Robert Stiglmier vs Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Dept et al

Case Number

20CV03501

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 04/19/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

For all reasons discussed herein, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted.

Background:

Plaintiff Robert Stiglmier filed his original complaint in this action on October 20, 2020. On October 30, without any response having been filed by any party, Stiglmier filed his first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC asserted eight causes of action: (1) false arrest; (2) false imprisonment; (3) negligence; (4) battery; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of statutory duty to properly train officers; (7) violation of statutory duty to properly supervise officers in the field; (8) violation of title 42 United States Code section 1983. Defendants the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department, the County of Santa Barbara, Deputy Brady, and Sergeant Dan Calderon (collectively, defendants) demurred to each of the causes of action of the FAC. On April 9, 2021, the court sustained the demurrer, with leave to amend, as to each of the causes of action. As to the first through seventh causes of action, the basis for sustaining the demurrer was that a criminal complaint was pending and Stiglmier had not alleged facts showing that Government Code section 945.3, which precludes civil actions based upon the conduct of law enforcement relating to a pending criminal action, did not apply. As to the eighth cause of action, the court found the allegations entirely conclusory.

On May 21, 2021, Stiglmier filed his second amended complaint (SAC). The SAC dropped each of the state law causes of action and asserted eleven causes of action, each of which was asserted under title 42 United States Code section 1983 though each employed a different theory of violation and liability. On September 3, 2021, the court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the SAC, with leave to amend, as to the second (retaliation), third (excessive force and undue duress), sixth (malicious and retaliatory prosecution), seventh (municipal liability—ratification), eighth (municipal liability—inadequate training), ninth (municipal liability—negligent hiring), tenth (municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices), and eleventh (violation of substantive due process) causes of action. The court overruled the demurrer to the remaining causes of action for unlawful detention (first cause of action), arrest without probable cause (fourth cause of action), and false imprisonment (fifth cause of action).

On October 15, 2021, Stiglmier filed a third amended complaint (TAC). The TAC asserts 12 causes of action, all of which are premised on title 42 United States Code section 1983 under different theories of violation and liability: (1) unlawful detention; (2) retaliation; (3) excessive force; (4) arrest without probable cause; (5) false imprisonment; (6) denial of medical care; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) municipal liability—ratification; (9) municipal liability—inadequate training; (10) municipal liability—negligent hiring; (11) municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices; and (12) substantive due process. In terms of numbering, the first through fifth causes of action were the same in the TAC as in the SAC. The sixth cause of action was new. The seventh through twelfth causes of action of the TAC were the former sixth through eleventh causes of action of the SAC. On March 4, 2022, the court sustained defendants’ demurrer to the TAC, with leave to amend, as to the third, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action, and overruled the demurrer as to the second and eighth causes of action.

On March 28, 2022, Stiglmier filed a fourth amended complaint alleging 12 causes of action, all of which are asserted under title 42 United States Code section 1983 under different theories of violation and liability: (1) unlawful detention; (2) retaliation; (3) excessive force; (4) arrest without probable cause; (5) false imprisonment; (6) denial of medical care; (7) malicious prosecution; (8) municipal liability—ratification; (9) municipal liability—inadequate training; (10) municipal liability—negligent hiring; (11) municipal liability—unconstitutional customs and practices; and (12) substantive due process. The causes of action are the same as those alleged in the TAC.

As alleged in the fourth amended complaint, on October 20, 2019, at approximately 11:30 p.m. to 11:45 p.m., Stiglmier was walking a bicycle on the sidewalk in the 5700 block of Hollister Avenue. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 42.) In the moments prior to walking his bicycle, Stiglmier had dismounted from the bicycle in the driveway apron for the Spud Nut Donut Shop located on Hollister Avenue. (Id. at ¶ 43.) While peaceably and lawfully walking his bike on the sidewalk, Stiglmier was stopped by defendants Santa Barbara County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Brady and Sergeant Dan Caulderon (collectively, the Sheriff Defendants). (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13, 44.)

The Sheriff Defendants accused Stiglmier of riding the bicycle on the sidewalk, not displaying lights on the bicycle, and of having stolen the bicycle. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 45.) The Sheriff Defendants initially stated that the reason for the stop was that Stiglmier had been riding the wrong way on Hollister Avenue itself and not on the sidewalk. (Id. at ¶ 46.) After Stiglmier demonstrated that he had been crossing Hollister Avenue to dismount from the bicycle in the driveway, the Sheriff Defendants stated that the reason for the stop was that Stiglmier had been riding his bicycle on the sidewalk. (Id. at ¶ 47.) After Stiglmier pointed out that he had dismounted from the bicycle in the driveway and was thereafter walking beside his bicycle and neither astride it nor riding it, the Sheriff Defendants then stated that the reason for the stop was the lack of lights on the bicycle. (Id. at ¶ 48.) After Stiglmier pointed out that his bicycle was equipped with functioning front and rear lights, the Sheriff Defendants, without supporting evidence or any reasonable belief in the truth of their allegation, falsely accused Stiglmier of being in possession of stolen or misappropriated property, namely the bicycle. (Id. at ¶ 49.) After Stiglmier informed the Sheriff Defendants that the bicycle was lawfully in his possession and that it had been given to him by Kit Delmarsh of Isla Vista Bicycle Boutique, the Sheriff Defendants ordered Stiglmier to move and to stand in front of the patrol vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 50.)

At all times, Stiglmier was unarmed, physically unimposing, and exhibiting signs of physical distress stating that he was in pain. (Fourth Am. Compl., ¶ 51.) Stiglmier did not pose an immediate threat of death to himself or to anyone else. (Ibid.) Stiglmier informed the Sheriff Defendants that he was unable to sit on the curb based upon prior injuries sustained in an encounter with another officer in 2016. (Id. at ¶ 52.) Stiglmier also informed the Sheriff Defendants that he suffered from arthritis in his right hip. (Ibid.) Following Stiglmier’s communication of these facts regarding his prior injuries and present medical ailments to the Sheriff Defendants, the Sheriff Defendants’ attitude and demeanor towards Stiglmier became antagonizing, combative, punishing, and aggressive. (Id. at ¶ 53.) Deputy Brady forced Stiglmier to assume positions and to follow objectively unreasonable commands that resulted in extreme pain to Stiglmier, the worsening of pre-existing serious injuries, and the creation of permanent injuries. (Id. at ¶ 58.) Deputy Brady’s physical battery of Stiglmier included grabbing Stiglmier’s arm in a “control hold” and employing unnecessary or excessive force to forcibly and violently move Stiglmier, pulling and yanking Stiglmier’s arm with unnecessary or excessive force, handcuffing Stiglmier with undue force, and employing unnecessary and excessive force to place Stiglmier in the vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 59.) Sergeant Caulderon approved of Deputy Brady’s treatment of Stiglmier and failed to stop the treatment of Stiglmier. (Id. at ¶¶ 61-62.) The Sheriff Defendants did not timely summon medical care or permit medical personnel to treat Stiglmier despite Stiglmier’s obvious and critical need for emergency medical care and treatment. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.)

On February 28, 2023, Stiglmier filed a motion for leave to file a fifth amended complaint to add claims under state law that were previously held in abeyance due to restrictions imposed pursuant to Government Code section 945.3. The motion was granted on May 5, 2023, and plaintiff was given until May 12, 2023, to file his fifth amended complaint. However, Stiglmier failed to file the fifth amended complaint by that date.

On July 14, 2023, Stiglmier filed a motion to allow the filing of a fifth amended complaint. The motion was denied. As such, the fourth amended complaint remains the operative complaint.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on the grounds that no triable issue of material fact exists as to plaintiff’s claims that defendants caused or contributed to plaintiff’s claimed injuries and damages, or in the alternative, defendants move for summary adjudication on each of plaintiff’s twelve causes of action and on the prayer for punitive damages.

While plaintiff did submit a declaration that he asked defense counsel for a 120-day continuance to oppose the motion, he did not seek a continuance from the court. There is no indication that defense counsel agreed to a continuance. Further, as trial is scheduled for May 24, 2024, a continuance of 120-days would not be possible without a trial continuance. This matter has been in litigation since October 20, 2020, and has been continued previously at the request of plaintiff. The motion is unopposed.

Analysis:

As has previously been pointed out in this matter: “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation. [Citation.] . . . A doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985.)

            Prior Evidentiary Sanctions

Due to Stiglmier’s continued failure and refusal to provide code compliant discovery responses, on March 15, 2023, the court imposed evidentiary sanctions regarding any subject matter contained in defendants’ requests for production of documents, set one, form interrogatories, set one, and special interrogatories, set one.

Of note is that the special interrogatories contained contention interrogatories that required Stiglmier to state all facts supporting his contentions, identify all persons with knowledge of the facts supporting his contentions, and identify all documents that support his contentions. The form interrogatories required Stiglmier to provide information regarding any claims of physical, mental, or emotional injuries.

            Standard on Summary Judgment

A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)

The moving party bears the burden of persuasion that that there is no triable issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 235 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Consequently, a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Ibid.) The motion must be supported by evidentiary facts, not merely the ultimate facts. Further, conclusions of fact or law are not sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 751.) 

Once a moving defendant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence to prove the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding that element of its cause of action or the defense at issue in the motion, and if plaintiff is unable to do so, defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)), and must view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) In examining the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, those filed by the moving party are strictly construed, and those of the opposing party are liberally construed. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20-21.)

In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra at p. 1107.)

            Undisputed Material Facts

“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(1), requires each motion for summary judgment to be accompanied by a separate statement “ ‘setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts that the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ” California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2)4 states: “ ‘The separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion.’ ” Under the Rules of Court, “ ‘ “Material facts’ “ are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion.’ ” (Rule 3.1350(a)(2).)” (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 850-851.)

“The point of the separate statement is not to craft a narrative, but to be a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them. “ ‘The separate statement serves two important functions in a summary judgment proceeding: It notifies the parties which material facts are at issue, and it provides a convenient and expeditious vehicle permitting the trial court to hone in on the truly disputed facts.’ ” [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“The duty to comply with the law regarding separate statements applies to both sides of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. The opposing party’s responses to the separate statement must be in good faith, responsive, and material. Responses should directly address the fact stated, and if that fact is not in dispute, the opposing party must so admit. It is completely unhelpful to evade the stated fact in an attempt to create a dispute where none exists.” (Ibid.)

“In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must submit a separate statement setting forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. [Citations,] Without a separate statement of undisputed facts with references to supporting evidence in the form of affidavits or declarations, it is impossible for the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of disputed facts.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116; disapproved on other grounds by Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 41-42.)

In support of defendants’ motion for summary judgment, they submit the declarations of Deputy Brady and Lieutenant Garrett Te Slaa. These declarations provide the evidence establishing all of defendants’ undisputed material facts (“UMF”).

“If a party is otherwise entitled to summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility or for want of cross-examination of witnesses furnishing affidavits or declarations in support of the summary judgment . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. €.)

As relevant, defendants present the following UMFs in support of their motion. As Stiglmier has provided no response to the UMFs, or any evidence disputing the UMFs, they are established as undisputed.

Deputy Brady is trained on the Vehicle Code and Penal Code. (UMF No. 1.) Deputy Brady saw Stiglmier violate Vehicle Code section 21650 (traveling the wrong way) and Vehicle Code section 21201(d) (failure to have the correct bike lights and reflectors) on October 20, 2019. (UMF Nos. 2, 3.)

Stiglmier was interviewed and the bicycle he was riding was registered to Aashka Pandya after Stiglmier claimed to have borrowed the bicycle from Kit Delmarsh, causing Deputy Brady to believe Stiglmier was in violation of Penal Code section 485 (theft). (UMF No. 4.) Stiglmier’s repeated refusal to cooperate with Deputy Brady’s requests and Stiglmier’s hostility caused Deputy Brady to believe that Stiglmier was in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1) (resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer). (UMF No. 5.)

Deputy Brady is a trained deputy. (UMF No. 11.) Stiglmier was initially hostile in his interactions with Deputy Brady. (UMF No. 12.) Stiglmier refused to comply with Deputy Brady’s instructions to sit on the curb or lean against the patrol car. (UMF No. 13.) Deputy Brady’s training and experience led him to believe that Stiglmier’s hostility was a pre-assaultive indicator and Deputy Brady placed Stiglmier in handcuffs for officer safety. (UMF No. 14.) Stiglmier was placed in the back of Deputy Brady’s patrol vehicle after Stiglmier was handcuffed. (UMF No. 15.0

Stiglmier was screened by nurses at the Santa Barbara County Jail as part of the booking process. (UMF No. 26.) As part of the County Jail medical exam, Stiglmier was asked about his injuries, medications, allergies, medical conditions, recent hospitalizations, past infections, mental health, social history, and whether he used assistive devices. (UMF No. 27.) The nurse also took Stiglmier’s blood pressure, listened to his heart, and questioned him as to why he was wearing gloves. (Ibid.)

The Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office works toward best law enforcement practices and does not endorse unconstitutional practices. (UMF No. 38.) Every arrest report is reviewed by a supervisor. (UMF No. 39.)

The Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Office either hires qualified applicants and sends them to a Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (P.O.S.T.) certified academy or hires lateral transfers who have already completed the initial training. (UMF No. 40.) After the academy, new hires undergo months of field training. (UMF No. 41.) Probationary deputies are routinely assessed and evaluated, and only those who meet standards pass probation. (UMF No. 42.) California has set minimum ongoing training requirements that all law enforcement officers complete 24 hours of P.O.S.T. training every two years. (UMF No. 43.) The Sheriff’s Office has a training bureau that provides approved P.O.S.T. training to Sheriff’s Office employees and tracks the attendance and completion statistics of all. (UMF No. 44.) Deputies will be placed on leave if they have not completed required training within a required timeframe. (UMF No. 45.) The training bureau exceeds the standards required by P.O.S.T. (UMF No. 46.)

The Sheriff’s Office has a written policy manual that all employees are required to know and are trained on. (UMF No. 50.) The Sheriff’s Office contracts with a company that ensures the Sheriff Office’s policies stay current with changes in the law and best law enforcement practices. (UMF No. 51.) As changes occur, the Sheriff Office’s policies are updated, the training bureau is notified, and Sheriff Office employees are trained on the changes. (UMF No. 52.)

Deputy Brady had sufficient cause to detain and probable cause to arrest Stiglmier. (UMF No. 56.) After Deputy Brady initiated the stop, Stiglmier was immediately hostile and was yelling at Deputy Brady. (UMF No. 57.) Stiglmier repeatedly refused to provide his name to Deputy Brady. (UMF No. 58.)

            First Cause of Action for Unlawful Stop and Detention

“[I]n order to justify an investigative stop or detention the circumstances known or apparent to the officer must include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, superseded on other grounds by Cal. Const., art. I, § 28.) In determining the lawfulness of a temporary detention, courts look at the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” (U.S. v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273.)

Here, the UMFs establish that on October 20, 2019, Deputy Brady observed Stiglmier violating the Vehicle Code by riding a bicycle the wrong way and not having the required lighting on the bicycle. Upon an initial brief contact with Stiglmier, Deputy Brady had reasonable cause to believe that the bicycle might be stolen or lost. Stiglmier initially refused to give his name and became hostile.

Defendants have met their burden of showing that Deputy Brady had a reasonable objective suspicion that Stiglmier had broken the law and that the stop and detention was justified.

            Second Cause of Action for Retaliation

“ “[A]s a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ ” for engaging in protected speech. [Citation.] If an official takes adverse action against someone based on that forbidden motive, and “ ‘non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences,’ ” the injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a First Amendment claim. [Citation.]” (Nieves v. Bartlett (2019) 587 U.S. ---, 1722.)

“To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish a “ ‘causal connection’ ” between the government defendant’s “ ‘retaliatory animus’ ” and the plaintiff’s “ ‘subsequent injury.’ ” [Citation.] It is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the plaintiff was injured - the motive must cause the injury. Specifically, it must be a “ ‘but-for’ ” cause, meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.” (Ibid.)

“[P]laintiffs must also prove as a threshold matter that the decision to press charges was objectively unreasonable because it was not supported by probable cause.” (Id. at p. 1723.)

Here, as set forth above, Deputy Brady had probable cause to both detain and arrest Stiglmier based on Stiglmier violating the Vehicle Code and the events following the initial contact.
 

            Third Cause of Action for Excessive Force

“[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “ ‘seizure’ ” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “ ‘reasonableness’ ” standard, rather than under a “ ‘substantive due process’ ” approach. Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “ ‘substantive due process,’ ” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” (Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 395.)

“Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is “ ‘reasonable’ ” under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of “ ‘ “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests” ' ” against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. [Citations.] Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 22–27, 88 S.Ct., at 1880–1883. Because “ ‘[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,’ ” [citation], however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” (Id. at p. 396.)

“The “ ‘reasonableness’ ” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S., at 20–22, 88 S.Ct., at 1879–1881. The Fourth Amendment is not violated by an arrest based on probable cause, even though the wrong person is arrested, [citation], nor by the mistaken execution of a valid search warrant on the wrong premises, [Citation]. With respect to a claim of excessive force, the same standard of reasonableness at the moment applies: “ ‘Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,’ ” [citation], violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” (Id. at pp. 396-397.)

“ ‘With respect to the possibility of less intrusive force, officers need not employ the least intrusive means available[,] so long as they act within a range of reasonable conduct.’ [Citation]” (Estate of Lopez by and through Lopez v. Gelhaus (2017) 871 F.3d 998, 1006.)

“Because there are no genuine issues of material fact and “ ‘the relevant set of facts’ ” has been determined, the reasonableness of the use of force is “a pure question of law.’ ” [Citation.]” (Lowry v. City of San Diego (2017) 858 F.3d 1248, 1256.)

Here, the evidence before the court establishes that Stiglmier was initially uncooperative, hostile, and refused to follow Deputy Brady’s instructions. Deputy Brady perceived Stiglmier’s hostility as pre-assaultive based on his training. Stiglmier was handcuffed for officer safety and placed in the back of the patrol car.

Defendants have met their burden of showing that Stiglmier is unable to establish his claim for excessive force. There is no evidence before the court that Deputy Brady, or any other person, used excessive force against Stiglmier related to the allegations in this matter.

            Fourth Cause of Action for Arrest Without Probable Cause

Probable cause for Stiglmier’s arrest was addressed above. To further elaborate on the existence of probable cause:

“Probable cause is “ ‘defined in terms of facts and circumstances ‘ “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the (suspect) had committed or was committing an offense” ’ ” [Citation.] “ ‘If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.’ ” [Citation.]” (People v. Gerberding (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th Supp.1, 7.)

A prudent person in Deputy Brady’s position would believe that Stiglmier had committed more than one crime. He appeared to be in violation of the vehicle code, he became hostile, and there was reason to believe that the bike he was in possession of was either stolen or lost.

Defendants have met their burden that plaintiff will be unable to prove that he was arrested without probable cause.

            Fifth Cause of Action for False Imprisonment

“Under California law, the elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: “ ‘(1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief.’ ” [Citation.]” (Young v. County of Los Angeles (2011) 655 F.3d 1156, 1169.)

Here, the evidence before the court establishes that Deputy Brady, as a Peace Officer, had lawful privilege to detain and arrest Stiglmier based on the personally observed violations of the law.

“California law . . . protects a law enforcement officer from liability for false arrest or false imprisonment where the officer, acting within the scope of his or her authority, either (1) effects a lawful arrest or (2) has reasonable cause to believe the arrest is lawful. See Cal.Penal Code § 847(b); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (an “ ‘officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence of the suspect is later proved’ ”), overruled on other grounds, [Citations].” (Cervantes v. U.S. (2003) 330 F.3d 1186, 1188.)

Here, the evidence before the court establishes that Deputy Brady had reasonable cause, at the very least, to believe the arrest of Stiglmier was lawful. Thus, defendants have met their burden of establishing that Stiglmier cannot prevail on his cause of action for false imprisonment.

            Sixth Cause of Action for Denial of Medical Care

A prisoner’s claim of a denial of medical care is governed by the Eighth Amendment. (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 104-105.) By contrast, a pretrial detainee’s claim of a denial of medical care is governed by Fourteenth Amendment, and specifically the due process clause. (City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp. (1983) 463 U.S. 239, 244.)

The elements of both types of claims, however, are essentially identical. (Irwin v. City of Hemet (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 507, 520.) “The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments is violated by ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’ [Citation.]” (City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 243-244.) Likewise, “the Fourteenth Amendment is violated if state officials are deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs. [Citation.]” (Rife v. Oklahoma Department of Public Safety (10th Cir. 2017) 854 F.3d 637, 647.)

“A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.’ [Citations.]” (Taylor v. Hughes (11th Cir. 2019) 920 F.3d 729, 733.)

The facts before the court establish that Stiglmier was screened by a nurse at the jail as part of the booking process. As part of the County Jail medical exam, Stiglmier was asked about his injuries, medications, allergies, medical conditions, recent hospitalizations, past infections, mental health, social history, and whether he used assistive devices. The nurse also took Stiglmier’s blood pressure, listened to his heart, and questioned him as to why he was wearing gloves. There is no evidence before the court that Stiglmier required more care than he received or that he had any serious medical needs.

Defendants have met their burden of establishing that Stiglmier cannot prevail on his cause of action for denial of medical care.

            Seventh Cause of Action for Malicious and Retaliatory Prosecution

“To establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution, the malicious prosecution plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior action was “ ‘(i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with malice.’ ” [Citation.]” (Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442, 453, fn. 6.)

“The tort of malicious prosecution is disfavored and has therefore been limited for policy reasons.” (Jackson v. Lara (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 337.)

Here, as discussed above, defendants have established that the prosecution of Stiglmier was initiated with probable cause. Because the absence of probable cause is an essential element of Stiglmier’s cause of action for malicious prosecution, defendants have met their burden of establishing that Stiglmier cannot prevail on the cause of action.

            Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Causes of Action

Plaintiff’s eighth through eleventh causes of action are based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They consist of: (1) Ratification; (2) Inadequate Training; (3) Negligent Hiring; and (4) Unconstitutional Customs and Practices. The causes of action are directed to defendants County of Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Department. Each of them are variations of Monell claims based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.

“[A] local government may not be sued under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” (Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 694 (Monell).)

“In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a plaintiff must prove “ ‘(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.’ ” [Citation.]” (Dougherty v. City of Covina (2011) 654 F.3d 892, 900.)

As established by defendants’ UMFs and supporting evidence, and as noted above:

The Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office works toward best law enforcement practices and does not endorse unconstitutional practices. (UMF No. 38.) Every arrest report is reviewed by a supervisor. (UMF No. 39.)

The Santa Barbara Sheriff’s Office either hires qualified applicants and sends them to a Peace Officer Standards and Training Commission (P.O.S.T.) certified academy or hires lateral transfers who have already completed the initial training. (UMF No. 40.) After the academy, new hires undergo months of field training. (UMF No. 41.) Probationary deputies are routinely assessed and evaluated, and only those who meet standards pass probation. (UMF No. 42.) California has set minimum ongoing training requirements that all law enforcement officers complete 24 hours of P.O.S.T. training every two years. (UMF No. 43.) The Sheriff’s Office has a training bureau that provides approved P.O.S.T. training to Sheriff’s Office employees and tracks the attendance and completion statistics of all. (UMF No. 44.) Deputies will be placed on leave if they have not completed required training within a required timeframe. (UMF No. 45.) The training bureau exceeds the standards required by P.O.S.T. (UMF No. 46.)

The Sheriff’s Office has a written policy manual that all employees are required to know and are trained on. (UMF No. 50.) The Sheriff’s Office contracts with a company that ensures the Sheriff Office’s policies stay current with changes in the law and best law enforcement practices. (UMF No. 51.) As changes occur, the Sheriff Office’s policies are updated, the training bureau is notified, and Sheriff Office employees are trained on the changes. (UMF No. 52.)

Stiglmier has produced no evidence of ratification, inadequate training, negligent hiring, or unconstitutional customs and practices. By way of special interrogatories, Stiglmier was asked to state all facts supporting these contentions. He did not do so and the above mentioned evidentiary sanctions were issued. Defendants have met their burden of showing that Stiglmier cannot prevail on these claims.

            Twelfth Cause of Action for violation of Substantive Due Process

“The term “ ‘substantive due process’ ” refers to a line of disparate cases which generally concludes that the guaranty of due process in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments includes a “ ‘substantive’ ” component that restricts infringement upon certain fundamental “ ‘liberty interests.’ ” [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 157, 175.)

“Substantive due process protects against arbitrary government action. [Citation.] A substantive due process violation requires more than “ ‘ordinary government error,’ ” and the “ ‘arbitrary and capricious’ ” standard applicable in other contexts is a lower threshold than that required to establish a substantive due process violation. [Citation.] A substantive due process violation requires some form of outrageous or egregious conduct constituting “ ‘a true abuse of power.’ ” [Citation.]” (Las Lomas Land Co., LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 837, 854-856.)

 Defendants have presented evidence and established that the actions of defendants, including Deputy Brady, were not outrageous or egregious conduct constituting an abuse of power. Stiglmier’s claim, by way of his FAC, that he was targeted because he was homeless, is unsupported by any evidence. As noted above, Deputy Brady had reasonable cause to believe that Stiglmier committed a crime. Based on Stiglmier’s hostile behavior and refusal to follow directions, Stiglmier was placed in handcuffs for officer safety and placed in the back of a patrol car. There is nothing unreasonable about Deputy Brady’s actions.

            Stiglmier’s Declaration    

To the extent that the declaration filed by Stiglmier, containing a letter to defense counsel, purports to be a request for a continuance of the hearing on the motion, which it is not, the declaration fails.

“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(c), subd. (h).)

“The nonmoving party seeking a continuance “ ‘must show: (1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.]” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 633.)

Stiglmeir represents, by way of his letter to defense counsel, that he is awaiting “new evidence of medical damages.” The motion for summary judgment is not addressed in any way to Stiglmeir’s claimed damages. Rather, the motion for summary judgment is based on Stiglmeir’s inability to prove liability. Any new evidence of damages would have no bearing on the liability issues. Further, Stiglmeir fails to show how any new medical evidence is essential to opposing the motion or why additional time would be needed to obtain that evidence more than three years into this case.

Defendants have met their burden of persuasion that that there is no triable issue of material fact, and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion for summary judgment will be granted.