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Delina Terregone vs Henry J Walsh

Case Number

2024CUPP020651

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 06/10/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Demurrer

Tentative Ruling

Delina Terregone v. Henry J. Walsh 

Case No. 2024CUPP020651     

Hearing Date: June 10, 2023                                                 

MATTER:                Demurrer Of Defendant To Plaintiff’s Complaint

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff Delina Terregone: Self Represented

                             For Defendant Henry J. Walsh: Sarah L. Overton, Cummings, McClorey, Davis, Acho & Associates, P.C.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of defendant to plaintiff’s complaint is sustained without leave to amend. Defendant shall serve notice of this ruling on plaintiff at all known addresses.

Background:

On February 13, 2024, plaintiff Delina Terregone filed a Judicial Council of California form complaint against Henry J. Walsh, a judge of the Superior Court of Ventura County (Judge Walsh), generally alleging causes of action for intentional tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress, case discrimination, financial abuse, and violations of state constitutional rights. (Compl., ¶¶ 8 & 9 & Attachment 1.) Attached to the complaint is a motion which appears to have been filed by plaintiff in Superior Court of Ventura County case number 2023CUBC010335 (the Ventura County action). (Id. at Attachment 1.) In the motion, plaintiff requested an order setting aside a judgment of dismissal based on mistake, inadvertence, and an excusable non-attendance at a hearing scheduled in the Ventura County action on either September 19 or December 19, 2023 (the set aside motion). Also attached to plaintiff’s complaint is a declaration ostensibly filed by plaintiff in support of the set aside motion (the declaration). (Id. at Attachment 1.)

Information appearing in the set aside motion reflects that plaintiff filed in the Ventura County action a First Amended Complaint (the FAC) alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act or Song-Beverly (Civ. Code, § 1791 et seq.) in response to which defendants named in that action filed a demurrer. (See Compl., Attachment 1, Motion at p. 2, ll. 13-17 [referring to defendant’s demurrer to the FAC] & p. 3, ll. 1-9 [referring to “defendant’s” violations of the California Lemon Law]; Declaration [“Introduction” referring to the filing of documents for “Lemon Law compensatory monetary relief, breach of warranty”]; see also Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 792, 800 [California’s “lemon law” is officially known as Song-Beverly].) Additional information appearing in the set aside motion further indicates that it was filed by plaintiff in response to the entry of a dismissal in the Ventura County action in connection with a demurrer to the FAC. (Compl., Attachment 1, Motion at p. 2, ll. 14-17 [describing the set aside motion as a response to “the Defendants Demurrer[] to the [FAC]”]; p. 4, ll. 4-7 [referring to the demurrer “causing a mistake in a dismissal for non-attendance”].)

As alleged in the present complaint, “[t]he dismiss [sic] was done with collaborated intent and with reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress to” plaintiff, and Judge Walsh “has violated Civil Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment in favor of the defendants violating civil rights and civil liberties.” (Compl., Attachment 1, IT-1.)

On February 23, 2024, plaintiff filed a declaration purporting to set forth provisions of “Title 18, U.S.C., Section 245”, the “[t]est for [n]egligence” under “Kruger v. Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 A at 430 E-H”, and alleging that the complaint is “substantiated in fundamental rights in the United States Constitution”.

On March 12, 2024, plaintiff filed a substantially similar if not identical declaration substituting Judge Walsh for the name Daniel Shenton Wallis where it appeared in the February 23, 2024, declaration filed by plaintiff in this action.

On March 25, 2024, Judge Walsh filed a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that the complaint is barred by absolute judicial immunity and res judicata, and that plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action against Judge Walsh.

The court has no record of plaintiff having filed an opposition to the present demurrer of Judge Walsh. On June 3, 2024, Judge Walsh filed a notice stating that he has not received any opposition to the demurrer and did not stipulate to allow plaintiff additional time to oppose the demurrer.

Analysis:

The role of a demurrer is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of a complaint considering only those matters which are alleged on the face of the pleading or subject to judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The “face of the complaint” includes the allegations of the challenged pleading and matters shown in exhibits to the pleading which are incorporated by reference. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)

In ruling on a demurrer, the court determines whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The pleading subject to demurrer is given a reasonable interpretation and is read as a whole, with all its parts in their context. (Ibid.) A demurrer assumes the truth of properly pleaded material allegations, but not of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.) The court also accepts as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged and facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint. (McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509; Mead v. Sanwa Bank California (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 561, 567.) “[A] demurrer will be sustained only where the pleading is defective on its face.” (City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 459.) “If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Though the allegations of the complaint do not clearly reveal the precise scope of plaintiff’s claims in this matter and notwithstanding the nature of the dismissal entered in the Ventura County action as referenced in the set aside motion, a reasonable interpretation of the complaint, including facts which may be inferred from information appearing in the attachments thereto, demonstrates that plaintiff seeks to impose liability for judicial or adjudicative acts or decisions undertaken or made by Judge Walsh in the Ventura County action while acting in his official capacity as a judge. (See Olney v. Sacramento County Bar Assn. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 807, 811 (Olney) [defining “judicial” actions as “those relating to a function normally performed by a judge and where the parties understood they were dealing with the judge in his official capacity”].)

“Judges enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages for acts performed in their judicial capacities.” (Olney, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 811.) “The concept of judicial immunity is longstanding and absolute, with its roots in English common law. It bars civil actions against judges for acts performed in the exercise of their judicial functions and it applies to all judicial determinations, including those rendered in excess of the judge’s jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous or even malicious or corrupt they may be. [Citations.] The judge is immune unless ‘he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Beyond doubt, the doctrine of ‘civil immunity of the judiciary in the performance of judicial functions is deeply rooted in California law.’ [Citations.]” (Howard v. Drapkin (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851-852 (Howard).)

To the extent the causes of action alleged in plaintiff’s complaint arise from or relate to the performance of judicial functions by Judge Walsh or judicial determinations rendered in the Ventura County action which plaintiff contends was erroneous or otherwise improper, the causes of action are barred under the doctrine of judicial immunity. There is no reasonable construction of the complaint that would take this action outside the absolute immunity that exists for any judicial action undertaken by Judge Walsh in the Ventura County action. In addition, available information shows that the present action is not in any way based on any conduct or acts by Judge Walsh outside of or apart from those undertaken in his judicial capacity with respect to the Ventura County action. Moreover, plaintiff has not submitted an opposition demonstrating why the complaint does not relate to any judicial function exercised by Judge Walsh in the Ventura County action. Therefore, as the protection afforded by the doctrine of judicial immunity is absolute and for all reasons discussed above, the Court will sustain the demurrer of Judge Walsh to plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend. (Howard, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 852 [“[t]he effect of judicial immunity is that the action against the judicial officer must be dismissed”].)

The request for judicial notice of Judge Walsh:

In support of the demurrer, Judge Walsh requests judicial notice of the docket in the Ventura County action, a judgment entered in the Ventura County action on December 22, 2023 (the judgment), and a Minute Order entered in the Ventura County action on February 7, 2024 (the Minute Order). (Walsh RFJN, ¶¶ 2-4 & Exhs. 1-3.) Though the docket, judgment, and Minute Order are proper subjects of judicial notice (see Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)(1)), these documents are not necessary to the court’s determination of the demurrer. (Save Lafayette Trees v. East Bay Regional Park District (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 21, 29, fn. 2 [request for judicial notice of documents not necessary to resolve appeal denied].) Further, the matters appearing in the docket, judgment, and Minute Order may or do constitute or include matters extrinsic to the present complaint which may not be considered on demurrer. (Executive Landscape Corp. v. San Vicente Country Villas IV Assn. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 496, 499-500.) For these reasons, the court will deny the request of Judge Walsh for judicial notice of the docket, the judgment, and the Minute Order.

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