Robert Stiglmier vs Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Dept et al

Case Number

20CV03501

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 07/19/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion to Set Aside; Motion for New Trial; Motion for Reconsideration

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein: Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied. Plaintiff’s motion for new trial is denied. Plaintiff’s motion to set aside judgment is denied.

Background:

Plaintiff Robert Stiglmier filed his original complaint in this action on October 20, 2020. On October 30, without any response having been filed by any party, Stiglmier filed his first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC asserted eight causes of action: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) negligence; (4) battery; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of statutory duty to properly train officers; (7) violation of statutory duty to properly supervise officers in the field; (8) violation of title 42 United States Code section 1983. Defendants the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, the County of Santa Barbara, Deputy Brady, and Sergeant Dan Calderon (collectively, defendants) demurred to each of the causes of action of the FAC. On April 9, 2021, the court sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend, as to each of the causes of action. As to the first through seventh causes of action, the basis for sustaining the demurrer was that a criminal complaint was pending and Stiglmier had not alleged facts showing that Government Code section 945.3, which precludes civil actions based upon the conduct of law enforcement relating to a pending criminal action, did not apply. As to the eighth cause of action, the court found the allegations entirely conclusory.

On May 21, 2021, Stiglmier filed his second amended complaint (SAC). The SAC dropped each of the state law causes of action and asserted eleven causes of action, each of which was asserted under title 42 United States Code section 1983 though each employed a different theory of violation and liability. On September 3, 2021, the court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the SAC, with leave to amend, as to the second (retaliation), third (excessive force and undue duress), sixth (malicious and retaliatory prosecution), seventh (municipal liability—ratification), eighth (municipal liability—inadequate training), ninth (municipal liability—negligent hiring), tenth (municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices), and eleventh (violation of substantive due process) causes of action. The court overruled the demurrer to the remaining causes of action for unlawful detention (first cause of action), arrest without probable cause (fourth cause of action), and false imprisonment (fifth cause of action).

On October 15, 2021, Stiglmier filed a third amended complaint (TAC). The TAC asserts 12 causes of action, all of which are premised on title 42 United States Code section 1983 under different theories of violation and liability: (1) unlawful detention; (2) retaliation; (3) excessive force; (4) arrest without probable cause; (5) false imprisonment; (6) denial of medical care; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) municipal liability—ratification; (9) municipal liability—inadequate training; (10) municipal liability—negligent hiring; (11) municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices; and (12) substantive due process. In terms of numbering, the first through fifth causes of action were the same in the TAC as in the SAC. The sixth cause of action was new. The seventh through twelfth causes of action of the TAC were the former sixth through eleventh causes of action of the SAC. On March 4, 2022, the court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the TAC, with leave to amend, as to the third, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action, and overruled the demurrer as to the second and eighth causes of action.

On March 28, 2022, Stiglmier filed a fourth amended complaint alleging 12 causes of action, all of which are asserted under title 42 United States Code section 1983 under different theories of violation and liability: (1) unlawful detention; (2) retaliation; (3) excessive force; (4) arrest without probable cause; (5) false imprisonment; (6) denial of medical care; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) municipal liability—ratification; (9) municipal liability—inadequate training; (10) municipal liability—negligent hiring; (11) municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices; and (12) substantive due process. The causes of action are the same as those alleged in the TAC.

As alleged in the fourth amended complaint, on October 20, 2019, at approximately 11:30 p.m. to 11:45 p.m., Stiglmier was walking a bicycle on the sidewalk in the 5700 block of Hollister Avenue. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 42.) In the moments prior to walking his bicycle, Stiglmier had dismounted from the bicycle in the driveway apron for the Spud Nut Donut Shop located on Hollister Avenue. (Id. at ¶ 43.) While peaceably and lawfully walking his bike on the sidewalk, Stiglmier was stopped by defendants Santa Barbara County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Brady and Sergeant Dan Caulderon (collectively, the Sheriff Defendants). (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13, 44.)

The Sheriff Defendants accused Stiglmier of riding the bicycle on the sidewalk, not displaying lights on the bicycle, and of having stolen the bicycle. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 45.) The Sheriff Defendants initially stated that the reason for the stop was that Stiglmier had been riding the wrong way on Hollister Avenue itself and not on the sidewalk. (Id. at ¶ 46.) After Stiglmier demonstrated that he had been crossing Hollister Avenue to dismount from the bicycle in the driveway, the Sheriff Defendants stated that the reason for the stop was that Stiglmier had been riding his bicycle on the sidewalk. (Id. at ¶ 47.) After Stiglmier pointed out that he had dismounted from the bicycle in the driveway and was thereafter walking beside his bicycle and neither astride it nor riding it, the Sheriff Defendants then stated that the reason for the stop was the lack of lights on the bicycle. (Id. at ¶ 48.) After Stiglmier pointed out that his bicycle was equipped with functioning front and rear lights, the Sheriff Defendants, without supporting evidence or any reasonable belief in the truth of their allegation, falsely accused Stiglmier of being in possession of stolen or misappropriated property, namely the bicycle. (Id. at ¶ 49.) After Stiglmier informed the Sheriff Defendants that the bicycle was lawfully in his possession and that it had been given to him by Kit Delmarsh of Isla Vista Bicycle Boutique, the Sheriff Defendants ordered Stiglmier to move and to stand in front of the patrol vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 50.)

At all times, Stiglmier was unarmed, physically unimposing, and exhibiting signs of physical distress stating that he was in pain. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 51.) Stiglmier did not pose an immediate threat of death to himself or to anyone else. (Ibid.) Stiglmier informed the Sheriff Defendants that he was unable to sit on the curb based upon prior injuries sustained in an encounter with another officer in 2016. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Stiglmier also informed the Sheriff Defendants that he suffered from arthritis in his right hip. (Ibid.) Following Stiglmier’s communication of these facts regarding his prior injuries and present medical ailments to the Sheriff Defendants, the Sheriff Defendants’ attitude and demeanor towards Stiglmier became antagonizing, combative, punishing, and aggressive. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Deputy Brady forced Stiglmier to assume positions and to follow objectively unreasonable commands that resulted in extreme pain to Stiglmier, the worsening of pre-existing serious injuries, and the creation of permanent injuries. (Id. at ¶ 58.) Deputy Brady’s physical battery of Stiglmier included grabbing Stiglmier’s arm in a “control hold” and employing unnecessary or excessive force to forcibly and violently move Stiglmier, pulling and yanking Stiglmier’s arm with unnecessary or excessive force, handcuffing Stiglmier with undue force, and employing unnecessary and excessive force to place Stiglmier in the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Sergeant Caulderon approved of Deputy Brady’s treatment of Stiglmier and failed to stop the treatment of Stiglmier. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-62.) The Sheriff Defendants did not timely summon medical care or permit medical personnel to treat Stiglmier despite Stiglmier’s obvious and critical need for emergency medical care and treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.)

On February 28, 2023, Stiglmier filed a motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint to add claims under state law that were previously held in abeyance due to restrictions imposed pursuant to Government Code section 945.3. The motion was granted on May 5, 2023, and plaintiff was given until May 12, 2023, to file his fifth amended complaint. However, Stiglmier failed to file the fifth amended complaint by that date.

On July 14, 2023, Stiglmier filed another motion to allow the filing of a fifth amended complaint. The motion was denied. As such, the fourth amended complaint remains the operative complaint.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. Stiglmier did not timely oppose the motion for summary judgment. Rather, he submitted a declaration that he asked defense counsel for a 120-day continuance to oppose the motion, he did not seek a continuance from the court. On April 18, 2024, Stiglmier filed “Plaintiff’s Declaration in Preliminary Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.” This was one day prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. The filing by plaintiff, even if it had been timely filed, was woefully deficient and did not coherently address the motion or even contain a response to defendants’ separate statement of undisputed material facts.

On April 19, 2024, the motion for summary judgment was granted. Judgment was entered on May 8, 2024.

Stiglmier now moves for reconsideration, for a new trial, and to set aside the judgment.

Defendants oppose the motions.

Analysis:

            Reconsideration

Plaintiff’s first motion is a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 (a). That section is directed to interim rulings. (Magallanes v. Superior Court (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 878, 882.)

“A motion for reconsideration may only be considered before final judgment is entered and while the case is still pending in trial court.” (In re Marriage of Condon (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533, 541, fn. 8; accord, Betz v. Pankow (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 931, 937-938.)

Judgment was entered on May 8, 2024, and the notice of entry of judgment was served on plaintiff the same day. Because judgment was entered prior to the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the motion must be denied.

Even if the motion had been heard prior to the entry of judgment, it would be denied on the same substantive grounds that the motion for new trial will be denied.

            Motion for New Trial

Code of Civil Procedure section 657, provides in pertinent part:

“The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:

“1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

“2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

“3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

“4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

“5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

“6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

“7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application. . . .

“A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.”

“(a) The party intending to move for a new trial shall file with the clerk and serve upon each adverse party a notice of his or her intention to move for a new trial, designating the grounds upon which the motion will be made and whether the same will be made upon affidavits or the minutes of the court, or both, either:

“(1) After the decision is rendered and before the entry of judgment.

“(2) Within 15 days of the date of mailing notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court pursuant to Section 664.5, or service upon him or her by any party of written notice of entry of judgment, or within 180 days after the entry of judgment, whichever is earliest; provided, that upon the filing of the first notice of intention to move for a new trial by a party, each other party shall have 15 days after the service of that notice upon him or her to file and serve a notice of intention to move for a new trial.

“(b) That notice of intention to move for a new trial shall be deemed to be a motion for a new trial on all the grounds stated in the notice. The times specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) shall not be extended by order or stipulation or by those provisions of Section 1013 that extend the time for exercising a right or doing an act where service is by mail.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 659.)

Stiglmier sets forth 17 “grounds” for a new trial in his notice. Most of the stated grounds are not legally sufficient grounds for moving for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. For example, Stiglmier argues that perjury was committed by Deputy Brady and that defendants engaged in “gamesmanship.” He also argues that the motion was untimely, which it was not, and that he should somehow not be held to the same standard because he is self-represented and suffers from disabilities. Stiglmier has been advised several times previously: “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation. [Citation.] . . . A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

Simply put: There were no irregularities in the proceedings, no juror misconduct (there was no jury), no properly demonstrated accident or surprise, no “newly discovered evidence,” no insufficiency of evidence upon which the court based its granting of the motion for summary judgment, and no error in law. The court followed the law and rendered its ruling based on the undisputed facts and evidence before it.

Stiglmier has failed to demonstrate any sufficient grounds for the granting of a new trial. Defendants presented admissible evidence and undisputed facts in support of the motion for summary judgment. Stiglmier simply failed to oppose the motion and has since failed to provide any admissible evidence that summary judgment should not have been granted.

Stiglmier’s primary argument appears to be that he should have been granted a continuance to oppose the motion for summary judgment and that it was error for the court not to grant a continuance.

As it relates to summary judgment: “If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” (Code Civ. Proc., 437c, subd. (h).)

“Although [Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h)] authorizes the trial court to either continue the hearing on the summary judgment motion or deny the motion to permit the opposing party to obtain necessary discovery, it was the [opposing party’s] responsibility to request such an order and to demonstrate, either in their opposition papers or in a separate application filed no later than their opposition papers, that the missing discovery was required. (See Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 780 [party seeking continuance must show facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion and those facts could not have been presented with the opposition papers].” (Roman v. BRE Properties, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1056.)

The hearing on summary judgment was April 19, 2024. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), any opposition, and therefore any request for a continuance, was due no later than 14 days preceding the hearing date. Stiglmier did not submit a declaration to the court until one day before the hearing. The declaration was not accompanied by an Ex Parte Motion to Continue and did not follow any statutory authority for a proper request for continuance.

Even if Stiglmier had made a timely request, which he did not, he failed to demonstrate what missing discovery was required, how any additional information would be essential to opposing the motion, or why the information could not have been presented with opposition papers. Stiglmier’s late filed “declaration” was conclusory and contained little in the way of legal argument. Stiglmier has been referencing body cam video throughout this case, and claims that defendants have failed to provide it. Defendants claim that, despite no proper discovery requests from Stiglmier, they provided the video in October 2022 and even followed-up with Stiglmier to ensure that he was able to access the video. (Smith Dec., ¶¶ 3, 4.) Of note is that Stiglmier has provided stills of the videos to the court. This fact establishes that he was in fact provided copies of the videos. His claims to the contrary are not credible.

Further compounding the inadequacy of Stiglmier’s declaration is the fact that discovery sanctions were previously imposed on Stiglmier, on March 15, 2023, that essentially prevent him from introducing any evidence regarding liability or damages other than his own testimony.

The motion for new trial will be denied.

            Motion to Set Aside Judgment

Code of Civil Procedure section 663 provides:

“A judgment or decree, when based upon a decision by the court, or the special verdict of a jury, may, upon motion of the party aggrieved, be set aside and vacated by the same court, and another and different judgment entered, for either of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and entitling the party to a different judgment:

“1. Incorrect or erroneous legal basis for the decision, not consistent with or not supported by the facts; and in such case when the judgment is set aside, the statement of decision shall be amended and corrected.

“2. A judgment or decree not consistent with or not supported by the special verdict.”

Stiglmier’s motion to set aside the judgment will be denied for the same reasons that the motion for new trial will be denied. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, provided admissible evidence, and met their burden of proof. Stiglmier did not oppose the motion and did not timely request a continuance. Even if Stiglmier had requested a continuance, discovery has been closed for over a year and there has never been any showing that Stiglmier would be able to obtain and provide admissible evidence that would create any triable issues of material fact.