R Scott Turicchi et al vs Randy Quaid et a

Case Number

19CV06268

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 11/20/2023 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Motion re Modify Subpoena; Motion to Compel; Motion to Quash

Tentative Ruling

R. Scott Turicchi, et al., v. Randy Quaid, et al.

Case No. # 19CV06268 

Hearing Date:         11/20/2023                                                      

HEARINGS:

Turicchi motion to modify subpoena to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company   

Quaid motion to quash five deposition subpoenas for production of business records             

Quaid motion to compel the Turicchis to provide further responses and documents responsive to Evgenia Quaid’s request for production of documents.

           

ATTORNEYS:          Craig S. Granet / Claire K. Mitchell of RIMON, PC and Andrew W.

Zepeda of Lurie, Zepeda, Schmalz, Hogan & Martin for plaintiffs

R. Scott Turicchi and Lannette C. Turicchi

                                    Grant Puleo / Karen L. Alexander / Daniel M. Doft of Duane Morris LLP

for defendants Randy Quaid and Evgenia Quaid

                       

TENTATIVE RULINGS:

The  Turicchis’ motion to modify the subpoena issued by the Quaids to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company is denied at this time. However, the Court will require production of the documents by Fidelity and preparation and service of a comprehensive privilege log by the Turicchis, as well as further meet and confer efforts by the parties to resolve any disputes regarding application of the privilege to any responsive documents, in the manner outlined below. The Court further overrules the objection to production of documents responsive to Category 16 based upon Marsy’s Law.

For the reasons more fully articulated below, the Quaids’ motion to quash the five records subpoenas is denied. However, to the extent that the subpoenas have not been rendered moot by the provision of “no records” responses by several of the subpoena recipients, the Court will modify the language of the subpoenas, in the manner set forth below.

For the reasons more fully articulated below, the Quaids’ motion to compel the Turicchis to provide further responses to requests for production of documents is denied.

Background:

Plaintiffs’ operative First Amended Complaint (FAC), filed February 14, 2022, contained causes of action to quiet title, for declaratory relief, and for slander of title, related to property located at 1355 East Mountain Drive in Santa Barbara, title to which the Turicchis alleged they obtained pursuant to a Grant Deed from Bruce Berman and Nancy Goliger Berman recorded on August 21, 2007. The FAC alleged that the Quaids claimed an interest in the property. The quiet title and declaratory relief causes of action were summarily adjudicated in favor of the Turicchis after hearing on March 27, 2023.

The remaining cause of action for slander of title alleged that commencing at least as of November 26, 2016, and continuing thereafter, defendants willfully, maliciously, and without privilege or justification published false and disparaging statements concerning Plaintiffs’ title to the property, including that defendants, and not plaintiffs, were the rightful owners of the property. Their false and disparaging statements have impaired the marketability of the property, in an amount according to proof. The publication of the false statements was motivated by malice and intended to cause injury to plaintiffs, entitling plaintiffs to punitive damages. Unless prevented from continuing to make the false and disparaging statements that they are the owners of the property and not the Turicchis, plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury in the continued impairment of the marketability of the property. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law to prevent defendants from continuing their wrongful conduct. With respect to the slander of title cause of action, the FAC prayed for damages for the impairment of the marketability of the property, punitive damages, and an injunction enjoining each of the defendants from continuing to make false and disparaging statements that they, and not the Turicchis, are the owners of the property.

The Quaids maintained cross-complaints against the Turicchis and others at various times during the pendency of the action. Their most recent cross-complaint, the Fifth Amended Cross-Complaint, was dismissed by the Quaids on July 19, 2023, while demurrers and motions to strike directed to that pleading were pending.

As a result of the Quaids’ dismissal of their Fifth Amended Cross-Complaint, the only claim currently pending before the court is the Turicchis’ cause of action for slander of title.

Turicchi motion to modify subpoena to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company:

Filed on August 18, 2023, the motion seeks to modify document categories 1 [“ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the PROPERTY.”], 2 [“Any COMMUNICATIONS between YOU [defined as Fidelity] and the BERMANS, TURICCHIS and/or QUAQIDS RELATING TO the PROPERTY.”], 4 [“Any COMMUNICATION between YOU and the TURICCHIS related to the PROPERTY.”], 5 [“Any COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and the TURICCHIS related to the QUAIDS.”], 8 [“Any settlement agreement between YOU and the TURICCHIS related to the settlement of litigation involving the PROPERTY.”], and 16 [“Any COMMUNICATIONS between YOU and Deputy District Attorney Anthony Davis or any other employees of Santa Barbara County’s District Attorney’s Office, Sheriffs, or other law enforcement related to the Quaids.”], of the records subpoena served by the Quaids upon Fidelity National Title Insurance Company.

The motion explains that Fidelity was the title insurer for the Turicchis in connection with this lawsuit regarding the East Mountain Drive property, and provided a defense to the Turicchis. As a result, there exists a tripartite relationship among the Turicchis, Fidelity, and their lawyers. Under Bank of America, N.A. v. Superior Court (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1090, an attorney retained by an insurance company to defend its insured under the insurer’s contractual obligation to do so represents and owes a fiduciary duty to both the insurer and the insured. As a result, the Turicchis contend that the communications among them, Fidelity, and their attorneys, are privileged, and the Quaids are not entitled to discovery those communications. The Turicchis contend that the requests at issue in the motion seek documents related to those communications, and they request that the Court modify the subpoena so as not to require production of documents relating to communications among the Turicchis, Fidelity, and their attorneys.

Although no longer relevant to this case, given the dismissal of the Quaids’ cross-complaint, the Turicchis state that they have provided the Quaids with a copy of the title insurance policy. Given that the only remaining claim in the action is their cause of action for slander of title, there is no claim by the Quaids that could be covered by insurance, and no business records of Fidelity have any relevance to the slander of title claim. As a result, the documents sought by Category Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 16, have no relevance to the subject matter of this action, and are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

With respect to Category No. 16, the Turicchis also contend that any communications between Fidelity and any Deputy District Attorney Anthony Davis, any other employees of the District Attorney’s Office, Sheriff’s, or other law enforcement, related to the Quaids, would have been made by Fidelity on behalf of the Turicchis, as victims of the crimes committed by the Quaids. They would therefore also be protected from disclosure by Article I, Section 28, of the California Constitution (Marsy’s Law).

The Quaids have opposed the motion to modify the subpoena, contending that it is without merit for three reasons. First, they contend that either Fidelity or the Turicchis must produce a privilege log in order for the parties to ascertain whether the withheld documents are covered by a claimed privilege. Second, they assert that the documents sought are outside the scope of the tripartite relationship, which only attaches once the attorney-client relationship has been established. They further contend that the Turicchis were adverse to Fidelity prior to the filing of this lawsuit, having pursued a federal lawsuit against Fidelity regarding the same issues in 2018, the 2019 settlement of which included an agreement that Fidelity would engage Mr. Granet to prosecute a quiet title action on the Turicchis’ behalf. No attorney-client tripartite relationship existed prior to that retention. The Quaids argue further that, to the extent any attorney-client relationship “attaches” to the pre-lawsuit communications, the privilege has been waived, since the Turicchis and/or Fidelity have disclosed dozens of documents, in both the Los Angeles Superior Court and in the federal action, including communications amongst themselves. That publication acted as a waiver.

The Quaids argue further that the Turicchis are using the tripartite relationship/privilege to improperly block the Quaids from obtaining probative evidence, including documentation related to the Turicchis’ refinance of the property in 2021. The Turicchis have taken the position that their inability to refinance the property was part of their damages on the slander of title claim, but have also contended that the documentation regarding the 2021 refinance should not be produced by Fidelity because of the tripartite relationship. They assert that communications regarding the refinance were not a part of the attorney-client relationship, and are not privileged, and that to the extent there is any privilege, it has been waived by placing the issue in the heart of the claim.

Finally, the Quaids assert that Marsy’s Law does not apply, because it does not extend to civil proceedings, even if the parties are simultaneously involved in a pending criminal case, citing Slaieh v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 266, 275.

No reply was filed by the Turicchis.

Quaid motion to quash five deposition subpoenas for production of business records:

Filed on September 8, 2023, the motion seeks to quash five deposition subpoenas for production of business records, which were served by the Turicchis on AT&T Corp., Comcast Corporation, Spectrum, Verizon Wireless Services, LLC, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. The subpoenas sought all documents relating to the ownership records for fax or phone numbers (213) 473-8846; (213) 858-0943; and (818) 954-2249, from November 1, 1991, through January 1, 2008.

The motion contends the subpoenas seek irrelevant information, since they relate to phone records from 30+ years ago, which would fall far outside of any statute of limitations for a slander of title claim. Second, the motion contends the subpoenas are overbroad, in seeking “all documents” related to ownership of those numbers during a 15+ year period, which could result in the disclosure of irrelevant and private information potentially including call logs, billing records, and payment history. The motion seeks sanctions of $2,640, based upon the Quaids’ contention that the Turicchis cannot show that either their issuance of the subpoenas, or their refusal to correct the deficiencies after receiving notice, is justified.

The Turicchis have opposed the motion, asserting that they are seeking records relating to the Quaids’ contention that they never sold the property in 1992, because of the alleged forged deed. Some of the allegedly forged documents were amendments to escrow instructions that were faxed unsigned to certain telephone numbers, and then the signed documents were faxed back to the broker with what appeared to be the Quaids’ signatures. As a result, the identities of the registered users of the telephone numbers to which the faxes were sent are highly relevant to the Quaids’ claims that the signatures were forged. They assert that the forgery contention is the Quaids’ main defense to the slander of title cause of action. The Turicchis contend that the subpoenas were narrowly tailored, and sought only the identity of the persons to whom the telephone numbers are registered, but the offered to add further clarifying language that they were not seeking records related to billing or payment information, or any call logs for the numbers, but defense counsel refused the request and filed the motion. The Turicchis contend the time period was chosen to span from a time just prior to the sale of the property to the Bermans, to the time the Turicchis obtained the property from the Bermans. They note that, before the production date, Verizon, T-Mobile, and Spectrum/Charter Services responded to the subpoenas stating they had no records relating to those numbers. The Turicchis seek sanctions of $3,235.90 against the Quaids and their counsel, contending there was no need to move to quash because of their offer of clarifying language to address the objections which the Quaids’ counsel raised in meet and confer efforts.

In reply, the Quaids contend that the Turicchis have failed to articulate how 16 years of records could be relevant or reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Their theory of relevance is that in 1992, several amendments to the escrow instructions for the sale of the property were faxed to certain telephone numbers unsigned, and then signed documents were sent back, and the identity of the registered users of the numbers is therefore relevant to the issue of whether the documents were forged. Under that theory, the only relevant documents are from 1992, but the subpoenas seek documents from 1991-2008, and such records could subject Randy Quaid to identity theft, oppression, and fraud. They further argue—for the first time—that three of the companies did not exist in 1992, referring to Wikipedia as authority for the contention. The Quaids contend further that seeking “all ownership records” is not narrowly tailored, that the Turicchis’ offer to modify the language to clarify that they were not seeking call logs or billing records was insufficient because they never offered to narrow the timeframe of the subpoenas or the breadth of records sought. They assert that a more appropriate request would have been “documents sufficient to ascertain the ownership of the fax numbers (XXX) XXX-XXXX from November 1991 through January 1, 1993, which would allow them to ascertain ownership of the numbers during the relevant time period. The Turicchis’ request for sanctions is unwarranted, because their attempt to amend language was insufficient, and they failed to explain why they needed subpoenas to three entities which did not exist in the relevant time frame.

Quaid motion to compel the Turicchis to provide further responses and documents responsive to Evgenia Quaid’s requests for production of documents:

Filed on October 5, 2023, the motion does not include a notice of motion, does not include the required specific facts showing good cause for production, and is not accompanied by the required separate statement. The Turicchis’ opposed the motion on the ground that it is moot, and because it does not include the required showing of good cause for production or the required separate statement. In reply, the Quaids contend the motion is not moot, because they are seeking sanctions, because the Turicchis waived all objections by making generalized objections and failing to provide individualized objections, and because the responses they provided did not fully comply with the requests, and their failure to produce documents prior to the Berman deposition will likely force the Quaids to seek an order allowing an additional Berman deposition. The Quaids contend the motion did not require a showing of good cause, because it sought only a proper response to the inspection demand, and the response they provided was no response at all, since it did not separately respond to each category. Finally, the Quaids contend they did not need a separate statement because the motion merely sought to compel a response, and not to compel further responses. The Turicchis filed an objection to the arguments made by the Quaids for the first time in their reply papers, including claimed deficiencies in the responses which were served to the re-served requests which are not before the court and have not been the subject of meet and confer efforts, and the claim that the failure to earlier produce documents will require a further Berman deposition, given that nothing the Turicchis produced had anything to do with the alleged 1992 Quaid/Berman transaction, with which they were uninvolved.

ANALYSIS:

The Turicchis’ motion to modify the subpoena issued by the Quaids to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company is denied at this time. However, the Court will require production of the documents by Fidelity and preparation of a privilege log by the Turicchis, as well as further meet and confer efforts by the parties to resolve any disputes regarding application of the privilege to any responsive documents, in the manner outlined below. The Court further overrules the objection to production of documents responsive to Category 16 based upon Marsy’s Law.

The Quaids’ motion to quash the five records subpoenas is denied. However, to the extent that the subpoenas have not been rendered moot by the provision of “no records” responses by several of the subpoena recipients, the Court will modify the language of the subpoenas, in the manner set forth below.

The Quaids’ motion to compel the Turicchis to provide further responses to requests for production of documents is denied.

1.         Motions to quash or modify subpoenas.

            A.        Legal authority.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 provides, in relevant parts:

(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

(b) The following persons may make a motion pursuant to subdivision (a):

(1) A party.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2(a), in making an order pursuant to Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.

B.        Turicchi motion to modify subpoena to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company.

The Turicchis have moved to modify the subpoena issued by the Quaids to Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, seeking an order that Fidelity need not respond to Category Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, or 16 [the subpoena contained two categories bearing the No. 1, and the motion makes clear that it is referring to the first of the two]. The motion is primarily made on the ground that Fidelity retained attorney Granet to pursue the quiet title and declaratory relief claims against the Quaids, creating a tripartite relationship among the Turicchis, Fidelity, and their lawyers, and that all such communications are therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege.

With respect to Category 16, which seeks communications between Fidelity and anyone affiliated with the Santa Barbara County District Attorney’s Office, Sheriffs, or other law enforcement, related to the Quaids, the Turicchis also contend that the communications are protected from disclosure by Marsy’s Law, found at Article I, Section 28 of the California Constitution. The motion does not reference a specific subdivision of Section 28, but the section, at subdivision (b)(5), permits a victim of a crime to refuse a discovery request by the defendant.

The Quaids object that the Turicchis should provide a privilege log, that at least some of the communications were made outside the tripartite relationship (including prior to its creation) and are unprivileged, that the privilege was waived as to some of the communications by their publication by the Turicchis or Fidelity in the course of the federal and Los Angeles County litigation among them, that documentation regarding the 2021 refinance of the property with Fidelity was outside the attorney-client tripartite relationship, and that Marsy’s Law does not apply to civil cases.

The Court finds merit in the Quaids’ objections. In a holding of first impression, the court in Slaieh v. Superior Court (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 266, 275, conducted an analysis of Marsy’s Law, and found that its protections apply only in criminal proceedings, and do not extend to civil or family law proceedings. The Court therefore overrules the Turicchis’ objection to Fidelity’s production of documents responsive to Category 16 on the basis of Marsy’s Law protections.

With respect to the issue of the privilege arising from the tripartite relationship between the Turicchis, Fidelity, and their respective attorneys, the Court does not have sufficient information before it to make any rulings on the application of the privilege to any document(s) that might be responsive to Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, or 16. As a result, the Court will make the following orders:

1.         For any categories of documents referenced in the subpoena other than Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 16, Fidelity may produce all documents directly to both parties.

2.         For document category Nos. 1 (the first of the two No. 1 categories), 2, 4, 5, 8, and 16, Fidelity shall produce responsive documents directly and solely to counsel for the Turicchis.

3.         Counsel for the Turicchis shall produce to the Quaids any of the documents produced by Fidelity, for which neither the Turicchis nor Fidelity are claiming any privilege, within 10 days of their receipt from Fidelity.

4.         Counsel for the Turicchis shall prepare and serve upon the Quaids a comprehensive privilege log with respect to any documents not produced based upon a claim of privilege, also within 10 days of the receipt of the documents from Fidelity.

5.         To the extent that the parties dispute the application of privilege to any document(s) withheld on that basis, they shall meet and confer in an attempt to resolve the dispute(s).

6.         Proper application of the privilege will, if necessary, be resolved by the Court upon the filing by the Quaids of a motion to compel further compliance with the subpoena. Should such a motion prove necessary, the parties should be prepared to specifically address the issue of the application of privilege to the documents in question.

            C.        Quaid motion to quash five records subpoenas to telephone carriers.

The Turicchis contend that the records they sought through the subpoenas are relevant to the action, because unsigned documents were faxed to the specified numbers, and documents which reflected signatures by the Quaids were then faxed back. As a result, if the Quaids are associated with any of those numbers, that would significantly call into question their claim that the documents were forged. The identity of the persons associated with those numbers is therefore highly relevant to the Quaids’ contention that the documents were forged, which is a component of their defense to the remaining slander of title claim.

In their reply papers, the Quaids backed off of the contention originally made in their motion to quash—that the records sought were wholly irrelevant—and basically acknowledged that some amount of the records sought would be relevant. They object, however, on the basis that only records from 1991 to January 1, 1993 would have been relevant, under the sole theory of relevance advanced by the Turicchis. They further make a curious objection (not made in the moving papers) that three of the entities subpoenaed did not exist in the 1991-2008 time period, and appear to use that to support their contention that the subpoenas were issued in bad faith and warrant sanctions.

Taking the latter contention first, the Court does not find the Quaids’ Wikipedia research with respect to the subpoenaed entities to support a contention that the Turicchis acted in bad faith in subpoenaing any such entities. Historically, communications companies have come into being and/or ceased to exist through mergers with and/or acquisitions of other companies. The Turicchis were not obligated to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the communications companies prior to serving the subpoenas—if the company did not exist in any manner (including through the previous existence of an acquired company), there would simply be no responsive records.

With respect to the time period of the subpoenas from 1991-2008, however, the Court believes that the Quaids’ objection has merit. The Turicchis’ assertion of relevance only related to the transactions which occurred in 1992, with respect to the faxing of unsigned documents to the numbers, and the return from those numbers of documents which appeared to have been signed by the Quaids. In the absence of any other claim to relevance, the Court is inclined to limit the time period in the manner suggested by the Quaids’ reply papers.

Additionally, the Court will limit the scope of the subpoena similar to the manner in which the Turicchis proposed to add clarifying language to the subpoenas. The subpoenas should also eliminate any reference to “all documents related to,” because this language creates issues with respect to overbreadth of the request, in encompassing far more documents than are necessary for the purposes for the subpoenas as articulated by the Turicchis.

The Court will therefore modify the subpoenas to seek documents which reflect the identities of the owners of the numbers in question during the time period between January 1, 1991 and January 1, 1993, and specifically excluding any call logs, billing information, or payment information. To the extent that the parties can suggest additional clarifying and limiting language at the hearing on this motion, the Court will consider it at that time.

The Court will exercise its discretion to decline to award sanctions to either party with respect to this motion.

2.         Quaid motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents.

            A.        Legal authority.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(a), a party may move to compel a further response to a demand for inspection if (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. Such a motion must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(2).) It must also set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98). To establish “good cause,” the moving party must show both relevance to the subject matter, and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) The showing of good cause is generally made through the use of declarations setting forth specific facts rather than mere conclusions. (Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1138, 1141.) If the showing is made on information and belief, the sources of the information must also be set forth. (See Grannis v. Board of Medical Examiners (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 551, 564.) If good cause is shown for discovery, the responding party must justify its objections. (Kirkland v. Superior Court, supra.)

Additionally, the motion must be accompanied either by a separate statement or, where the court has provided its permission to the party to do so, a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(3); Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345, subds. (a)(3), (b)(2).)

Rule 3.1345 provides further:

(c) A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue. The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference. The separate statement must include--for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested--the following:

(1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand;

(2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers;

(3) A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute;

(4) If necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it;

(5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and

(6) If the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them must summarize each relevant document

Finally, when discovery sanctions are sought, the notice of motion must identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanctions is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040.)

            B.        Quaid motion to compel further responses to demand for production.

The motion to compel is fatally defective in numerous respects, and will therefore be denied.

Under the express terms of Section 2031.310(a), the motion which the Quaids filed was absolutely a motion to compel further responses, and not a motion to compel any responses, which is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.300(b), when no response has been provided. Consequently, it was subject to the mandatory requirement that it be accompanied by a declaration setting forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand. Only upon such a showing would the Turicchis have any obligation to justify their objections. Because no attempt was made at a showing of good cause, that obligation never arose.

Second, because it was a motion to compel further responses, it was also subject to the mandatory requirement that a separate statement be provided. The failure to comply with this basic requirement is grounds for denial of a motion to compel further responses to discovery.

Third, because the response was timely filed pursuant to the statutory scheme, there was no waiver of objections. Certainly, the propriety of the objections can be challenged in a motion to compel further responses, but the improper assertion of objections does not constitute a waiver.

Fourth, while the Quaids contend that the motion is not moot because the amended responses they received from the Turicchis were insufficient, those responses are not before the court, and the documents before the court do not reflect the conduct of proper meet-and-confer efforts with respect to the responses. To the extent that the Quaids believe the amended responses are insufficient, they should be made the subject of a separate motion to compel further responses, made on a proper showing of good cause, a proper showing of adequate meet and confer efforts, and accompanied by a separate statement which complies with Rule 3.1345(c).

Fifth, the motion does not properly seek discovery sanctions. The motion was unaccompanied by any notice of motion; pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040, when discovery sanctions are sought, the notice of motion must identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought. Without a notice of motion, the sanction request was fatally defective. Consequently, even had the motion not been fatally defective in other respects, the Quaids’ failure to comply with this basic requirement eliminated any ability to obtain a sanction order from the court on their motion.