Lowes have failed to offer any persuasive arguments as to why the issues of liability and contractual indemnity should not be bifurcated at the time of trial and actually support Inzunza’s contentions that the issues of liability and contractual indemnity should be bifurcated at the time of trial due to there being legitimate disputes as to Inzunza’s contractual liability to Lowes.

Contends that Plaintiffs base their objection on the notion that Inzunza wants to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages at the time of trial; however, as evident by Inzunza’s Motion, Inzunza instead seeks to bifurcate the issues of liability from the issues of contractual indemnity raised by Lowes.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ allegations in their Opposition, the issues of liability and contractual indemnity is not likely to require the joint testimony from any witness other than the PMK for Inzunza, as the issues related to Lowes’ contractual indemnity allegations surround the Independent Haulers Agreement entered into between Inzunza and DSI Logistics, Inc; the bifurcation of liability from contractual indemnity claims will not delay justice for Plaintiffs’ at all.

As outlined in Inzunza’s Motion, if Inzunza’s installation of the subject dryer is found to not have been the cause of or contributed to the fire at Plaintiffs’ residence, Inzunza contends that they do not owe Loews any contractual indemnity; that bifurcation will in fact promote the convenience of the witnesses, the ends of justice, and the judicial economy and efficacy of the Court and the handling of this litigation. 

Inzunza argues the primary focus of Lowes throughout this litigation with regards to Inzunza has been to these issues of contractual indemnity and Lowes has been the driving force that Inzunza’s installation of the subject dryer was the cause of the fire at the property; that there is a very real possibility, despite Lowes’ contentions to the contrary, that a jury would in fact be confused and possibly swayed by arguments related to contractual indemnity prior to the establishment of any liability on behalf of Inzunza; that granting of Inzunza’s Motion to Bifurcate would allow the jury to determine if Inzunza is liable for the fire at Plaintiffs’ residence without any unnecessary arguments by Lowes related to their alleged contractual indemnity claims against Inzunza, potentially prejudicing the jury with regards to Inzunza’s liability.

Supported by the Declaration of Dominique Sicari: attaches a copy of the Independent Hauler’s Contract between DSI Logistics, Inc. as produced in discovery in this case [Exhibit “A”].

The Court’s Conclusions

The Court does not doubt that there are legitimate disputes as to Inzunza’s contractual liability to Lowes. But the Court finds that bifurcation will not be helpful to the Court in getting this case to a prompt resolution and bifurcation promotes such delay. Bifurcation will not, in fact, promote the convenience of the witnesses, the ends of justice, and the judicial economy and efficacy of the Court and the handling of this litigation. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs, Lowes and Garrisons that the law is persuasive on the facts; this case should not be bifurcated pursuant to C.C.P. § 598, Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., (1959) 52 Cal.2d 411, 416, Cont'l Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mech. Servs., Inc., (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 500, 505, Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 888.), Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 Cal. App.3d 954-955.

There are very able lawyers in this case and the argument that there is a possibility that a jury would in fact be confused and possibly swayed by arguments related to contractual indemnity prior to the establishment of any liability on behalf of Inzunza is not persuasive; although it is a possibility the Court finds it is not a probability. This Court has not found juries to be confused in past litigation when there are such able attorneys as there are in this case to explain the facts and the law. Jurors in Santa Barbara have been well educated; sophisticated; committed; industrious.