Austin Buist et al vs The State of California, Department of Transportation et al

Case Number

20CV03089

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 02/16/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Minor's Compromise; Good Faith Settlement

Tentative Ruling

For the reasons discussed herein:

1. Plaintiffs’ petition for approval of compromise of claim for Minor plaintiff Maverick Buist is granted;
2. Toyota defendants’ motion for determination of good faith settlement of claims of Maverick Buist as to the Toyota defendants is granted.

Background:

This action arises out of a vehicle collision that occurred on U.S. Highway 101 (the highway) at the intersection (the intersection) of Las Varas Ranch Access Road (Las Varas) in an unincorporated area of Santa Barbara County north of the City of Goleta. The operative pleading is the Second Amended Complaint (SAC) filed on December 16, 2020, by plaintiffs Austin Buist and Maverick Buist, who is a minor, individually and as heirs at law and successors in interest to Allyson Jean Buist, who is deceased, and the Estate of Allyson Jean Buist. (Note: For ease of reference, the court will refer to plaintiffs and decedent by their first names. No disrespect is intended.) The SAC alleges eight causes of action: (1) negligence/negligence per se (against defendants Garrett Staab (Staab) and Spirit Flow, Inc. (Spirit Flow)); (2) dangerous condition of property (against defendant the State of California, Department of Transportation (Caltrans)); (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress-bystander (against Staab, Spirit Flow, and defendants Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Toyota Motor North America Inc., Toyota Motor Manufacturing, California, Inc., and Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc.); (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress-direct victim (against Staab, Spirit Flow, and the Toyota defendants identified above); (5) negligence-product liability (against the Toyota defendants identified above); (6) strict product liability (against the Toyota defendants identified above); (7) breach of express warranty (against the Toyota defendants identified above); and, (8) breach of implied warranty (against the Toyota defendants identified above). Pursuant to the court’s order dated January 4, 2022, this matter is related to Santa Barbara Superior Court case number 21CV03400 entitled Anthony M. Koehl vs. Garrett Staab.

As alleged in the SAC, on September 10, 2019, Austin, Maverick, and Allyson were in a Toyota vehicle traveling southbound on the highway approaching the intersection. At the same time, Staab was travelling northbound on the highway. At the intersection, which is owned or controlled by Caltrans, the highway has a speed limit of 65 miles per hour and consists of two southbound lanes and two northbound lanes with designated left turn lanes onto Las Varas for both northbound and southbound traffic. Staab, who was employed by and running business errands for Spirit Flow, was travelling northbound on the highway. After missing his exit, Staab made a left U-turn at Las Varas, turning in front of Austin who, despite taking evasive maneuvers, was unable to avoid colliding with Staab’s vehicle. Austin, Maverick, Allyson were each injured in the collision. Allyson later died as a result of her injuries.

Staab, Spirit Flow, Caltrans, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Toyota Sales), Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc. (Toyota Engineering), and Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota Corp.) each filed their answers to the SAC generally denying its allegations and asserting affirmative defenses. Spirit Flow, Staab, Caltrans, Toyota Sales, and Toyota Engineering each filed cross-complaints. Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint on February 10, 2022, substituting David Alan Zaboski (Zaboski) for Doe 1. Zaboski filed an answer to the SAC on September 13, 2022.

On April 10, 2023, the court granted an application of Caltrans for determination of good faith settlement.

Plaintiffs and Toyota have reached an agreement regarding a settlement amount to resolve the entire action as to Toyota. Plaintiffs now petition for approval of minor plaintiff Maverick Buist’s claims. The petition is unopposed.

Toyota moves for determination of good faith settlement. The motion is unopposed.

 

Analysis:

            Minor’s Compromise

“While the guardian ad litem has the power to assent to procedural steps that will facilitate a determination of the ward’s case [citation], the guardian ad litem’s authority is that of “ ‘ “an agent with limited powers.” ’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] For example, when a guardian ad litem believes that settling a case is in the ward’s best interests, that decision requires court approval. (Code Civ. Proc., 372.) The court has a duty to ensure that the ward’s rights are protected by the guardian ad litem.” (McClintock v. West (2013) 219 Cal.App.4^th 540, 549.)

“A petition for court approval of a compromise of, or a covenant not to sue or enforce judgment on, a minor’s disputed claim; a compromise or settlement of a pending action or proceeding to which a minor or person with a disability is a party; or the disposition of the proceeds of a judgment for a minor or person with a disability under Probate Code sections 3500 and 3600-3613 or Code of Civil Procedure section 372 must be verified by the petitioner and must contain a full disclosure of all information that has any bearing on the reasonableness of the compromise, covenant, settlement, or disposition. Except as provided in rule 7.950.5, the petition must be submitted on a completed Petition for Approval of Compromise of Claim or Action or Disposition of Proceeds of Judgment for Minor or Person With a Disability (form MC-350).” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950.)

“If the petitioner has been represented or assisted by an attorney in preparing the petition for approval of the compromise of the claim or in any other respect with regard to the claim, the petition must disclose the following information:

“(1) The name, state bar number, law firm, if any, and business address of the attorney;

“(2) Whether the attorney became involved with the petition, directly or indirectly, at the instance of any party against whom the claim is asserted or of any party’s insurance carrier;

“(3) Whether the attorney represents or is employed by any other party or any insurance carrier involved in the matter;

“(4) Whether the attorney has received any attorney’s fees or other compensation for services provided in connection with the claim giving rise to the petition or with the preparation of the petition, and, if so, the amounts and the identity of the person who paid the fees or other compensation;

“(5) If the attorney has not received any attorney’s fees or other compensation for services provided in connection with the claim giving rise to the petition or with the preparation of the petition, whether the attorney expects to receive any fees or other compensation for these services, and, if so, the amounts and the identity of the person who is expected to pay the fees or other compensation; and

“(6) The terms of any agreement between the petitioner and the attorney.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.951.)

The petition alleges that Maverick was born on May 3, 2019, and is 4 years old. (Petition, ¶ 2.)

On September 10, 2019, Maverick was involved in a motor vehicle accident on Highway-101 Southbound at Las Varnas Ranch Access Road, when Staab attempted a U-turn after missing his exit on Northbound Highway-101. (Petition, ¶¶ 4, 5.) Maverick sustained: (1) Bruising and ecchymosis to his face; (2) A seatbelt abrasion to his lower left abdomen; (3) A traverse fracture through the femoral shaft with full shaft displacement and overriding; (4) Soft tissue swelling; and (5) Emotional distress and pain and suffering. (Petition, ¶ 6.)

As a result of his injuries, Maverick had a left displaced femur fracture resulting in a closed reduction surgery and SPICA casting, and several follow-up visits regarding his left leg. (Petition, ¶ 7.) Maverick has not recovered completely from his injuries and his pediatrician will continue to monitor that both legs are growing equally and appropriately for his age group. (Petition, ¶ 8, subd. (c).)

The amount of settlement is confidential, and plaintiffs have lodged an unredacted copy of the petition, showing the amounts of settlement, medical expenses, attorney’s fees, payments owed to others, and net recovery by Maverick.

Maverick’s net proceeds are to be deposited into a blocked, insured, account at Cornerstone Bank, 1945 California Street, Redding, CA 96001. (Petition, ¶ 18 & attachment 18a(3)(a).) “When the minor reaches 18 years of age. the depository, without further order of this court, is authorized and directed to pay by check or draft directly to the former minor, on proper demand, all funds, including interest, deposited under this order. The money on deposit is not subject to escheat.” (Proposed Order, ¶ 9 (c)(2).)

Maverick has supported his petition with medical documentation and has provided all the information required by the California Rules of Court. The court has thoroughly reviewed all the information provided and finds that the settlement is reasonable and in Maverick’s best interests. As such, the petition will be granted. The court finds the proposed order granting the petition, and the proposed order to deposit funds in blocked account, acceptable and intends on executing the same.

            Good Faith Settlement

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors . . . shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1),)

Code of Civil Procedure section 877 provides:

“Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights, it shall have the following effect:

“(a) It shall not discharge any other such party from liability unless its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater.

“(b) It shall discharge the party to whom it is given from all liability for any contribution to any other parties.

“(c) This section shall not apply to co-obligors who have expressly agreed in writing to an apportionment of liability for losses or claims among themselves.

“(d) This section shall not apply to a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment given to a co-obligor on an alleged contract debt where the contract was made prior to January 1, 1988.”

“When confronted with motions for good faith settlements, judges should . . . not yearn for the unreal goal of mathematical certainty. Because the application of section 877.6 requires an educated guess as to what may occur should the case go to trial, all that can be expected is an estimate, not a definitive conclusion.” (North County Contractor’s Assn. v. Touchstone Ins. Services (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1090.) “ ‘[A] “good faith” settlement does not call for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“[T]he intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.] Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.] The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.” (Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499-500 (Tech-Bilt).)

The declaration of counsel for the Toyota defendants demonstrates evidence as to all the factors outlined by Tech-Bilt. Given the facts of this case, and the theory of liability as to the Toyota defendants, the settlement is within the reasonable range and the settlement is in good faith.