Jose Lopez et al vs Aysha Davis

Case Number

20CV03222

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 06/17/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion: Transfer and Consolidate

Tentative Ruling

Jose Lopez, et al. v. Aysha Davis 

Case No. 20CV03222          

Hearing Date: June 17, 2024                                                 

MATTERS:             Plaintiffs’ Motion To Transfer And Consolidate

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiffs Jose Lopez and Maria Galindo: S. Edmond El Dabe, Jonathan M. Ritter, El Dabe Ritter Trial Lawyers

For Defendant Aysha Davis: Christopher P. Wesierski, Kathryn J. Harvey, Wesierski & Zurek LLP

For Opposing Nonparty Wawanesa General Insurance Company: Peter H. Klee, Thomas R. Proctor, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of plaintiffs to transfer and consolidate is denied.

Background:

This action arises from a motor vehicle collision (the collision) which occurred on September 6, 2020, on State Highway 154 (SR-154) west of Salvar Road in Santa Barbara, California. As alleged in the complaint filed on October 5, 2020, by plaintiffs Jose Lopez (Lopez) and Maria Galindo (Galindo) (collectively, plaintiffs), plaintiffs were traveling westbound on SR-154 on the date of the collision when defendant Aysha Davis (Davis), who was traveling eastbound, made an unsafe movement causing Davis to lose control of her vehicle and drift into opposing traffic, causing the collision. (Compl., ¶ GN-1.) At the time of the collision, Davis was driving under the influence. (Ibid.) Plaintiffs suffered serious injuries which require medical treatment. (Ibid). The complaint alleges two causes of action against Davis for motor vehicle and negligence.

Davis filed an answer to plaintiffs’ complaint on March 10, 2021, generally denying its allegations and asserting four affirmative defenses.

Court records reflect that on December 18, 2023, plaintiffs filed a notice of related case (the notice) identifying case number 37-2023-00024291-CU-BC-CTL entitled Wawanesa General Insurance Company v. Lopez et al. (the Wawanesa action) as related to the present matter. The notice reflects that the Wawanesa action was filed on June 9, 2023, with the Superior Court of San Diego County. (Dec. 18, 2023, Notice at p. 1.) In the notice, plaintiffs assert that in the Wawanesa action, Wawanesa General Insurance Company (Wawanesa) alleges that plaintiffs breached an agreement purporting to settle the present action against Davis, who is Wawanesa’s insured. (Id. at Attachment 1h.)

Court records further reflect that on December 22, 2023, Davis filed an objection to the notice (the objection), asserting that each action involves different questions of law and fact and different claims for relief. Davis also contends in the objection that plaintiffs failed to timely file the notice upon the discovery of facts concerning the existence of the Wawanesa action.

Also on December 22, 2023, Wawanesa filed a response to the notice asserting that the notice is untimely, and that the present action and the Wawanesa action do not involve the same parties or the same or similar claims.

On January 2, 2024, plaintiffs filed a motion for an order transferring the Wawanesa action to this court and consolidating the Wawanesa action with the present action (the first transfer motion). In the first transfer motion, plaintiffs contend that the present action and the Wawanesa action are interrelated and that the interests of justice under the standards set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1, including concerns of judicial efficiency, support the transfer and consolidation of the Wawanesa action to this court. The first transfer motion was opposed by Davis and Wawanesa.

On March 11, 2024, the court issued its Minute Order denying the first transfer motion based on the existence of procedural problems with that motion. The court’s denial of the first transfer motion was without prejudice to the future filing of a procedurally appropriate motion by plaintiffs. (Mar. 11, 2024, Minute Order at p. 4.)

On April 18, 2024, plaintiffs filed a second motion for an order transferring the Wawanesa action to this court, and consolidating the Wawanesa action with this action for all purposes, including trial (the motion or present motion). The motion is brought on effectively the same grounds asserted in the first transfer motion.

In support of the motion, plaintiffs submit the declaration of their counsel, Cynthia A. Goodman (Goodman). Attached to the Goodman declaration is a copy of the complaint filed by Wawanesa on June 9, 2023, in the Wawanesa action; a cross-complaint filed by Lopez and Galindo on August 9, 2023, in the Wawanesa action; and a motion for summary adjudication filed by Wawanesa in the Wawanesa action, which Goodman declares is currently set for hearing on June 21, 2024. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 4, 9 & Exhs. A-C.) Goodman states that there is no trial date currently set in the Wawanesa action. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 9.)

In her declaration, Goodman characterizes the Wawanesa action as a dispute between plaintiffs in this action and Wawanesa, in which Wawanesa asserts causes of action for declaratory relief, specific performance, and breach of contract, based on Wawanesa’s allegation that it accepted plaintiffs’ offer to settle their claims against Davis. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 4.) Goodman declares that the witnesses to the Wawanesa action will include two claim adjustors for Wawanesa, whose locations are unknown, and the person most knowledgeable concerning Wawanesa’s file. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.) Goodman further declares that, should the motion for summary adjudication of Wawanesa filed in the Wawanesa action be denied, there will not be numerous pretrial motions or difficult or novel legal issues to resolve because the issues will largely focus on whether communications between the parties and their counsel resulted in a timely acceptance of plaintiffs’ settlement offer by Wawanesa. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11-12.)

Goodman further states that, with respect to the present action, the primary issue is plaintiffs’ damages claim and that Davis has admitted responsibility for the collision and liability. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 2, 11.) Goodman asserts that the witnesses to this action will include plaintiffs, who are each residents of Los Angeles County, Davis, and medical experts who will address primarily the issue of damages. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Goodman contends that the damages issues to be litigated in the present action will not be overly complex or novel. (Id. at ¶ 11.)

Though Goodman concedes, on behalf of plaintiffs, that the venue of the present action may be less convenient for the witnesses in the Wawanesa action and that plaintiffs are not witnesses to the events which give rise to the Wawanesa action, though plaintiffs would want to attend the trials in both actions. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 3, 6-7.) Goodman contends that, because plaintiffs are residents of Los Angeles County, it would be “patently unfair” to require them to litigate issues arising from an action filed in Santa Barbara County in separate courts which are “hundreds of miles” away from one another. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Goodman further contends that plaintiffs will suffer hardship and inconvenience if the Wawanesa action is not transferred to this court. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Goodman further states that the proposed transfer will not impact Davis and that the Wawanesa action should not have been filed in San Diego County. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 8.)

In addition, Goodman states that the parties in the present action and the Wawanesa action will litigate plaintiffs’ recovery for injuries caused by Davis and whether this action was settled. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 14.) Further, Goodman contends, the outcome of the Wawanesa action will directly impact the present litigation because, among other things, if Wawanesa prevails in the Wawanesa action, the present action would be rendered moot. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 14.) By contrast, Goodman argues, if the motion of Wawanesa for summary adjudication of the claims asserted by the parties in the Wawanesa action is denied, the parties will litigate whether the claims asserted in the present action were settled. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Goodman further claims that, to the extent the court in the Wawanesa action finds that Wawanesa failed to accept plaintiffs’ settlement offer, this would impact plaintiffs’ recovery of damages and Wawanesa’s liability for a favorable verdict in this action. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15.) Therefore, Goodman argues, it is necessary to coordinate the timing of the trials in each action also to avoid inconsistent verdicts and duplicative discovery. (Goodman Decl., ¶ 15, 16.)

Also attached to the Goodman declaration are copies of correspondence sent by plaintiffs to Davis and Wawanesa seeking to meet and confer regarding the transfer and consolidation requested by plaintiffs in the present motion. (Goodman Decl., ¶¶ 19, 20 & Exhs. D, G & H.) Wawanesa and Davis declined to stipulate to the transfer. (Id. at ¶¶ 19-20 & Exhs. E, I & J.) Goodman also attaches a copy of a letter notifying Wawanesa of its obligation to advise the court of other motions to transfer and consolidate. (Id. at ¶ 19 & Exh. F.)

The motion is opposed by Davis and Wawanesa.

Analysis:

“A judge may, on motion, transfer an action or actions from another court to that judge’s court for coordination with an action involving a common question of fact or law within the meaning of Section 404. The motion shall be supported by a declaration stating facts showing that the actions meet the standards specified in Section 404.1, are not complex as defined by the Judicial Council and that the moving party has made a good faith effort to obtain agreement to the transfer from all parties to each action. Notice of the motion shall be served on all parties to each action and on each court in which an action is pending. Any party to that action may file papers opposing the motion within the time permitted by rule of the Judicial Council. The court to which a case is transferred may order the cases consolidated for trial pursuant to Section 1048 without any further motion or hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.)

There is nothing to indicate, based on the available evidence and information including the contents of the pleadings and motion for summary adjudication filed in the Wawanesa action, that the present action and the Wawanesa action are likely to involve numerous pretrial motions, difficult or novel legal issues that would be time-consuming to resolve, a large number of witnesses or evidence, coordination with other actions, or substantial judicial supervision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.400 et seq. & 3.502.) In addition, the parties do not appear to dispute that neither the present action nor the Wawanesa action are complex cases which require “exceptional judicial management….” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a).) Therefore, plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that this action and the Wawanesa action are not complex. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 403.)

The information and evidence presented by plaintiffs also demonstrates that notice of the present motion was served on the court in the Wawanesa action and on all parties to each action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 403.) Information provided in the Goodman declaration further described above also shows that plaintiffs have made a good-faith effort to obtain the agreement of all parties to this action and the Wawanesa action to the transfer, coordination, and consolidation proposed in the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500(b) & (c)(2); Code Civ. Proc., § 403.) Though there is no information to demonstrate that plaintiffs notified Davis of her obligation to disclose any information concerning other motions requesting a transfer that would be affected by the granting of the present motion, plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that they notified Wawanesa of this obligation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.500(c).) Further, Davis does not, in her opposition to the motion, present information to demonstrate that she was not notified of her obligations as described in California Rules of Court, rule, 3.500(c). Therefore, for all reasons discussed above, the present motion appears to be procedurally appropriate.

Code of Civil Procedure section 403 requires the Goodman declaration to state facts showing that present action and the Wawanesa action meet the standards specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 404.1, “[c]oordination of civil actions sharing a common question of fact or law is appropriate if one judge hearing all of the actions for all purposes in a selected site or sites will promote the ends of justice taking into account whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation; the convenience of parties, witnesses, and counsel; the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel; the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower; the calendar of the courts; the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and, the likelihood of settlement of the actions without further litigation should coordination be denied.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 404.1.)

The information and evidence presented by plaintiffs is insufficient to demonstrate that the present action and the Wawanesa action share common questions of fact or law. For example, the parties do not dispute that Davis is the insured under an automobile policy issued by Wawanesa (the Wawanesa policy). (See Goodman Decl., Exh. A [Wawanesa complaint filed in Wawanesa action], ¶ 7 & Exh. B [plaintiffs’ cross-complaint filed in Wawanesa action], ¶ 4.) The evidence further indicates that in the Wawanesa action, plaintiffs and Wawanesa do not appear to dispute that on September 23, 2020, plaintiffs made a written offer to Wawanesa to settle the bodily injury claims alleged by plaintiffs against Davis in this action for the “global policy limits” of the Wawanesa policy. (Id. at Exhs. A & B, ¶¶ 9.) In the Wawanesa action, plaintiffs and Wawanesa also do not appear to dispute that the acceptance deadline stated in plaintiffs’ offer to Wawanesa was October 2, 2020. (Id. at Exh. A, ¶ 9 & Exh. B, ¶ 10.) In the Wawanesa action, Wawanesa alleges that it accepted plaintiffs’ settlement offer by the October 2, 2020, deadline by, among other things, agreeing to pay the full limits of the Wawanesa policy as demanded by plaintiffs. (Id. at Exh. A, ¶ 11 & Exh. C, p. 7, ll. 19-21 & p. 9, ll. 3-14.) Plaintiffs allege that on October 1, 2020, Wawanesa sent a counteroffer for the Wawanesa policy limits which plaintiffs contend does not constitute an acceptance because it did not fulfill or mention the conditions set out in the initial offer. (Id. at Exh. B, ¶ 17.)

As noted above, Davis filed in this action an answer to plaintiffs’ complaint on March 10, 2021. Though the answer was filed over five months after the occurrence of the events described in the Wawanesa action and detailed above, Davis does not appear to assert an affirmative defense based on the existence of a settlement agreement between Wawanesa and plaintiffs. (See Mar. 10, 2021, Answer.) Further, there is no information or evidence to indicate that, at the time the answer was filed, Davis was not aware of plaintiffs’ settlement offer or Wawanesa’s purported acceptance of the offer. (See, e.g., Goodman Decl., Exh. B at ¶ 11 [plaintiffs’ allegation that their settlement offer required Davis to sign a declaration drafted by plaintiffs’ counsel]; Exh. A at ¶ 11 [Wawanesa allegation that it agreed on October 2, 2020, that Davis would sign a declaration to be drafted by plaintiffs’ counsel].) In addition, plaintiffs offer no factual or legal argument to demonstrate that Davis intends to assert in this action a defense to plaintiffs’ claims based on the existence of a settlement between plaintiffs and Wawanesa.

Furthermore, the information and evidence presented by plaintiffs is insufficient to show that the claims alleged against Davis in this action, which relate solely to whether Davis is liable for the bodily injuries and damages sustained by plaintiffs as a result of the collision, are related in any predominating or significant way to whether Wawanesa agreed to settle those claims as alleged by Wawanesa in the Wawanesa action. To the extent there is a future determination that the claims alleged in this action were settled, this issue can be raised in a procedurally and substantively appropriate manner at an appropriate time without the need to transfer the Wawanesa action to this court or to litigate in this action the existence of the settlement agreement itself.

Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions are also inadequate to demonstrate that both actions will require overlapping litigation of the injuries sustained by plaintiffs in the collision. For example, plaintiffs fail to adequately explain why the dispute at issue in the Wawanesa action regarding whether Wawanesa did or did not accept plaintiffs’ offer to settle the present action for the limits of the Wawanesa policy will require litigation of the injuries at issue in this action, or why litigation of plaintiffs’ injury claims in this action will require litigating the issue of whether there exists a settlement agreement between plaintiffs and Wawanesa for the limits of the Wawanesa policy. Therefore, plaintiffs have also failed to demonstrate the possibility of inconsistent rulings, orders, verdicts, or judgments with regard to whether Davis caused plaintiffs’ injuries or whether plaintiffs and Wawanesa entered into an enforceable settlement agreement.

Moreover, while the information offered in the Goodman declaration indicates that a transfer of the Wawanesa action to this court would be convenient for plaintiffs, information appearing in both the moving and opposing papers demonstrates that, with the potential exception of Davis who nonetheless opposes the present motion, the proposed transfer would be inconvenient for the witnesses in the Wawanesa action as well as Wawanesa and its counsel. Though plaintiffs contend that San Diego County is not the proper venue for the Wawanesa action, the court is not in a procedurally appropriate position to determine whether San Diego County is the proper place for trial of that action.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. For all reasons described above, the information and evidence presented by plaintiffs is insufficient to demonstrate the existence of common questions of fact or law or to permit the court to make the required findings with respect to the standards enumerated in California Rules of Court, rule 3.500(d)(2), (3), (5) & (7). Therefore, and considering the qualitatively different issues presented in this action and the Wawanesa action, the court will deny the motion.

Davis and Wawanesa have suggested in their respective oppositions to the motion that the court stay this action pending resolution of the Wawanesa action. If any party seeks to stay this litigation, they may file and serve a procedurally appropriate noticed motion setting forth appropriate grounds for a stay.

Wawanesa’s objections to the Goodman declaration:

The court will overrule the objections of Wawanesa to matters stated in the Goodman declaration.