Natalie Hockey v. Brighton Collectibles, LLC

Case Number

19CV06616

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 03/03/2025 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Natalie Hockey’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

Tentative Ruling

Natalie Hockey v. Brighton Collectibles, LLC                   

Case No. 19CV06616

           

Hearing Date: March 3, 2025                                                             

HEARING:              Natalie Hockey’s Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings

ATTORNEYS:        For Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Natalie Hockey: Roger Y. Muse, John Matheny, Timothy A. Hall, Excelsior Law

                                    For Defendant and Cross-Complainant Brighton Collectibles, LLC: Peter W. Ross, Charles Avrith, Ross LLP

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is ordered off-calendar.

Background:

On December 16, 2019, plaintiff Natalie Hockey (Hockey) filed a complaint in this action against defendant Brighton Collectibles, LLC (Brighton), alleging one cause of action for penalty wages pursuant to Labor Code section 203. Briefly, in the complaint, Hockey alleges that in October 2018, she was employed by Brighton as a model for a photography shoot. (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Pursuant to an employment agreement, Hockey’s employment began and concluded on October 4, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.) Hockey asserts that pursuant to Labor Code section 201, she was entitled to be paid her wages upon the completion of the photo shoot, but was not paid until more than 30 days after she was discharged. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.) Hockey claims an entitlement to penalty wages for 30 days at a daily rate amounting to $90,000. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11.)

On March 2, 2020, Brighton answered the complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting eight affirmative defenses, and filed a cross-complaint (the Brighton/Hockey CC) against Hockey, alleging two causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; and (2) fraud. As alleged in the Brighton/Hockey CC:

Brighton is in the business of designing, manufacturing, marketing, and selling women’s accessories. (Brighton/Hockey CC, ¶ 4.) L.A. Models, Inc. (LA Models) is a modeling agency based in Los Angeles and the employer of Hockey, who is a fashion model, at times relevant to this action. (Id. at ¶¶ 5 & 7.) Neither LA Models nor Hockey ever said or indicated to Brighton that they considered Hockey to be an employee of Brighton. (Id. at ¶ 13.)

On October 3, 2018, Brighton and LA Models agreed to a contract (the Brighton/LA Models Contract), providing that LA Models had the authority to act on Hockey’s behalf, that LA Models would instruct Hockey to appear for a photo shoot with Brighton on October 4, that Brighton would pay LA Models $3,000 for Hockey’s work in accordance with an invoice that LA Models would send to Brighton, that the invoice would be paid by Brighton directly to LA Models and not to Hockey, and that LA Models would fully and timely pay Hockey in accordance with all applicable laws. (Brighton/Hockey CC, ¶ 8.) Hockey modeled for the photo shoot on October 4. (Id. at ¶ 10.)

On October 29, 2018, LA Models sent Brighton an invoice for the October 4 work of Hockey. (Brighton/Hockey CC, ¶ 11.) On December 7, 2018, Brighton sent to LA Models a $3,000 check in full payment of the October 29, 2018, invoice. (Id. at ¶ 12.)

Hockey failed to disclose that she intended to make a claim against Brighton unless it paid her directly and immediately after each shoot. (Brighton/Hockey CC, ¶ 21.) This fact was not known to Brighton. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.) Brighton relied on Hockey’s deception by paying LA Models instead of paying Hockey directly at the end of the shoot. (Id. at ¶ 24.)

On June 30, 2020, Brighton separately filed a cross-complaint against LA Models (the Brighton/LA CC) alleging causes of action for breach of contract and indemnity.

On April 29, 2020, Hockey filed a special motion to strike the Brighton/Hockey CC pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the Hockey anti-SLAPP motion), which was opposed by Brighton.

On July 1, 2020, the Court entered a Minute Order (the Minute Order) adopting its tentative ruling granting the Hockey anti-SLAPP motion as to the second cause of action for fraud alleged in the Brighton/Hockey CC, and denying that motion as to the first cause of action for declaratory relief alleged in the Brighton/Hockey CC.

On August 13, 2020, Hockey filed an answer to the Brighton/Hockey CC, generally denying its allegations and asserting nine affirmative defenses.

On August 26, 2020, Brighton filed a notice of appeal from the Minute Order. On September 25, 2020, the Court entered a Minute Order staying the case due to Brighton’s appeal from the Minute Order.

On September 20, 2021, the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, filed with the Court its opinion vacating the Minute Order and directing the Court to enter a new and different order denying the Hockey anti-SLAPP motion.  

On April 1, 2022, Brighton filed a first amended cross-complaint against LA Models (the Brighton/LA FACC), alleging the same causes of action for breach of contract and indemnity. The Brighton/LA FACC includes the allegations asserted in the Brighton/LA CC and the Brighton/Hockey CC with respect to Hockey’s employment by LA Models, the Brighton/LA Models Contract, the photoshoot modeled by Hockey on October 4, 2018, the invoice sent by LA Models to Brighton, and the $3,000 check paid by Brighton to LA Models. (See Brighton/LA FACC, ¶¶ 5, 7, 9, 11-13.) Brighton also alleges that neither LA Models nor Hockey informed Brighton that they considered Hockey to be an employee of Brighton, or that Brighton must pay Hockey other than as agreed. (Id. at ¶ 14.)

On September 6, 2022, LA Models filed its answer to the Brighton/LA FACC, generally denying its allegations and asserting 26 affirmative defenses.

On December 4, 2023, Hockey dismissed her complaint without prejudice.

On February 5 and June 25, 2024, the Court entered orders denying the separately filed motions of LA Models for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication of the Brighton/LA FACC.

As reflected in the Court’s July 12, 2024, Minute Order, a settlement conference was held on that date at which Brighton and LA Models informed the Court that they had reached a settlement as to their dispute, the terms of which were placed on the record and approved by the Court. (Jul. 12, 2024, Minute Order.) Further, the Court confirmed the date of the trial confirmation conference set for August 5, 2024, as to remaining parties. (Ibid.)

Court records reflect that on August 5, 2024, the Court entered a Minute Order continuing the trial confirmation conference to March 24, 2025, due to the unavailability of the Court.

On August 30, 2024, Brighton filed a request for dismissal of the Brighton/LA FACC, with prejudice.

On October 17, 2024, Hockey filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In the motion, Hockey contends that, notwithstanding their labels, the Brighton/LA CC and the Brighton/LA FACC (collectively, the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints) each constitute an amendment to the Brighton/Hockey CC, and that, as a result, the only remaining operative cross-complaint in this matter is the Brighton/LA FACC. Hockey further contends that, because Brighton did not name Hockey or sufficiently state any claims against Hockey in the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints, the filing of the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints operate as a dismissal of Hockey as a cross-defendant in this action. Because Hockey has dismissed her claims against Brighton and the remaining operative pleading in this matter fails to state any causes of action against Hockey, Hockey argues, she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

The motion is opposed by Brighton, who contends that the Brighton/LA CC is authorized under Code of Civil Procedure section 428.50 as an “additional” cross-complaint. Therefore, Brighton argues, the filing of the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints did not operate to amend or dismiss the Brighton/Hockey CC. Brighton further asserts that, though it settled with LA Models and dismissed the Brighton/LA FACC, it never settled its claims with Hockey, and did not amend or dismiss the separately filed Brighton/Hockey CC, which, according to Brighton, remains pending. For these reasons, Brighton argues, the motion should be denied.

Analysis:

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made as to a cross-complaint, or any of its causes of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(2)(A). Relevant here, a cross-defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that “the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged” in the cross-complaint, or that the cross-complaint “does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” against that cross-defendant. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) & (ii).)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999; Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) “The issue is whether the complaint raises an issue that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Westly v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System Bd. of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1115.)

“Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings …, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings for the purpose of determining if an agreement can be reached that resolves the claims to be raised in the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).) (Note: Undesignated code references shall be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.) In addition, the moving party must file and serve a declaration stating the matters set forth in section 439, subdivisions (a)(3)(A) or (B). (Code Civ. Proc., § subd. (a)(3).)

The Court’s records reflect that Hockey failed to file the declaration required under section 439, showing that, at least 5 days prior to the date the motion was filed, Hockey met and conferred with Brighton to determine if an agreement could be reached that resolves the claims raised in the present motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(2).) For this reason, the motion is procedurally inappropriate and not filed in conformity with applicable law. Therefore, the Court will order the motion off-calendar.

Even if the Court were to consider the merits of the motion, there exist sufficient additional grounds on which the Court may deny or decline to permit the motion.

The parties here do not dispute that Hockey is not expressly named or identified as a cross-defendant with respect to the causes of action alleged in the Brighton/LA FACC, or that the Brighton/LA FACC does not allege any causes of action directed to Hockey. In addition, the Court’s review of the Brighton/LA FACC, giving that pleading a reasonable interpretation and assuming the truth of its material allegations, also shows that Hockey is not named as a cross-defendant in the Brighton/LA FACC and that Brighton does not allege a cause of action against Hockey in that pleading. (Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-1220.) Under the circumstances present here, to the extent Hockey seeks in the motion a determination as to whether or not the Brighton/LA FACC states a cause of action against Hockey, it appears that there is no dispute or controversy for the Court to determine or resolve. (See Catlin Ins. Co., Inc. v. Danko Meredith Law Firm, Inc. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 764, 773-775 [general discussion of issues which are moot or unripe].)

In addition, Hockey offers no reasoned legal or factual argument to show why the Brighton/Hockey CC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Instead, Hockey raises this argument for the first time in her reply to Brighton’s opposition to the motion.

Written notice of a motion must state “the grounds upon which it will be made….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a) [“[a] notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph … the grounds for issuance of the order”].) “The purpose of the notice requirements ‘is to cause the moving party to “sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court.” ’ [Citations.]” (Kinda v. Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277.) “As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion.” (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.)

The grounds stated in the notice of the present motion are further detailed above, and are directed only to the Brighton/LA FACC. (Notice at p. 1, l. 24 – p. 2, l. 5.) The arguments raised for the first time in Hockey’s reply with respect to the sufficiency of the causes of action alleged in the Brighton/Hockey CC are not included in the notice of the present motion. For this reason, the Court may not consider these grounds for relief.

Moreover, “[p]oints raised for the first time in a reply brief will ordinarily not be considered, because such consideration would deprive the respondent of an opportunity to counter the argument.” (American Drug Stores, Inc. v. Stroh (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453.) Considering due process concerns, the new arguments and matters raised for the first time in Hockey’s reply brief with respect to the sufficiency of the allegations of the Brighton/Hockey CC may be disregarded. (San Diego Watercrafts, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 308, 316 [“due process requires a party be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail”].)

As to the remaining arguments advanced by Hockey, Hockey contends that the Brighton/LA CC constitutes an amended cross-complaint which supersedes the Brighton/Hockey CC. Because Brighton did not name or allege any causes of action against Hockey in the Brighton/LA CC, Hockey argues, the Brighton/LA CC operates as a dismissal of Hockey as a cross-defendant in this action.

Hockey further contends that, because the Brighton/LA FACC also does not name or allege causes of action against Hockey who has dismissed her complaint, there exist no remaining claims against Hockey in this action, entitling Hockey to judgment on the pleadings. (Estate of Garrett (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 [dismissal of an action “deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction”].)

Procedurally, the filing of a cross-complaint is substantially similar to the filing of a complaint, such that a cross-complaint is treated as an independent action. (Ohio Casualty Ins. Group v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 444, 448-449 [general discussion]; see also Douglas v. Superior Court (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 395, 398 [the filing of a cross-complaint results in “two simultaneous actions pending between the parties wherein each is at the same time both a plaintiff and a defendant”]; Luse v. Peters (1933) 219 Cal. 625, 630 [a cross-complaint is a “pleading”]; Berg v. Investors Real Estate Loan Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 808, 815 [a cross-complaint must “contain all allegations essential to a complaint on the same cause of action”]; Code Civ. Proc., § 432.10 [“[a] party served with a cross-complaint may … demur, or otherwise plead to the cross-complaint in the same manner as to an original complaint[]”].)

As with an amended complaint, an amended cross-complaint supplements and supersedes the original cross-complaint, which “no longer serve[s] any purpose in the action….” (Schlake v. MacConnell (1924) 69 Cal.App. 207, 209.) To the extent an amended cross-complaint omits a defendant named in the original or prior cross-complaint, the amended cross-complaint “operates as a dismissal as to them.” (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142.)

Relevant here, and subject to exceptions which do not appear to apply under the circumstances present in this action, to the extent Brighton asserts causes of against Hockey which are related to the subject matter of Hockey’s complaint, Brighton was required to allege those causes of action in the Brighton/Hockey CC. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) Any failure by Brighton to raise a related cause of action against Hockey in a cross-complaint filed in this proceeding operates to bar Brighton from asserting that cause of action in a later proceeding. (AL Holding Co. v. O’Brien & Hicks, Inc. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313-1314.)

In addition, and also subject to exceptions which do not apply here, Brighton “may” file a cross-complaint setting forth “[a]ny cause of action” Brighton has against a person alleged to be liable on the complaint filed by Hockey, “whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.10.)

The parties do not dispute that, at the time Brighton filed the Brighton/Hockey CC, LA Models was not yet a party to this action. Therefore, under the code provisions further discussed above, Brighton was authorized to assert causes of action against LA Models by filing the Brighton/LA CC, provided the causes of action alleged in that pleading “arise out of” the same occurrence or transaction set forth in Hockey’s complaint. In addition, and provided the cross-complaint included a related cause of action, Brighton was authorized to unite or join “any other causes of action [it] has against [LA Models]….” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.30.) Hockey offers no reasoned argument to show why the Brighton/LA CC was procedurally inappropriate with respect to the claims alleged against LA Models.

Though Hockey argues in a conclusory manner that the Brighton/LA Models CC operates as an amendment to the Brighton/Hockey CC, Hockey fails to provide any reasoned legal argument to support this conclusion. For example, though a cross-complaint filed pursuant to the provisions further discussed above must be filed as “a separate document” (Code Civ. Proc., § 428.40), Hockey fails to explain, with reasoned argument, why this provision, or those cited above, prohibit Brighton from separately filing the Brighton/LA CC.

By way of further example, Hockey also fails to offer reasoned argument showing why Brighton was required to obtain leave to amend the Brighton/Hockey CC in order to allege related or permissible causes of action against LA Models. Hockey also fails to cite any statutory provisions which, expressly or by inference, require a defendant such as Brighton to assert all compulsory or permissive claims in one cross-complaint, or which would prohibit Brighton from separately filing a cross-complaint alleging permissive claims against another party.

For all reasons discussed above, it appears to the Court that Brighton intended to allege in the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints separate causes of action against LA Models only, apart from the compulsory claims alleged against Hockey in the Brighton/Hockey CC. The Court’s records also reflect that Brighton did not seek leave to amend and did not dismiss the Brighton/Hockey CC. For example, the request for dismissal filed by Brighton on August 30, 2024, states that Brighton dismisses its independent action as to LA Models only, and not as to any claims remaining against Hockey.

The examples provided above are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive. As the moving party, Hockey bears the burden to prove “every fact essential to the relief requested.” (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200.) The Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints are directed to a different party and allege theories of liability which, though arising from the same transaction or occurrence, are qualitatively different from those alleged in the Brighton/Hockey CC. For these reasons, Hockey has failed to show, with reasoned factual and legal argument, why the filing of the Brighton/LA Cross-Complaints caused or constitute an amendment to the Brighton/Hockey CC, or operated as a dismissal of Hockey as a cross-defendant in this action.

Hockey also appears to concede that the motion is untimely under section 438, pursuant to which the motion may not be made “if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section 575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the court otherwise permits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (e).) Considering the matters further discussed herein, the Court is not inclined to permit the late filing of the motion. (Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1054 [section 438, subdivision (e) “allows courts the broadest of discretion” to permit the motion].)