Sophie Strasburg et al vs Santa Barbara Unified School District et al

Case Number

20CV00740

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Fri, 05/31/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

(2) Motions to Compel

Tentative Ruling

(1)       As set forth herein, defendant Santa Barbara Unified School District’s motion to compel further responses to its Requests for Admission, set one, is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to require further responses to request Nos. 1 and 2 to the extent directed herein. Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg shall serve such verified further responses on or before June 17, 2024, without objection except as to qualifications permitted by this order. The motion, including all requests for sanctions, is denied in all other respects.

(2)       As set forth herein, the hearing on defendant Santa Barbara Unified School District’s motion to compel further responses to its Special Interrogatories, set three, is continued to July 19, 2024. On or before June 17, 2024, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants shall further meet and confer, in person, by telephone, or by video conference, and shall file a report to the court on or before June 28, 2024, setting forth the status of the discovery dispute, including particularly what issues are no longer at issue. The parties may file a joint report (preferred), or may file and serve separate reports. Any party may file and serve supplemental declaration(s) concurrently with the report(s) to the extent necessary. To the extent a written response is required, such written response shall be filed and served on or before noon on July 9, 2024.

Background:

The first amended complaint (FAC) filed on February 19, 2021, by plaintiffs Sophie Strasburg (Sophie), Gidget Strasburg (Gidget), Keven Strasburg (Keven), and Summer Strasburg (Summer) (collectively, plaintiffs) is the operative pleading in this matter. (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the court will refer to plaintiffs individually by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.) As alleged in the FAC:

On February 22, 2019, Sophie, who was 17 years old at the time, was attending San Marcos High School (San Marcos) and was chosen to perform in a variety talent show for the school’s theater department. Under the direction of San Marcos and through Shannon Saleh (Saleh), Suzette McCormick (McCormick), and Alex Sheldon (Sheldon), Sophie was directed to wear an oversized hippopotamus costume as part of her act. (Note: Available information indicates that Sheldon was erroneously sued as “Alex Shelton”.) The costume Sophie wore was poorly maintained, too large, and created visual impairment. In addition, the lighting in the auditorium was insufficient.

During her performance, Sophie fell approximately four to five feet off an elevated stage, severely injuring her left ankle. Sophie’s parents, Keven and Gidget and Sophie’s younger sister Summer were in the audience and witnessed Sophie fall and injure herself. Keven, Gidget, and Summer each suffered mental anguish, emotional trauma, and distress from the event.

Sophie was taken to the emergency room where she was diagnosed with multiple fractures in her left ankle, foot, and the lower end of her left fibula. Defendants encouraged, organized, sanctioned and presented the variety show, while failing to provide a safe environment for Sophie. As a result of Sophie’s injuries, she was required to utilize a knee scooter to travel around the school.

On April 23, 2019, Sophie was on her way to the theater department as required by San Marcos when she hit a curb. Sophie was thrown from her knee scooter breaking her left elbow and suffering injuries to her face. San Marcos High failed to provide safe handicap access around the campus for Sophie and failed to properly maintain the premises, resulting in substantial injury to Sophie.

Plaintiffs allege five causes of action: (1) negligence (against San Marcos, Saleh, McCormick, Sheldon, and Santa Barbara Unified School District); (2) premises liability (against San Marcos, Saleh, McCormick, Sheldon, and Santa Barbara Unified School District); (3) negligent supervision of a minor (against San Marcos, Saleh, McCormick, Sheldon, and Santa Barbara Unified School District); (4) negligence (against San Marcos and Santa Barbara Unified School District); and (5) premises liability (against San Marcos and Santa Barbara Unified School District).

On March 18, 2021, McCormick filed an answer to the FAC generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-five affirmative defenses. The court has no record of San Marcos, Saleh, Sheldon, or the Santa Barbara Unified School District (SBUSD) having filed a response to the FAC separate from the answer to the original complaint.

On October 19, 2023, SBUSD, Saleh, McCormick, and Sheldon (the SBUSD defendants) filed a cross-complaint against Christopher “Woody” Locke (Locke) asserting four causes of action: (1) indemnification; (2) apportionment of fault; (3) negligence; and (4) intentional tort. In the cross-complaint, the SBUSD defendants allege that Locke willfully breached his duty to use reasonable care in supervising students for the Royal Blue Variety Show at San Marcos which caused Sophie’s injuries.

The court has no record of Locke having filed a response to the cross-complaint of the SBUSD defendants.

On January 25, 2024, SBUSD served its Requests for Admission, Set One, to plaintiff Sophie (RFA). (Khosh-Chashm decl. re RFA, ¶ 2 & exhibit B.) The RFA consists of three requests for admission. (Ibid.)

On January 26, 2024, the court ruled on defendants’ motion for an order compelling the mental examination of Sophie. In that motion, defendants asserted that the stipulation presented by Sophie under Code of Civil Procedure section 2032.320, subdivision (c) was insufficient because the stipulation did not provide a list of the specific physical injuries Sophie will claim at trial. The court denied the motion, finding the stipulation sufficient.

On February 1, 2024, SBUSD served its Special Interrogatories, Set Three, to plaintiff Sophie (SI). (Khosh-Chashm decl. re SI, ¶ 2 & exhibit B.) The SI consists of 213 special interrogatories (Nos. 602-814, inclusive). (Ibid.) Attached to the SI is a declaration for additional discovery. (Ibid.) (Note: Paragraph 4 of the declaration for additional discovery states that the SI consists of 212 special interrogatories. While 814 minus 602 is 212, this calculation is the difference between these two numbers and does not include the initial interrogatory. For example, if the interrogatory numbers were 602, 603, and 604, 604 minus 602 is only two, but there are three interrogatories. There are actually 213 interrogatories in the third set.)

On February 23, 2024, Sophie served her responses to the RFA consisting entirely of objections. (Khosh-Chashm decl. re RFA, ¶ 3 & exhibit C.)

On April 5, 2024, Sophie served her response to the SI consisting entirely of objections. (Khosh-Chashm decl. re SI, ¶ 3 & exhibit C.)

SBUSD attempted an unsuccessful meet-and-confer process as to the responses to the RFA and SI. (Khosh-Chashm decl. re RFA, ¶ 3 & exhibit D; Khosh-Chashm decl. re SI, ¶ 3 & exhibit D.)

On March 27, 2024, SBUSD filed its motion to compel further responses to the RFA.

On April 15, 2024, SBUSD filed its motion to compel further responses to the SI.

Both motions are opposed by Sophie.

Trial is now set for September 13, 2024.

Analysis:

(1)       Timeliness of Oppositions and Replies

In both replies, filed on May 24, 2024, SBUSD objects to the consideration of the oppositions because they were each filed and served on May 21 for a May 31 hearing. The oppositions are untimely. Oppositions must be filed and served at least nine court days before the hearing and replies must be filed and served at least five court days before the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) With the Memorial Day holiday, nine court days before May 31 was May 17; five court days before was May 23. So, neither the oppositions nor the replies were timely.

As discussed below, the issues with the motion to compel further responses to the RFA appear in the moving papers (and more specifically in the text of the requests and responses) so the court’s resolution of that motion does not depend upon the opposition papers. There is therefore no problem with resolving that motion as set forth herein. The court will require a further meet and confer before resolving the motion to compel further responses to the SI, so timeliness of the opposition will become moot. The court expects timely further filings as to this motion and in general.

(2)       Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFA

“On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply:

            “(1)      An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete.

            “(2)      An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (a).)

“[I]f a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on responding party to justify any objection.” (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

RFA No. 1 is: “Admit that the only physical injuries YOU (the terms ‘YOU’ and ‘YOUR’ mean Sophie Strasburg, or any representative thereof) are claiming in this lawsuit are:

            “a.       Bruising

            “b.       Swelling

            “c.        Pain

            “d.       Fracture of fibula

            “e.        Fracture of metatarsal

            “f.        Skin tightness

            “g.       Skin discoloration

            “h.       Skin redness

            “i.        Not being able to walk

            “j.        Not being able to swim

            “k.       Not breathing normally

            “l.        Not being able to run

            “m.      Having to take longer than usual walking

            “n.       Pain when walking on sand

            “o.        Ankle being delicate

            “p.       Head scrape

            “q.       Broken elbow

            “r.        Vein protrusion

            “s.        Muscle next to YOUR heel getting hard

            “t.        Throbbing pain

            “u.       Aching pain

            “v.       Burning pain”

The response to RFA No. 1 is: “Objection. Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg, hereafter Sophie, objects to this request for admission on the following grounds:

            “1.       Objection. This request for admission contains subparts, is compound and attempts to cover a variety of matters in a single subdivided question, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure, hereafter C.C.P., § 2033.060.

            “2.       Objection. This request for admission is vague, ambiguous, and unclear as to subparts a, b, c, f, g, h, r, s, t, u, and v in that these subparts don’t specify whether these conditions are always present or periodically occur. Without further clarification of this request for admission, any admission by Sophie could be misconstrued, for example, that Sophie can never walk, swim, run, or breathe normally and that Sophie always suffers from skin tightness, and discoloration, bruising, and vein protrusion.

            “3.       Objection. This request for admission is vague, ambiguous, and unclear as to subpart o, in that ‘being delicate’ is not defined.

            “4.       Objection. This request for admission is burdensome and oppressive and would require a compilation or summary from Plaintiff’s previous discovery responses and deposition testimony already in Defendant’s possession. Thus far, Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg has provided answers to form interrogatories, has provided answers to over 600 special interrogatories and has provided all her related medical records in response to Defendant’s requests for production, Further, on July 11, 2023, Sophie was deposed for over six hours. Sophie’s deposition transcript is over 300 pages in length. To comply with this request for admission would be an undue burden on Sophie because the requested information has been provided previously. Continuous discovery into the same matter constitutes oppression and Sophie further objects on this ground. Professional Career Colleges v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal app 3rd 490, 493-494.

            “5.       Objection. This request for admission fails to comply with C.C.P. §2033.030 (a) as the propounding party has exceeded the limit of requests for admissions by including 68 sub parts to the request for admission, without having included a declaration justifying the excessive number of requests.”

“ ‘Requests for admission are not restricted to facts or documents, but apply to conclusions, opinions, and even legal questions. [Citations.] Thus, requests for admission serve to narrow discovery, eliminate undisputed issues, and shift the cost of proving certain matters. As such, the requests for admission mechanism is not a means by which a party obtains additional information, but rather a dispute resolution device that eliminates the time and expense of formal proof at trial.’ [Citation.]” (Orange County Water Dist. v. The Arnold Engineering Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 96, 115.) “ ‘The primary purpose of requests for admissions is to set at rest triable issues so that they will not have to be tried; they are aimed at expediting trial. [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid.)

Objection 1 is as to the form of the request.

“No request for admission shall contain subparts, or a compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive request unless it has been approved under Chapter 17 (commencing with Section 2033.710).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.060, subd. (f).)

“In referring to the prohibition of ‘compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive’ questions (§ 2030.060, subd. (f)), Weil & Brown point out that the ‘purpose again is to prevent questions worded so as to require more information than could be obtained by 35 separate questions. [¶] How strictly this rule will be applied remains to be seen. Arguably, any question containing an “and” or “or” is compound and conjunctive!’ [Citation.] They comment that ‘[t]he rule should probably apply only where more than a single subject is covered by the question. Questions regarding the same subject should be allowed although they include an “and” or “or.” For example: “State your first name, middle name and last name, and your current address and telephone number.” Since only one subject is involved—identification of responding party—the question should not be objectionable because of the “ands” used.’ [Citation.]” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1291.)

RFA No. 1 is difficult to parse in dealing with the one subject rule. RFA No. 1 is written in the form of requesting an admission that the only physical injuries claimed in the lawsuit are those listed as (a) through (v), inclusive. If the response were “admit,” then that list would be conclusive as to the physical injuries, and it would be reasonable to conclude that this request deals with only one subject matter, i.e., the list of physical injuries. However, if Sophie were to claim some, but not all, of the physical injuries on the list, then Sophie would be required under section 2033.330, subdivision (b), to admit so much of the matter is true and deny so much of the matter as is untrue or for which the truth is unknown. Under that interpretation of RFA No. 1, RFA No. 1 would be equivalent to asking Sophie to admit claiming each of the 22 separately listed physical injuries—something which is prohibited by the rule against compound requests and against subparts.

The problem is most simply addressed by construing the RFA as a request for a complete list rather than a request as to each individual item listed, that is, RFA No. 1 is the equivalent of “Admit that there are no claims of physical injuries other than” items (a) to (v). If there are no other claims of physical injuries, then Sophie may admit the request; if there are other claims, then the request may be denied without qualification (except as discussed below). To the extent that Sophie lacks sufficient information or knowledge, then it can be denied on that basis in a manner conforming to section 2033.220, subdivision (c). As so construed, Sophie is under no obligation to admit or to deny individual items listed and the objection is to that extent overruled.

Objection 2 is that certain subparts do not specify whether these conditions are always present or periodically occur, thus making the request ambiguous. This objection is also resolved by the construction explained above. The “claim” of physical injury is that the physical injury has occurred at any time, whether or not recurring or continuous, so as to form a basis of any part of Sophie’s claim for damage. Again, this construction focuses on whether the list of particular physical injuries is complete, not on the scope of any particular physical injury. As so construed, objection 2 is overruled.

Objection 3 is as to the definition of “being delicate” as that term is used in item (o). “Each answer shall: (1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b)(1).) “If only a part of a request for admission is objectionable, the remainder of the request shall be answered.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.230, subd. (a).) The term “being delicate” apparently comes from Sophie’s own testimony in describing the condition of her ankle. Sophie may clarify that her claim as to item (o) is as she testified or may make any other reasonable and appropriate qualification as to the meaning of item (o) so as to clarify the extent to which RFA No. 1 is admitted or denied.

Objection 4 is that the request is burdensome and oppressive as requiring a compilation or summary from previous discovery. Again, by construing the request as focusing on whether the list of claimed physical injuries is complete, the response only requires plaintiff to identify whether or not there are other claims of physical injury at issue by her complaint. There is no sufficient showing that this is burdensome or oppressive. To that extent this objection is overruled.

Objection 5 is that the request exceeds the limit of requests for admission by including subparts. As construed herein, the request is a single request and does not violate the limited number of requests under section 2033.030, subdivision (a). The objection is overruled.

A further response will be required to RFA No. 1 as that request is construed herein.

RFA No. 2 is: “Admit that the only mental injuries YOU are claiming in this lawsuit are:

            “a.       Freaking out

            “b.       Crying

            “c.        Breathing to keep calm

            “d.       Digging nails into YOURSELF

            “e.        Frustration

            “f.        Irritation

            “g.       Sadness

            “h.       Bottling things up

            “i.        YOU explode

            “j.        Anxiety

            “k.       Being upset

            “l.        Extreme anxiety

            “m.      Depression

            “n.       Feeling suicidal”

The response to RFA No. 2 is: “Objection. Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg, hereafter Sophie, objects to this request for admission on the following grounds:

            “1.       Objection. This request for admission contains subparts, is compound and attempts to cover a variety of matters in a single subdivided question, in violation of C.C.P. § 2033.060.

            “2.       Objection. This request for admission is vague, ambiguous, and unclear in that it asks Sophie to admit that she is only claiming mental injuries that are listed in the request. The phrase mental injury is not defined in this request but normally means a loss of mental faculties, or mental or behavioral disorder or a clinically significant behavioral cognitive or psychological dysfunction. Sophie is not claiming that she suffered any traumatic brain injury or that she is suffering from memory issues, confusion, or any other cognitive deficits. She is claiming emotional distress injuries that any ordinary person would experience in any similar situation arising from her accident. These injuries include physical pain, mental suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, disfigurement, grief, anxiety, and humiliation. Without an explanation as to your definition of mental injuries, Sophie is unable to respond to your request for admission.

            “3.       Objection. This request for admission is burdensome and oppressive and would require a compilation or summary from Plaintiff’s previous discovery responses and deposition testimony already in Defendant’s possession. Thus far, Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg has provided answers to form interrogatories, answers to over 600 special interrogatories and she has provided all of her related medical records in response to Defendant’s requests for production, Further, on July 11, 2023, Sophie was deposed for over six hours. Sophie’s deposition transcript is over 300 pages in length. To comply with this request for admission would be an undue burden on Sophie because the requested information has been provided previously. Continuous discovery into the same matter constitutes oppression and Sophie further objects on this ground. Professional Career Colleges v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal app 3rd 490, 493-494.

            “4.       Objection. This request for admission fails to comply with C.C.P. §2033.030 (a) as the propounding party has exceeded the limit of requests for admissions by including 68 subparts to the request for admission, without having included a declaration justifying the excessive number of requests.”

The immediate difficulty with addressing RFA No. 2 in the same manner as RFA No. 1 is the problem raised by objection 2. In RFA No. 1, the request asks about “physical injuries” and then provides a list of items, such as a “fracture of fibula,” that more or less reasonably fall within the common understanding of a physical injury. In RFA No. 2, the requests ask about “mental injuries” and then provides a list of items, such as “crying,” that do not seem to fit the same pattern as an “injury” when that term is used in “physical injury.”

As with RFA No. 1, the request avoids the prohibition against subparts and compound, conjunctive, and disjunctive requests when it is construed as a request that the list is complete. By following the format of RFA No. 1, it is reasonable to construe RFA No. 2 as seeking parallel information relating to “mental injuries” as for “physical injuries.” There is, however, a need to clarify what is meant by “mental injuries” so that the completeness of the list can be assessed, and consequently admitted or denied.

The parties do not provide much assistance here, but the Restatement Third of Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm provides useful definitions: “ ‘Physical harm’ means the physical impairment of the human body (‘bodily harm’) or of real property or tangible personal property (‘property damage’). Bodily harm includes physical injury, illness, disease, impairment of bodily function, and death.” (Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm, § 4.) “ ‘Emotional harm’ means impairment or injury to a person’s emotional tranquility.” (Id., § 45.) “Emotional harm is distinct from bodily harm, which is defined in § 4. Emotional harm encompasses a variety of mental states, including fright, fear, sadness, sorrow, despondency, anxiety, humiliation, depression (and other mental illnesses), and a host of other detrimental—from mildly unpleasant to disabling—mental conditions. The distinction between physical and emotional harm is not precise and may be difficult to determine in some cases. Most physical harm, with the exception of disease, results from traumatic impact with the human body, while emotional harm can occur without such trauma, indeed without any event that resembles a physical-harm tort. Usually the existence of bodily harm can be verified objectively while the existence and severity of emotional harm is ordinarily dependent on self-reporting.” (Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm, § 45, com. a.)

Using the Restatement’s definition of “emotional harm” for “mental injuries” in RFA No. 2, and giving the request the same construction as for RFA No. 1, RFA No. 2 is the equivalent of: “Admit that there are no claims of emotional harm other than” items (a) to (n). As so construed, just as with the RFA No. 1, the request is about the completeness of a list and not a request as to each of the items on a list. To that extent the objections will be overruled and a further response will be required to RFA No. 2 as construed by the court.

RFA No. 3 is: “Admit that the only damages YOU are claiming in this lawsuit are:

            “a.       Not being able to walk

            “b.       Not being able to swim

            “c.        Not breathing

            “d.       Working on breathing

            “e.        Pain

            “f.        Lower grades at school

            “g.       Lower grades at college

            “h.       YOU cannot run

            “i.        Taking time walking

            “j.        Walking on sand hurts

            “k.       Not going on field trips

            “l.        Not going on hikes

            “m.      Not playing games like Car Lot

            “n.       Not playing games like Man On The Moon

            “o.        Not being able to stand for long periods

            “p.       Use of a knee roller

            “q.       Use of a crutch

            “r.        Use of a handicap placard

            “s.        Complex regional pain syndrome

            “t.        Plantar fasciitis

            “u.       Not being the happy go go go person YOU used to be

            “v.       Not being able to walk

            “w.       Not being able to swim

            “x.       Not breathing normally

            “y.       Not being able to run

            “z.        Having to take longer than usual walking

            “aa.     Pain when walking on sand

            “bb.     Ankle being delicate

            “cc.      Muscle next to YOUR heel getting hard

            “dd.     Throbbing pain

            “ee.      Aching pain

            “ff.       Burning pain”

The response to RFA No. 3 is: “Objection. Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg, hereafter Sophie, objects to this request for admission on the following grounds:

            “1.       Objection. This request for admission contains subparts, is compound and attempts to cover a variety of matters in a single subdivided question, in violation of C.C.P. § 2033.060.

            “2.       Objection. This request for admission is vague, ambiguous, and unclear as to subparts a, b, c, h, t, v, w, x, y, aa, and cc in that these subparts don’t specify whether these conditions are always present or periodically occur. In addition, subpart bb does not provide a definition for ‘delicate’. Without further clarification of this request for admission, any admission by Sophie could be misconstrued.

            “3.       Objection. This request for Admission is burdensome and oppressive and would require a compilation or summary from Plaintiff’s previous discovery responses and deposition testimony already in Defendant’s possession. Thus far, Plaintiff Sophie Strasburg has provided answers to form interrogatories, answers to over 600 special interrogatories and she has provided all of her related medical records in response to Defendant’s requests for production, Further, on July 11, 2023, Sophie was deposed for over six hours. Sophie's deposition transcript is over 300 pages in length. To comply with this request for admission would be an undue burden on Sophie because the requested information has been provided previously. Continuous discovery into the same matter constitutes oppression and Sophie further objects on this ground. Professional Career Colleges v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal app 3rd 490, 493-494.

            “4.       Objection. This request for admission fails to comply with C.C.P. §2033.030 (a) as the propounding party has exceeded the limit of requests for admissions by including 68 sub parts to the request for admission, without having included a declaration justifying the excessive number of requests.”

RFA No. 3 is particularly confusing. “ ‘[T]he term “damages” ..., both in its legal and commonly understood or “ ‘ordinary and popular sense,’ ” is limited to “money ordered by a court”....’ [Citations.]” (Rashidi v. Moser (2014) 60 Cal.4th 718, 725–726.) None of the items on the list are items of money. The list also includes items such as “Lower grades at school” which would not ordinarily themselves be the basis for a claim for damages, but may be evidence of a source of claims for damages based on emotional distress. The presence of these items in the list together with the use of the term “damages” which is not directly applicable to the list leaves the court unable to characterize the request as one seeking completeness of a list, as with RFA Nos. 1 and 2, and instead being more in the nature of an inappropriately compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive (and unreasonably vague and ambiguous) request. Objection 1 will therefore be sustained as to RFA No. 3. No further response is required to RFA No. 3; SBUSD is not thereby precluded from propounding additional requests for admission on this subject matter but otherwise complying with the Code of Civil Procedure.

With respect to sanctions, the court notes first that the motion does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, which provides: “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. The notice of motion shall be supported by a memorandum of points and authorities, and accompanied by a declaration setting forth facts supporting the amount of any monetary sanction sought.” The notice of the motion to compel re RFAs does not contain the required information. The opposition contains no specific request for sanctions, stating only, “A monetary award of sanctions would be appropriate.” (Opposition, at p. 11.) This, too, is insufficient.

In any case, the court finds that awarding sanctions in favor of, or against, either party under these circumstances would be unjust. All requests for awards of monetary sanctions will be denied. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

(3)       Motion to Compel Further Responses to SI

There has been considerable discovery up to this point. According to plaintiffs, Sophie responded to form interrogatories on June 29, 2020, including form interrogatories regarding physical, mental, and emotional injuries, and provided medical records. (Opposition, at pp. 4-5.) This point is raised only in argument. The supporting declaration does not mention the form interrogatories, and does not attach either the form interrogatories propounded or the responses thereto. Prior to propounding the SI now at issue, SBUSD propounded a first set of special interrogatories consisting of 597 interrogatories. (Andrade decl. re SI, ¶ 2 & exhibit A.) The responses to those interrogatories are not now, and have not previously, been at issue before the court. The deposition of Sophie was taken on June 23, 2023. (Andrade decl. re SI, ¶ 2 & exhibit C.) In support of the motion to compel, SBUSD notes that plaintiff propounded 1,252 special interrogatories on March 21, 2024. (Khosh-Chashm decl. re SI, ¶ 5 & exhibit G.)

At issue here is SBUSD’s third set of special interrogatories consisting of an additional 213 interrogatories. Sophie raises a number of related general objections to these interrogatories. Sophie argues that the number of additional interrogatories is unreasonably in excess of 35 special interrogatories. Sophie also argues that these interrogatories are oppressive and burdensome because the subject matter of the interrogatories has been addressed by form interrogatories and by deposition testimony.

In its moving papers, SBUSD argues that “all of this discovery and motion work would likely have been avoided if Plaintiff had responded to Defendant’s original request for a list of her physical injuries related to Defendant’s Motion for the Mental Exam.” (Motion, at p. 4.) However, as the court ruled in that motion, such a list was not required. SBUSD also essentially argues that the number of interrogatories is not unreasonable because plaintiffs have propounded as much and more.

The court is concerned that this amount of discovery, and the attendant disputes, far exceed the usefulness of the discovery and have become harassing, oppressive, and unreasonably burdensome. On the other hand, SBUSD is generally entitled to discovery of the nature and scope of Sophie’s claims for physical and mental harm (using the Restatement definitions discussed above). This entitlement is nonetheless subject to the procedures for discovery. (See, e.g., Professional Career Colleges, Magna Institute, Inc. v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 490, 494 [failure timely to move to compel unsatisfactory interrogatory responses waives right to propound a new interrogatory asking the same question].)

Rather than addressing the merits of the motion at this time, the court will provide guidance to the parties, require the parties further to meet and confer, and require the parties to report back to the court. The court makes the following observations:

The objection regarding the number of interrogatories as it solely relates to the number of interrogatories is not a proper objection to interrogatories. Challenges to the propriety of the declaration for additional discovery must be made by motion for protective order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040, subd. (a); Catanese v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165, abrogated on other grounds in Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1237, 1243-1244.) No motion for protective order is now before the court. Accordingly, the court will consider the objection to the number of additional interrogatories only in the context of burden and oppressiveness.

Ordinarily, a party is entitled to use different discovery procedures to address the same subject matter. (See Carter v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997-998 [statutes do not preclude seeking documents under one statutory procedure from seeking the same documents under another procedure, subject to the court’s discretion to restrict burdensome or duplicative discovery].) But, interrogatories, whether specially prepared interrogatories or Judicial Council form interrogatories are treated as a single discovery procedure under the Civil Discovery Act. (E.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.010, subd. (a) [authorizing discovery by written interrogatories generally], 2030.030, subd. (a) [identifying both types of interrogatories under the statutes relating to interrogatories].) The overlap of special and form interrogatories are responsible for some of the oppression and burden in the large number of special interrogatories now at issue.

“ ‘The responding party need only provide such information as is available at the time the answers are prepared. There is no duty to update or amend the answers, either to correct errors or to include new information discovered later. [Citation.]’ ” (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1328, quoting Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2004) ¶ 8:1119.) This limitation leads to tension in asking for essentially the same information as sought in earlier interrogatories. Repetitive interrogatories, particularly where the information requested has been or could have been ascertained by other reasonable means, is evidence of harassment and may constitute oppressiveness sufficient to justify denying a motion to compel a substantive response.

Sophie argues that form interrogatories had previously been propounded. (Opposition, at p. 4.) There is no evidence presented here as to the exact form interrogatories previously served, the responses to those form interrogatories, and the subsequent manner in which those responses were addressed. The special interrogatories here all address issues of damages. Form interrogatories Nos. 6.1 to 6.7 all address issues of physical, mental, and emotional injuries, asking the responding party to identify each injury attributed to the incident (No. 6.2), to identify complaints attributed to the incident (No. 6.3), and to identify health care services and treatment (Nos. 6.4-6.7). It appears that the responses to these form interrogatories provides the essential information sought in the special interrogatories at issue in this motion. The special interrogatories thus appear to be unreasonably repetitive of the form interrogatories.

This does not mean that SBUSD is not entitled to updated information in a reasonable form consistent with the discovery statutes. The principal purpose of the discovery statutes is “to educate the parties concerning their claims and defenses so as to encourage settlements and to expedite and facilitate trial.” (Emerson Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1107.) “ ‘Certainly, it can be said, that the Legislature intended to take the “game” element out of trial preparation while yet retaining the adversary nature of the trial itself. One of the principal purposes of discovery was to do away “with the sporting theory of litigation—namely, surprise at trial.” ’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) It is improper for a party to withhold information sought by earlier discovery where a reasonable inquiry would have disclosed that information at the time of the discovery response. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220, subd. (c).) Moreover, interrogatory responses need to be complete in themselves, without responses such as “see my deposition.” (See Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783–784.) Where a response requires a compilation, such as from medical records, a response complying with section 2030.230 may be sufficient. Most significantly, where a form interrogatory has previously been propounded covering the subject of the matter in need of alteration or updating, a supplemental interrogatory is designed to solicit that information. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.070.) A supplemental interrogatory may provide the updated and complete information reasonably required by SBUSD in a manner substantially less oppressive than the 213 special interrogatories now at issue.

With this guidance, the parties will be required further to meet and confer, personally, by telephone, or by video conference, on each of the interrogatories at issue and to report to the court as to what remains in dispute following that meet and confer process.