Gina Grossi vs Cottage Health et al
Gina Grossi vs Cottage Health et al
Case Number
20CV04042
Case Type
Hearing Date / Time
Fri, 01/19/2024 - 10:00
Nature of Proceedings
Motion for Summary Judgment
Tentative Ruling
For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment is denied; and the motion for summary adjudication is denied as to all causes of action.
BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff Gina Grossi, a pediatric surgery physician’s assistant (PA) who had worked for Defendant Cottage Health in that position for ten years, asserts that Cottage retaliated against her by eliminating her position after she repeatedly complained to management that Cottage’s new Chief of Pediatrics, Dr. Kanard, was placing patients’ safety at risk, and was deviating from the standard of care. Although Plaintiff was offered a position as a PA in robotics surgery, with the same pay and benefits, she asserts that this transfer was a demotion and an adverse employment action, and that it ruined her career and opportunities for advancement, because it deprived her of the ability to use her clinical and surgical skillset in pediatric surgery which she had trained for and developed for ten years; and that she has now lost those skills. She further asserts that she was constructively terminated by the elimination of her position and other intolerable work conditions which caused her to resign.
Plaintiff asserts causes of action for violation of Health & Safety Code section 1278.5 (1st c/a); wrongful termination or constructive discharge against public policy (2d c/a); retaliation against public policy (3rd c/a); retaliation in violation of Labor Code Section 1102 (4th c/a); and unfair competition/violation of Bus. & Prof. Code Section 17200.
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s position was eliminated not because she complained about Dr. Kanard, who was never aware of her complaints, but because Dr. Kanard did not use a PA, as he stated in his interview; he was dedicated to teaching and wanted to implement a residency program that would train residents in pediatric surgery; and therefore Herb Geary, Cottage’s Chief Nursing Officer, determined there was no longer a need to fund a PA position in pediatric surgery; that Plaintiff’s transfer to robotics surgery was not a demotion, and gave her an opportunity to learn cutting edge technology; and that she resigned following a pregnancy leave in order to take a new job at Stanford that paid more.
Defendant moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication as to each of Plaintiff’s causes of action, on the following bases:
As to Plaintiff’s Retaliation causes of action (1st, 3rd and 4th c/as):
- That Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Health and Safety Code section 1278.5, Labor Code section 1102.5, and for retaliation against public policy fail as a matter of law because eliminating the pediatric-surgery position and offering Grossi a position in robotic surgery did not constitute an adverse-employment action;
- That Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Health and Safety Code section
1278.5, Labor Code section 1102.5, and for retaliation against public policy fail as a matter of law because there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s complaint against Dr. Kanard caused the elimination of her position.
- That Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 fails as a matter of law because her alleged complaints about Dr. Kanard did not disclose reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity, and therefore do not constitute protected activities.
As to Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy (2d/c/a)
- That the claim fails as a matter of law, because Cottage did not terminate her; she quit.
- That the claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s working conditions were not objectively intolerable or aggravated to support a claim for constructive termination.
- That the claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s resignation from Cottage did not violate any public policies.
As to Plaintiff’s cause of action for unfair competition (5th c/a)
- Plaintiff’s unfair competition claim under Business and Professions Code
8 sections 17200 et seq. fails as a matter of law because this claim is derivative of her retaliation claims, and she cannot prove that Cottage retaliated against her.
Evidence presented
Both Defendant and Plaintiff have submitted Separate Statements consisting of hundreds of “material facts”. Many of these are not material, and will not be addressed. The supporting evidence for facts which are undisputed will not be cited in the following summary of the evidence; however the court will address the objections to the supporting evidence for those undisputed facts which are pertinent to its disposition.
Unless noted, the following facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff’s background at Cottage
Plaintiff began working for Cottage in 2009 as a pediatric surgery PA, and in the course of her employment worked with numerous pediatric surgeons who supervised her work. (UMF 2) Plaintiff’s skills as a pediatric surgery PA were highly regarded by several of her supervising physicians, including Dr. Kanard (PUMF 86, 87). Plaintiff’s manager was Elizabeth Lundquist, who reported to Herb Geary, Chief Nursing Operator. (UMF 8, 9)
Dr. Kanard’s hiring
In early 2017 Dr. Kanard interviewed for the position of Cottage’s medical director. (UMF 6) Plaintiff and her supervisor Elizabeth Lundquist, participated in his interview, at which time he told Plaintiff that he had never worked with a PA before, but had worked with nurse practitioners; and that he preferred working with residents over nurse practitioners. (UMFs 7, 8, 9, 10, Comp. Ex. B, Keith Dec. ¶ 4, Appendix Ex. 14, Grossi Deposition Volume 1, 128:2-129:12, 130:20-131:2,140:1-9, 130:20-131:2).
Outside of his interview with Plaintiff Dr. Kanard told several other Cottage personnel he preferred working with residents and did not want to work with a physician’s assistant. (UMF 11, Comp. Ex. B, Keith Dec. ¶ 8, Appendix Ex. 18, Geary Deposition, 72:24-75:9; Comp. Ex. B, Keith Dec. ¶ 4, Appendix Ex. 14, Grossi Deposition Volume 1, 140:13-141:1; Comp. Ex. B, Keith Dec. ¶ 6, Appendix Ex. 16, Wroblewski Deposition, 79:14-80:2). Plaintiff attempts to dispute UMF 11 with a narrative, but provides no controverting evidence; therefore UMF 11 remains undisputed.
Dr. Kanard contracted to work for Cottage in June 2017, and began doing surgeries in December 2017 or January 2018. (UMF 13, Schultz Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 6
(Deposition Transcript of Dr. Robert Kanard 14 at 89:9-90:25)
Plaintiff’s work with Dr. Kanard
Following Dr. Kanard’s interview it was initially decided that Plaintiff would work with him in the same capacity in the operating room as she had with her previous supervising physicians, Drs. Keshar and Stolar; and Dr, Kanard agreed. (UMF 16 Schultz Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. 3 (Deposition 26 Transcript of Herb Geary at 259:7-261:15, Ex. 10).
Plaintiff’s first surgery with Dr. Kanard was on March 13, 2018.(UMF 26) Between March 25 and April 23, 2018 she assisted Dr. Kanard with five additional surgeries (PUMF 45); she assisted him in a surgery on June 8, 2019 (PUMF 58); and between June 15 and July 6, 2018 she assisted him with four additional surgeries (PUMF 61). On June 3, 2019 Plaintiff worked on four surgeries with Dr. Kanard (PUMF 69].
Plaintiff’s complaints regarding Dr. Kanard, and Dr. Kanard’s and Cottage’s response
Plaintiff confronted Dr. Kanard in the operating room after their first surgery together on March 13, 2018 went poorly, with concerns about his poor judgment and technical skills. (PUMF 43). Plaintiff relies on her declaration in support of her claim that she did so. Defendant disputes this fact, but provides no controverting evidence. Defendant’s objection to this evidence (Objection #7) on the basis of relevance is overruled. Therefore UMF 43 remains undisputed.
Plaintiff asserts that the next day, March 14, 2018, Dr. Kanard excluded Plaintiff from his rounds, based on the testimony of Dr. Kanard (PUMF 44, Schultz Decl., ¶ 7 Ex. 6 (Deposition Transcript of Dr. Robert Kanard at 244:20-246:12). Defendant objects to this evidence (Objection 86) on the basis of relevance, lack of foundation and speculation, and disputes Plaintiff’s use of the term “excluded” with Dr. Kanard’s testimony in which he states that he started his rounds that day earlier than normal, but did not inform Plaintiff of this. Defendant’s objections are overruled. The court finds the evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Dr. Kanard excluded Plaintiff from rounds on March 14, 2018.
Plaintiff complained to her supervisor, Lundquist, in March and April 2018 regarding concerns about Dr. Kanard’s deviations from the standard of care and patient safety. (PUMF 47). Plaintiff relies on her declaration in support of her claim that she did so. Defendant disputes this fact, but provides no controverting evidence. Defendant’s objections to this evidence (Objections #8, 11, 18, 70 and 71) on the basis of relevance, lack of foundation and impermissible opinion testimony are overruled. Therefore PUMF 43 remains undisputed.
On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff, Lundquist and Geary met with Chief Medical Office Wroblewski to discuss Grossi’s concerns regarding Dr. Kanard, including potential deviations from the standard of care, poor judgment, poor ethics, failure to obtain informed consent, and concerns about the safety of patients. (PUMF 48). Plaintiff asserts that Geary suggested at that meeting that Dr. Kanard was doing “illegal surgeries” (PUMF 50, Schultz Decl., ¶ 4 Ex. 3 (Deposition Transcript of Herb Geary at 98:12-99:25) Defendant disputes this by presenting Geary’s testimony in which he states that in reporting unnecessary appendectomies Plaintiff was reporting “illegal surgeries”. Defendants’ objection to this testimony on the basis of impermissible opinion testimony (Objection 84) is overruled. The court finds that this evidence creates a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff reported illegal activity.
After this May 17 meeting, the frequency of Plaintiffs’ surgeries with Dr. Kanard diminished (PUMF 56). Plaintiff asserts that he began taking more measures to exclude her (changing the time and location of rounds without telling Plaintiff); communicated poorly with her, and ignored and humiliated her (PUMF 53-57). Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s testimony offered in support of these PUMFs on the basis of relevance, lack of foundation, and speculation (Objections 37, 39, 42, 44,143). These objections are overruled.
In July 2018 Plaintiff met again with Wroblewski and made additional complaints about Dr. Kanard’s failure to improve, including deviations from the standard of care. (PUMF 63)
On June 3, 2019, after working with Dr. Kanard on four surgeries, Plaintiff complained to Lundquist about Dr. Kanard with respect to patient safety issues and what she perceived as Dr. Kanard’s illegal deviations from the standard of care in performing those surgeries. (PUMF 70, Schultz Decl.19, ¶ 2 Ex. 1 (Deposition Transcript of Plaintiff Gina Grossi at 228:7- 232:3, Ex. 19.; 368:8-
371:5; 569:7-18; 305:12-21; 331:25-332:19); Schultz Decl., ¶ 8 Ex. 7 (Deposition Transcript of Liz Lundquist 111:6-21). Defendant objects to the testimony of Plaintiff and Lundquist offered in support of this UMF evidence on the basis of relevance, lack of foundation, and hearsay (Objections 25, 35, 45, 64, 66,145). These objections are overruled.
On June 5, 2019 Dr. Kanard asked to meet with Geary about Plaintiff, and on June 6, 2019 they met (PUMF 73, 74).
On June 7, 2019, Geary emailed Cara Williams in HR regarding eliminating Plaintiff’s pediatric surgery position, claiming than an impending change in resident coverage was the reason. [PUMF 76, Schultz Decl., ¶ 4 Ex. 3 (Deposition Transcript of Herb Geary at 339:9-340:7); Ex. 20, Schultz Decl., ¶ 15 Ex. 14 (Deposition Transcript of Cara Williams at 100:3-104:20, Ex. 4)] Defendant disputes this fact, but does not present any controverting evidence. Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’ evidence in support of the fact, based on lack of foundation and hearsay, (Objection 193) is overruled. Therefore, PUMF 76 remains undisputed.
On June 26, 2019, Cottage changed its residency program for pediatric surgery to provide one dedicated general surgery resident to assist with pediatric surgeries instead of a team of general residents. (PUMF 77), Defendant does not dispute this fact, and its objections to the evidence in support of this fact (Objections 138, 154) based on relevance, lack of foundation, hearsay and best evidence rule, are overruled.
The residents assigned to pediatric surgery under this program were first year/junior residents. Drs. Keshen, Stolar and Lee objected to this new program.
Dr. Stolar believes Plaintiff’s pediatric surgery skills are that of a third or fourth year resident; and Dr. Kanard testified that her skills were above that of all the residents and on par with a junior resident (PUMF 85, 86, 87). Defendant does not dispute these facts, and its objections to the evidence in support of these facts based on relevance and lack of foundation (Objections 129, 130, 174) are overruled.
Dr. Gauvin, Dr. Barkley, and Dr. Wroblewski collectively decided that the pediatric surgeons at Cottage would be supported with residents only and not a pediatric surgery physician’s assistant (PUMF 88). Drs. Gauvin, Barkley and Wroblewski talked to Dr. Kanard about this program shift to use residents instead of Plaintiff (UMF 98). Drs. Stolar and Lee, who had continued to use Plaintiff in their pediatric surgeries wrote letters to Geary to try to prevent the elimination of her position (PUMF 94, 95); but Dr. Kanard told Geary that he thought that this would make it less difficult on rounds and int the OR (PUMF 96). Defendants does not dispute these facts, and their objections to the evidence in support of these facts, based on relevance, lack of foundation, and hearsay are overruled.
In response to Geary’s request for a timeline of Plaintiff’s employment with Cottage, her supervisor, Lundquist, wrote that Plaintiff had 10 years of experience, had been very helpful on the pediatric surgical ward; that she had gone to Wroblewski “2x to express concerns about Kanard”; and that “this could be perceived as punishment for the perceived whistleblower”. (PUMF 103, 104). Defendant does not dispute these facts, and their objections to Plaintiff’s supporting evidence based on lack of foundation (Objection 109, 149) are overruled.
Grossi told her supervisors multiple times that she had concerns that she would be retaliated against for her complaints about Dr. Kanard. (PUMF 113 ). No one told HR of her concerns about retaliation (PUMF 114). This was a violation of Cottage’s retaliation policy. (PUMF 16). Defendant does not dispute PUMFs 113, 114. Defendant disputes PUMF 16, but does not present any controverting evidence. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s evidence un support of these PUMFs based on relevance, lack of foundation, hearsay (Objections 31,56,89,151,173, 192, 212) are overruled.
COO Fellows and CEO Weft were involved with and approved the elimination of Plaintiff’s position. (PUMF 127, 128).
The elimination of Plaintiff’s position and offer to transfer
On August 2, 2019, Geary and Lundquist met with Grossi to inform her that her pediatric surgery position was being eliminated. (PUMF 138) Defendant’s objection to Plaintiff’s supporting evidence on the basis of this relevance, hearsay and lack of foundation (Objection 48) is overruled. Plaintiff believed that she was being terminated, and began looking for other work (PUMF 174). Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s supporting evidence (Objections 47, 48, 52) are overruled.
On August 28, 2019, Cottage presented Plaintiff with an options letter listing three options: severance, a night position, and a robotics PA position. (PUMF 149). The robotics position was full time and offered the same salary and benefits (UMF 70) Cottage gave Plaintiff a month to decide (UMF 71). On September 20, 2019, Plaintiff accepted the robotic PA position (UMF 72) Plaintiff felt she had to take the robotics PA position because she had to support her family, she was pregnant and needed benefits, and she had mortgage assistance through Cottage that would stop if she left. (PUMF 167).
The robotics position was not open when this offer was made, the job description was not finalized until October 17, 2019., and medical staff did not approve her credential and privileges until February 2020, six months after her previous position was eliminated. (PUMF 168).
Plaintiff applied for a position at Stanford, and Stanford offered a job on October 21, 2019 which $204,028, which was more than her salary at Cottage, which was $170,000. (UMF 75, 76) After she received the offer letter, Plaintiff informed Stanford that she was pregnant, and they agreed to hold her position until after her maternity leave at Cottage. (UMF 77).
Medical staff approved Plaintiff’s credential and privileges for robotics in February 2020, six months after her previous position was eliminated. (UMF 79, PUMF 168). On July 31, 2020, Stanford memorialized her new position and set her start date as October 12. (UMF 85)
Maternity leave, resignation, employment with Stanford
Plaintiff went on maternity leave in April 2020. (UMF 84).
On October 7 she notified her then-manager, Marc Dailey, of her intent to resign on October 11. (UMF 87) In her resignation letter, she stated that she “greatly appreciate[d] the support [he] gave” her as she “attempted to transition to the robotics position.” but that she felt the position did not utilize her training and experience in pediatric surgery. (UMF 88)
The Stanford position requires Plaintiff to travel extensively, spend significant time away from her family, and has caused her significant emotional distress. (PUMF 193, 194).
Cottage’s justification for the elimination of Plaintiff’s pediatric surgery PA position
Plaintiff disputes Cottage’s claim that her position was eliminated because Dr. Kanard was “committed to teaching residents” (Def. UMF 12) with evidence that multiple residents reported negative experiences working with Dr Kanard including complaints about his judgment and failure to provide an environment for them to learn: that due to the residents’ poor experiences working with Dr. Kanard, Dr. Gauvin “felt it best to remove Dr. Kanard from the teaching faculty.” Dr. Gauvin therefore gave Dr. Kanard an ultimatum, which was that he must either resign from teaching residents or be forced to take a leave of absence from teaching the residents. Dr. Kanard therefore resigned from teaching residents and did not work with residents for a period of approximately a year until new residents began on the service who agreed to work with him again. ( Schultz Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 5 (Deposition Transcript of Dr. Edmund Wroblewski at 23 165:11-171:24; 178:5-194:5, Ex. 20) ; Schultz Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 6 (Deposition Transcript of Dr. Robert Kanard at 94:7-95:4; 192 :21-201:16; 204:13-205:6; 208:3-26 211:12, Ex. 22).
Intolerable working conditions
Plaintiff felt that the work environment created for her was “hostile” and “untenable”; and did not feel supported in the transition to robotics. (PUMF 165, 166). She felt ostracized after being told not to associate with people in pediatric surgery. (PUMF 176-178)
When Geary discussed Plaintiff’s options with her (severance, a night position, or a robotics PA position) he told her she would not like any of them. (PUMF 150)
The robotic surgery position was not similar to Plaintiff’s pediatric surgery position, namely because it essentially took away all of Grossi’s clinical responsibilities and did not allow her to use any of her clinical, surgical or medical skillset. It did not allow Plaintiff “to make rounds on patients, or talk to patients, pre-or post-op. (PUMF 161, 162] Defendant attempts to dispute this fact, but does not present any controverting evidence. Defendant’s objections to Plaintiff’s supporting evidence (Objections 47, 48, 55, 176) based on relevance, hearsay, lack of foundation, are overruled.
ANALYSIS:
Violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5 (1st c/a)
A plaintiff establishes a cause of action for violation of Health & Safety Code Section 1278.5 by showing that she (1) presented a grievance, complaint or report to the hospital or medical staff (2) regarding the quality of patient care and (3) the hospital retaliated or discriminated against her for doing so. Alborzi v Univ. of S. California (2020) 55 Cal App. 155, 178-79.
While Defendants contend that Plaintiff only complained about Dr. Kanard one time, on May 17, 2018, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that she did so on multiple occasions, with her final complaint taking place on June 3, 2019 (PUMF 47, 48, 50, 63, 70). Plaintiff’s complaints about Dr. Kanard concerned the quality of patient care, including patient safety and deviations from the standard of care (PUMFs 43,47,48,70,63).
There is sufficient evidence presented to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Dr. Kanard retaliated against Plaintiff after she made her complaints to him and others, by reducing the frequency of Plaintiffs’ surgeries with him; changing the time and location of rounds without telling Plaintiff so that she could not attend; communicating poorly with her; and ignoring and humiliating her (PUMF 56, 55-57). (PUMFs 44,56, 53, 55-57, 76, 103, 104)
There is also sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Cottage’s elimination of her pediatric surgery position was in retaliation for her complaints, and as to Cottage’s justification for the elimination of her position. (PUMF 73, 74,76,85, 88, 94, 95; Schultz Decl., ¶ 6, Ex. 5 (Deposition Transcript of Dr. Edmund Wroblewski at 23 165:11-171:24; 178:5-194:5, Ex. 20) ; Schultz Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. 6 (Deposition Transcript of Dr. Robert Kanard at 94:7-95:4; 192 :21-201:16; 204:13-205:6; 208:3-26 211:12, Ex. 22).
In addition, there is a rebuttable presumption that a discriminatory action by a health facility was taken in retaliation against an employee when responsible staff had knowledge of the employee’s complaint, and the discriminatory action takes place within 120 days of the employee’s complaint. Section 1278.5(d)(1). This section applies here, as Plaintiff’s final complaint was made on June 3, 2019, and her position was eliminated on August 2, 2019 (PUMF 70, 138)
The motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5 is therefore denied.
Wrongful termination (2d c/a)
Defendant asserts that this claim fails, because Plaintiff was not terminated; her working conditions were not so intolerable or aggravated as to give rise to a claim of constructive termination; and Plaintiff cannot show a violation of public policy, because she has not demonstrated retaliation.
Constructive discharge is established when a reasonable person faced with intolerable employer actions or conditions would have no reasonable alternative except to quit. Turner v Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1248. This is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury, unless there are undisputed facts showing that the decision to resign was unreasonable as a matter of law. Scotch v Art Institute of California (2016) 173 Cal. App. 4th 986. Plaintiff has presented evidence which creates a triable issue of fact as to whether a reasonable person in Plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign: her treatment by Dr. Kanard (failing to communicate with her as to the location and time of rounds, refusing to work with her, humiliating her, reducing her pediatric surgeries); the elimination of her position, which caused her to believe she had been terminated; the confusion and delay in providing her a new position; assigning her a position that did not use the skills she had developed over ten years.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to retaliation.
The motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s second cause of action for violation of Health and Safety Code Section 1278.5 is therefore denied.
Retaliation against Public Policy (3rd c/a)
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate this claim, because there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s complaint against Dr. Kanard caused the elimination of her position. They argue that Dr. Kanard had no knowledge that Plaintiff had made complaints about him; that Geary had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s final complaint on June 3, 2019; and therefore there is no temporal proximity between the Dr. Kanard’s meeting with Geary on June 5, 2019, and Geary’s email to Cara Williams on June 7, 2019 about eliminating Plaintiff’s position.
Plaintiff has established that she complained directly to Dr. Kanard on March 13, 2018 (PUMF 48); and that she made multiple complaints about him to various staff members between March, 2018 and June 3, 2019 (PUMF 47, 48, 50, 63, 70. Following her complaint to Wroblewski an investigation was conducted into her complaints.
Plaintiff presents evidence that she discussed her complaints about Dr. Kanard in a meeting with Geary, Lundquist and Chief Medical Office Wroblewski on May 17, 2018, including potential deviations from the standard of care, poor judgment, poor ethics, failure to obtain informed consent, and concerns about the safety of patients. (PUMF 48). She presents evidence that she continued to make repeated complaints to Lundquist, who reported to Geary, including on June 3, 2019; that Kanard met with Geary on June 6, 2019; and that Geary emailed Cara Williams on June 7, 2019 about the elimination of her position. (PUMF 70, 74,76)
This evidence creates an “inference derived from circumstantial evidence” sufficient to meet her burden under McRae v Dept. of Corrections (2006) 142 Cal. App. 4th 388 to show that Cottage’s adverse actions were linked to her protected activity.
The motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s third cause of action for retaliation against public policy is therefore denied.
Violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 (4th c/a)
Defendant asserts that this cause of action fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s complaints about Dr. Kanard did not disclose reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity, and therefore do not constitute protected activities.
This cause of action requires a plaintiff to show that she reasonably believed that there was a violation of a statute, rule or regulation. Nejadian v County of Los Angeles (2019) 40 Cal. App. 5th 703, 719. Plaintiff has presented evidence that she complained numerous times about Dr. Kanard’s deviations from the standard of care, and that she reported conduct (performing unnecessary appendectomies) that could be considered “illegal surgeries”. (PUMF 50) This evidence is sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff complained of reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity, or activity that violated regulations.
The motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 is therefore denied.
Unfair Business Practices (5th c/a)
Defendant asserts that this claim fails because it is derivative of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, and she cannot prove that Cottage retaliated against her.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to create a triable issue on the issue of retaliation.
The motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for unfair business practices is therefore denied.
Defendant’s Objections to Evidence:
The court need only rule on the objections to evidence that it “deems material to its disposition of the motion.” CCP Section 437(q).
The court has ruled above on the objections which it deems material to its disposition of this motion, and declines to rule on Defendant’s remaining objections.