Alison E Chase vs Brian M Metcalf et al

Case Number

21CV02245

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 08/09/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Protective Order

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of Alison E. Chase for a protective order is granted, in part, as to Brian M. Metcalf’s set two requests for admission nos. 36 through 220 only, and set two form interrogatories-general to the extent it relates to or is dependent on the response of Alison E. Chase to each set two requests for admission nos. 36 through 220. Except as otherwise herein granted, the motion is denied.

Background:

Plaintiff Alison E. Chase (Chase) filed this action for partition by sale of real property located at 1790 Eucalyptus Hill Road in Santa Barbara, California (the property), on June 7, 2021. Defendants are Brian M. Metcalf (Metcalf) and Pentagon Federal Credit Union (Pentagon). Chase filed a request for dismissal of the action, without prejudice, as to Pentagon on November 29, 2022.

In the operative verified second amended complaint (the SAC) filed by Chase on December 16, 2021, Chase alleges that the property was transferred by grant deed to Chase and Metcalf on March 20, 2018, as joint tenants. Chase and Metcalf each hold an undivided one-half fee simple interest in the property. On February 23, 2021, a deed of trust securing a mortgage loan was recorded, which is the only recorded encumbrance on the property. The mortgage loan secured by the deed of trust was sold, assigned, or transferred to Pentagon on April 1, 2021. As further alleged in the SAC:

After the parties’ relationship ended, Chase suggested to Metcalf that they list the property for sale which Metcalf refused to do. Chase then requested that Metcalf pay to Chase the equity in the property proportionate to her ownership interest which Metcalf also refused. Metcalf, who is the tenant-in-possession, has excluded Chase from the property by changing locks without the consent of Chase. Metcalf has also refused to provide Chase with a copy of a notice of sale, assignment, and transfer of note that was issued after the property was refinanced and the note secured by the property was transferred from the original lender to Pentagon.

Pursuant to a notice of errata, Metcalf filed his operative verified answer to the SAC on January 31, 2022, responding to its allegations and asserting twelve affirmative defenses. On October 15, 2021, Metcalf filed a verified first amended cross-complaint (the Metcalf cross-complaint). In the operative Metcalf cross-complaint, Metcalf alleges ten causes of action against Chase: (1) constructive fraud, (2) fraud by misrepresentation, (3) negligence, (4) breach of contract, (5) promissory estoppel, (6) breach of fiduciary duty, (7) accounting, (8) declaratory relief, (9) unjust enrichment, and (10) equitable indemnity. As generally alleged in the Metcalf cross-complaint:

Before Chase and Metcalf made an offer to purchase the property, Metcalf confirmed with Chase that the property was a suitable long-term residence for their child, and that Chase would contribute equally to its costs and expenses. Based on Chase’s agreements and representations, Metcalf supplied over 60 percent of the initial down payment for the property and became jointly and severally liable for a mortgage debt. Though Chase represented that she would pay her share of property related costs, shortly after purchasing the property Chase repeatedly declined to make equal, and in many cases any, contributions towards its expenses leaving Metcalf solely to pay for them. Chase abandoned the property in March 2021 and stopped making any mortgage payments, after which Metcalf began to pay with no contribution from Chase. Since purchasing the property in March 2018, Metcalf has also paid all property taxes, insurance, zoning case costs, repair, and maintenance expenses with little or no contribution from Chase.

Chase filed a verified answer to the Metcalf cross-complaint on February 15, 2022, responding to its allegations and asserting seventeen affirmative defenses. Also on February 15, 2022, Chase filed a verified cross-complaint against Metcalf (the Chase cross-complaint), alleging eight cause of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) promissory estoppel; (3) fraud; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) ouster; (6) conversion; (7) unjust enrichment; and (8) accounting. The allegations of the Chase cross-complaint generally arise from alleged misconduct by Metcalf in connection with the purchase of the property, alleged harassment of Chase by Metcalf, and a failure to support the parties’ child. On April 18, 2022, Metcalf filed a verified answer to Chase cross-complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting fourteen affirmative defenses.

On May 6, 2024, Chase filed a motion for a protective order which is brought under sections 2030.090 and 2033.080 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The motion of Chase seeks a protective order with respect to a set two requests for admission (the Set Two RFA) and a set two form interrogatories (the Set Two FI) (collectively, the Set Two Requests), served on Chase by Metcalf. In addition, Chase requests an award of reasonable sanctions.

In support of the motion, Chase submits the declaration of her counsel, Jennifer Duffy (Duffy), who states that Metcalf served the Set Two Requests on April 2, 2024. (Duffy Decl., ¶ 2 & Exh. A.) The Set Two RFA, a copy of which is attached to the Duffy declaration as exhibit A, are numbered 31 through 220. (Id. at Exh. A, PDF pp. 32-56.) Attached to the Set Two RFA is a declaration for additional discovery signed by counsel for Metcalf, R. Scott Mullen (Mullen), ostensibly setting forth the reasons why Metcalf contends the number of admission requests contained in the Set Two RFA are warranted. (Id. at PDF p. 57, ¶ 7.) The Set Two FI attached to the Duffy declaration as exhibit B consist of one interrogatory no. 17.1, in which Metcalf requests that, for each response to the Set Two RFA that is not an unqualified admission, Chase state the number of the request, all facts upon which Chase basis her response, the identity of persons with knowledge of those facts, and all documents that support Chase’s response. (Id. at Exh. B.)

On April 22, 2024, Duffy sent correspondence to Mullen setting forth issues with the Set Two Requests and proposing that Mr. Metcalf either withdraw the Set Two Requests or agree to streamline them based on the issues raised by Duffy in that correspondence. (Duffy Decl., ¶ & Exh. C.) Duffy also offered to be available by telephone. (Ibid).

Mullen responded to Duffy’s April 22, 2024, correspondence on April 26, 2024, asserting that Duffy’s letter was not a “meaningful attempt to meet and confer,” that Duffy delayed in seeking to initiate meet and confer discussions, that it was not Metcalf’s burden to informally resolve any purported issues with the Set Two Requests, and that Chase had not satisfied her code obligations. (Duffy Decl., ¶ 5 & Exh. D.) The parties exchanged additional written correspondence on April 29 and 30, and May 1 and 2, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-15 & Exhs. E-J.)

Metcalf opposes the motion.

Analysis:

A party to whom requests for admission have been made or to whom interrogatories have been propounded “may promptly move for a protective order. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under [Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 2016.040.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.090, subd. (a), & 2033.080, subd. (a).) (Note: Undesignated code references herein shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.)

As further noted above, the Set Two FI consists of one interrogatory no. 17.1 which corresponds to the Set Two RFA and requires a response from Chase only to the extent Chase has not answered any particular request within the Set Two RFA with an unqualified admission. Therefore, the determination of the motion with respect to the Set Two FI is dependent on whether there exists grounds for a protective order with respect to any admission request contained in the Set Two RFA. For this reason, the Court will first determine the motion as to the Set Two RFA.

The parties’ respective burdens:

The parties here disagree as to who bears the initial burden on the motion. For example, in her opening memorandum, Chase contends that Metcalf bears the burden to justify the number of requests for admission contained within the Set Two RFA. (Opening Memorandum at p. 4, ll. 1-10 & 14-17.) In the opposing memorandum, Metcalf contends that Chase bears the initial burden to demonstrate good cause for the protective order sought in the motion. (Opp. at p. 5, ll. 4-5; p. 6, ll. 2-3; p. 12, ll. 5-13.) To resolve this question, the Court must first determine the basis for the request for a protective order.

The parties here do not dispute that under section 2033.030, a party to an action may not request that “any other party admit more than 35 matters that do not relate to the genuineness of documents.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.030, subd. (a).) In addition, subdivision (b) of section 2033.050 provides that a party “need only respond to the first 35 admission requests served that do not relate to the genuineness of documents” unless the declaration described in section 2033.050 has been made, provided the responding party states an appropriate objection. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.030, subd. (b).) Section 2033.050 describes the required form and content of the declaration for additional discovery that must be attached to a request for more than 35 admissions not relating to the genuineness of documents. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.050.)

With respect to the Set Two RFA, the Chase brings the motion under section 2033.080, which provides that “[t]he court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080, subds. (a) & (b).) Relevant here, a motion for a protective order brought pursuant to section 2033.080 may challenge “the set of admission requests, or particular requests in the set” on the grounds that the requests “need not be answered at all.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080, subd. (b)(1).) To the extent the motion controverts or challenges representations contained in a declaration served under section 2033.050 and required where a party requests more than 35 admissions which do not relate to the genuineness of documents, the protective order may include a directive that the “number of admission requests is unwarranted.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080, subd. (b)(2); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.050 [setting forth requirements for a declaration for additional discovery].)

Generally, the party seeking a protective order bears the burden to show good cause for the order sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 (Fairmont); see also People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 128 (Williams) [noting generally that “the party that has the burden of raising an issue also has the burden of proof with respect to that issue”].) However, under circumstances where more than 35 admissions which do not relate to the genuineness of documents are requested from a responding party and that party “seeks a protective order on the ground that the number of requests for admission is unwarranted, the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of requests for admission.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040, subd. (b); see also Williams, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 128 [the “usual correlation” of burdens when an issue is raised in a motion “does not represent an immutable rule”].)

In the notice of the present motion, Chase expressly asserts that the Set Two RFA brings the total of Metcalf’s admission requests served in this matter to 220 requests. (Notice at p. 2, ¶¶ 1 & 2 [also addressing the Set Two FI] & p. 3, ¶ 3.) Chase seeks a protective order “limiting the scope” of the Set Two Requests on the grounds that the Set Two RFA are excessive and unnecessary in amount, among other things. (Id. at p. 2, ll. 6-9 & 21-27; p. 3, ll. 1-6.) In addition, in the supporting memorandum, Chase challenges the representations made in the Mullen declaration for additional discovery attached to the Set Two RFA and further described above. (Memorandum at pp. 4-9 [addressing statements and contentions made in Mullen declaration for additional discovery which Chase contends are insufficient to justify the number of admission requests].)

Considering the governing code provisions discussed above regarding the limit on admissions that may be requested by a party and the permissible grounds for a protective order with respect to admission requests which exceed or exhaust the statutory limits, both the notice and the supporting memorandum specifically and sufficiently apprise both the Court and Metcalf that Chase seeks a protective order on the grounds that, contrary to the representations made in the Mullen declaration for additional discovery attached to the Set Two RFA, the number of admission requests which exceed the limit set out in section 2033.030 are not warranted. (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125 [discussion of notice requirements and stating that any “omission in the notice may be overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief sought”].) Therefore, for all reasons further discussed above, Metcalf bears the burden to justify the number of admission requests contained within the Set Two RFA to the extent they exhaust the limit set forth in section 2033.030, as well as to justify the corresponding Set Two FI.

Though Metcalf bears the initial burden to justify the number of admission requests which exhaust statutory limits, Chase may not, in a blanket manner, unilaterally refuse to answer all admission requests including those which do not exceed statutory limits. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.030, subd. (b); 2033.040, subd. (a).) Rather, to the extent Chase seeks a protective order with respect to any admission requests which do not exhaust the limit set forth in section 2033.030, or the corresponding Set Two FI, Chase bears the burden to show good cause for all reasons further discussed above. (Fairmont, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 255.) In addition, and to the extent Metcalf meets his initial burden with respect to any Set Two RFA which exceed statutory limits, the burden shifts to Chase to show good cause for the protective order sought.

Set Two RFA Nos. 31 through 35:

As further discussed above, the Set Two RFA include 220 admission requests which on their face exceed, by a significant number, the 35 request limit set forth in subdivision (a) of section 2033.030. The undisputed evidence and information indicates that, before service of the Set Two RFA, Metcalf served and Chase responded to a prior set of admission requests which available evidence and information indicates included 30 requests. (See, e.g., Duffy Decl., Exh. A [Set Two RFA beginning with no. 31 & Mullen Additional Discovery Decl., ¶¶ 2-4 referencing an additional 190 admission requests]; Exh. C at PDF p. 71 [Apr. 22. 2024, letter referencing prior requests for admission served by Mullen].) Accordingly, the undisputed information and evidence shows that the prior set of admission requests served on Chase by Metcalf did not exhaust the 35 request limit stated in section 2033.030, and that the Set Two RFA includes the balance of 5 requests allowable under section 2033.030, subdivision (a). (Duffy Decl., Exh. A at PDF p. 35 [Set Two RFA nos. 31-35].) Accordingly, for all reasons further discussed above, Chase bears the burden to show good cause for a protective order with respect to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35, and the corresponding Set Two FI.

“The concept of good cause should not be enshrined in legal formalism; it calls for a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for the sought order. The good cause may be equated to a good reason for a party’s failure to perform that specific requirement from which he seeks to be excused.” (Waters v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 885, 893.) At a minimum, a party seeking a protective order must make a factual showing which is sufficiently specific to establish good cause. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318 (Nativi).) Declarations which are conclusory or factually unsubstantiated do not suffice. (Ibid.) In addition, “[t]he need for, and nature of, such a protective order will, of course, depend on the circumstances of the individual case.” (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110-1111.) For these reasons, to meet her burden to demonstrate good cause for a protective order as to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35, Chase must make a sufficient factual showing with reasoned argument demonstrating good cause.

Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35 request that Chase admit that she and Metcalf “discussed purchasing a home together in Santa Barbara, California”, that she and Metcalf “agreed that the purpose of the home was to provide a long-term family residence suitable for their child”, that Metcalf informed Chase that “he would not purchase a property unless it was an appropriate family home that was suitable and safe for their child, that Metcalf informed Chase that “he would not purchase a property unless [Chase] agreed it was an appropriate family home that was suitable and safe for their child”, and that Chase and Metcalf “discussed that purchasing and owning a home would require significant financial commitments.” (Duffy Decl., Exh. A at PDF p. 35.)

The Court notes that, in the Chase cross-complaint, Chase alleges that she “cared most about finding a property that would be good for raising her young daughter” and that there existed a general intention “to share equally the costs of keeping a home and raising a child together.” (Chase Cross-Compl., ¶¶ 8 & 18.) Therefore, on their face, Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35 appear to address and relate to the allegations made and issues raised by Chase in this action. Further, Chase does not appear to contend that matters stated or addressed in Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35 have no relevance to issues presented in this action.

Apart from asserting in a general and conclusory manner that the matters at issue in this action are not factually or legally complex and do not involve a voluminous number of transactions between Chase and Metcalf, among other things, Chase fails to offer any facts of evidentiary value sufficient to permit the Court to determine whether there exists good cause for a protective order with respect to the admissions requested in Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35. (See Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819-820 [facts offered in a motion for a protective order must have evidentiary value]. By way of example, the supporting memorandum addresses the first set of admission requests served by Metcalf and certain specific requests appearing in the Set Two RFA, including nos. 32 through 46, 51, 52, 55 through 68, 75 through 111, 117 through 145, and 150 through 191. (Memorandum at pp. 7 & 9-11.) However, absent from the memorandum and the Duffy declaration submitted in support of the memorandum is any specific reference to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35, or any reasoned argument showing good cause for a protective order with respect to these requests. In addition, the broad and unsubstantiated conclusions and general allegations of harm asserted in the memorandum are insufficient to show good cause. (Nativi, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 318.)

To the extent Chase contends that answering Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35 would impose an undue burden, “some burden is inherent in all demands for discovery.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418.) To establish an undue burden, Chase must offer “evidence showing the quantum of work required” or show either “either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (Id. at p. 417.) Chase “has an obligation to supply the basis for this determination.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 549.)

Chase offers no information or evidence sufficient to show the quantum of work required to answer Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35. Chase also fails to demonstrate how any burden in responding to these requests would outweigh any benefit sought by Metcalf. Also wholly absent from the moving papers is any factual information or other evidence demonstrating how or why Chase would suffer any annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression should Chase be required to answer Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35.

For all reasons discussed above, Chase has failed to establish, with sufficient factual specificity, good cause or reasonable grounds for the protective order sought with respect to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35. Therefore, the Court will deny the motion as to these requests.

Set Two RFA Nos. 36 through 220:

Chase objects to the balance of the Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220 as excessive and unnecessary in amount, among other things. The Court’s calculations demonstrate that the Set Two RFA exceed statutory limits by 185 requests (220 requests – 35 allowable requests = 185 requests at issue). This number is not insignificant.

As further discussed above, subject to exceptions which do not apply here, a party may not request that any other party admit more than 35 matters. In addition, if an initial set of admission requests does not exhaust the statutory limit, “the balance may be requested in subsequent sets.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.030, subd. (a).) However, “[s]ubject to the right of the responding party to seek a protective order under Section 2033.080, any party who attaches a supporting declaration as described in Section 2033.050 may request a greater number of admissions by another party if the greater number is warranted by the complexity or the quantity of the existing and potential issues in the particular case.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040.)

In the Mullen declaration for additional discovery attached to the Set Two RFA and further described above, Mullen declares that the Set Two RFA are “warranted under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.040 because of the complexity and quantity of existing potential issues related to the [c]omplaint and two [c]ross-[c]omplaints, including the number of causes of action at issue, of which there are 17 total; the parties’ differing explanations as to the alleged and other agreements and transactions, and the number and nature of those agreements and transactions; the number and nature of periodic and monthly payments and non-payments at issue, giving rise to a large number of requests; and the overall factual background of the case.” (Duffy Decl., Exh. A at PDF p. 57, ¶ 7.) The Mullen declaration for additional discovery is substantially in the form set out in section 2033.050.

The present motion with respect to Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220 is made on the grounds that, contrary to the representations made in the Mullen declaration for additional discovery, the number of admissions requested by Metcalf is unwarranted. Though Metcalf contends that Chase bears the burden to show good cause for Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220, it is Metcalf who, for all reasons further discussed above, bears the burden to justify the number of requests for admission to the extent they exceed the limit set out in subdivision (a) of section 2033.030.

Ostensibly resulting from a conflating by Metcalf of the parties’ respective burdens, Metcalf fails to offer reasoned argument sufficiently calibrated to the admission requests which substantially exceed statutory limits, and fails to tailor his arguments in a manner sufficient to justify Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220.

Notwithstanding that Metcalf does not offer reasoned argument sufficiently tailored to justify the excessive number of Set Two RFA, the express language of section 2033.050, which sets forth the required form and content of the declaration which must be attached to each request for more than 35 admissions, shows that additional admission requests may be warranted in actions where the “complexity or the quantity of the issues” warrant the additional requests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.050; see also Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [“[t]o determine legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent”].) The declaration required under section 2033.050 must effectively include reasons why each factor relied on by the propounding party applies to the number of admission requests. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.050.)

In an effort to demonstrate why the complexity or quantity of issues in this action warrant an additional 185 admission requests, Metcalf asserts that the three active pleadings in this action show that the parties seek or assert partition claims, allocations of costs arising out of unspecified agreements and transactions regarding the acquisition and maintenance of the property and Metcalf’s payments toward property expenses, in addition to the claims made by Chase in the Chase cross-complaint. In the Mullen declaration submitted in support of Metcalf’s opposition to the present motion, Mullen contends that Chase has introduced crossclaims which arise from agreements and transactions unrelated to property expenses or a partition of the property, and that these agreements and transaction relate instead to costs arising from childcare and parental leave, life insurance policies, vehicles, separate debts, routine living expenses, and personal property. (Mullen Opp. Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.) Mullen further contends that, because Chase has introduced claims which are not related to the property or partition issues, the number and nature of the allegations and respective claims made by the parties in this action support extensive discovery. (Id. at ¶ 7 [also identifying a “list” of allegations and claims for damages asserted by Chase].)

Though there exists no requirement that the present action be designated as complex litigation before Metcalf may serve admission requests which exhaust the statutory limit, a consideration of the general factors which indicate that an action is complex is useful for present purposes. (See, Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400.) Relevant here, these factors include whether the action is likely to involve difficult or novel legal issues or a large number of witnesses. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(b)(1) & (2).) For all reasons discussed below, the available information and evidence offered by Metcalf tends to show that the respective claims asserted by the parties do not raise complex issues of fact or law as Metcalf contends.

The Court has reviewed the pleadings filed by the parties in this matter. There are no allegations or claims raised in the pleadings which on their face implicate novel or difficult legal issues. In addition, the claims asserted by Chase and described in the Mullen declaration do not implicate complex issues of fact or law. (See, e.g., Mullen Decl., ¶ 7(a)-(m).)

Metcalf also offers examples of the manner in which the Set Two RFA are grouped into categories which reflect what Metcalf contends are the “necessary topics” in this litigation. (Mullen Opp. Decl., ¶¶ 11-14.) Metcalf further asserts that the Set Two RFA are intended to address the amounts spent by the parties on the property, the discussions and agreements between the parties, and Chase’s claims of ouster and offsets. (Ibid.)

The Court has reviewed the Set Two RFA described in paragraphs 12 through 14 of the opposing Mullen declaration. Based on the Court’s review of these admission requests, there appears to exist some amount of redundancy and overlap of matters and issues for which Metcalf requests admissions. Put another way, the number of admission requests which exceed statutory limits appears to arise not from a vast or large quantity of issues in this lawsuit, but from the fact that multiple requests appear to address the same or similar issues. There is no reason apparent to the Court why admissions regarding these singular issues could not be obtained in fewer requests.

For example, Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 34 seek admissions regarding the content of Metcalf and Chase’s discussions regarding the purchase of a home that would serve as an appropriate residence for their child. (Mullen Opp. Decl., Exh. 1 at p. 1.) Set Two RFA nos. 35 through 41, 44, and 45 seek admissions relating to discussions between the parties regarding financial commitments required in purchasing a home and the parties’ equal sharing or paying of half of the costs to purchase and own a home together. (Id. at Exh. 1 at pp. 1-5.) These admission requests relate to the same or similar issues which are not, on their face, complex.

Set Two RFA nos. 59 through 62 request admissions relating to a mortgage loan and related expenses for the property including whether Chase agreed with or represented to Metcalf that Chase would pay half the monthly mortgage payments for the property. (Mullen Opp. Decl., Exh. 1 at p. 7.) These requests seek admissions which implicate the same or similar issue (namely, the financial commitments or expenses involved in owning a home and the parties’ agreements or discussions regarding this issue) which is also addressed in other requests further discussed above. Further, Metcalf requests admissions regarding this same issue or similar issues in Set Two RFA nos. 64, 65, and 155 through 166, which each relate to the payment of taxes for the property. (Id. at pp. 8 & 17-18.)

By way of further example, Set Two RFA nos. 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, and 107 requests admissions regarding whether Chase paid any portion of the mortgage payments due for the property from April 2021 through December 2021. (Mullen Opp. Decl., Exh. A at pp. 11-12.) Set Two RFA no. 111 requests an admission from Chase regarding the same or similar issue with respect to whether Chase paid half of the mortgage payments that were due for the property. (Id. at p. 13.) RFA nos. 86, 87, and 88 also request admissions regarding whether Chase was a co-borrower of and obligated to pay the mortgage debt that financed the purchase of the property, which also implicates the same or similar issues further discussed above. (Id. at p. 10.)

Additional examples of multiple, and in some instances redundant and overlapping, requests seeking admissions regarding the same or similar issues appear throughout the Set Two RFA. (See, e.g., Mullen Opp. Decl., Exh. A at p. 16 [Set Two RFA nos. 141-144 seeking admissions relating to the filing of the complaint and related documents] & p. 17 [Set Two RFA nos. 148-154 seeking admissions relating to the issue of the appointment of a partition referee & nos. 155-156 seeking admissions regarding the issue of whether each party owed or was obligated to pay property taxes].)

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. The information and evidence offered by Metcalf fails to establish the existence of a sufficient quantity or complexity of issues in this action that would warrant the service of admissions requests which significantly exceed the limit set out in section 2033.030, subdivision (a). Furthermore, Metcalf’s conclusory assertion that there exists hundreds of individual transactions, agreements, representations, and communications between the parties is, without more, insufficient to meet the burden to justify the number of Set Two RFA. In addition, information offered by Chase appears to indicate that Metcalf previously requested admissions with respect to some of the issues and matters for which Metcalf requests admissions in the Set Two RFA. Metcalf fails to offer sufficient information to enable the Court to determine whether or not any prior requests did or did not seek admissions with respect to any of the actual or potential issues or matters to which Metcalf requests admissions in the Set Two RFA.

For all reasons further discussed above, Metcalf has failed to meet his burden to justify the excessive number of Set Two RFA based on any complexity or quantity of issues in this action. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion of Chase, in part, as to Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220.

Set Two FI:

The same analysis and reasoning applies with respect to the Set Two FI which, as further described above, consists of a single interrogatory that corresponds to and is dependent on the content of Chase’s response to each of the Set Two RFA. For all reasons discussed above, the Court will deny the motion with respect to the Set Two FI as it relates to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35. The Court will grant the motion, in part, with respect to the Set Two FI as it relates to Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220.

Efforts to informally resolve the issues presented:

Metcalf contends that Chase failed to meaningfully meet and confer prior to seeking a protective order. The Court has reviewed the record of correspondence offered by the parties with respect to the present discovery dispute. The record demonstrates that Chase initiated efforts to informally resolve the purported issues with the Set Two Requests at issue in the present motion. (Duffy Decl., Exhs. C-L; Mullen Opp. Decl., Exhs. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, through 17.) Available information further demonstrates that Metcalf unequivocally stated that he would not withdraw the Set Two Requests. (Mullen Opp. Decl., Exh. 8, PDF p. 132; Exh. 16.) Accordingly, available information demonstrates that the parties reached an impasse such that additional efforts by Chase to informally resolve the issues were unlikely to bear fruit. (See Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1293-1294.) For these reasons, the Court finds that the efforts made by Chase to informally resolve the issues presented in the motion are sufficient.

Sanctions:

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order under [section 2033.080], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.080, subd. (d); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (d) [same re interrogatories].)

The Set Two RFA include admission requests which exceed express statutory limits by 185 requests. Though the number of admission requests served by Metcalf is excessive and unwarranted due to any complexity or quantity of issues in this action, Metcalf persisted in demanding that Chase answer the requests necessitating the filing of the present motion. In addition, Metcalf failed to concede that, by its express provisions, section 2033.040, subdivision (b), places the burden squarely on Metcalf to justify the excessive number of requests for admission which Metcalf wholly failed to meet for all reasons further discussed above. For these reasons, the Court finds that Metcalf acted without substantial justification with respect to Set Two RFA nos. 36 through 220, and the corresponding Set Two FI. Therefore, an award of sanctions in favor of Chase is justified.

Though the imposition of sanctions is warranted for all reasons further discussed above, the notice of the motion fails to “identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought ….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.) Therefore, the Court will deny the request of Chase for monetary sanctions on procedural grounds.

Metcalf also requests an award of sanctions based in part on what Metcalf contends is a failure by Chase to meaningfully meet and confer prior to seeking the Court’s intervention. For all reasons discussed above, Metcalf’s request for an award of sanctions on this ground is without merit. Moreover, though the Court will deny the motion in part as to Set Two RFA nos. 31 through 35, Metcalf fails to provide any information tethering any fees he incurred in connection with opposing the motion as to these requests. Therefore, the Court declines to impose sanctions against Chase as requested by Metcalf.