R. SCOTT TURICCHI, ET AL., V. RANDY QUAID, ET AL

Case Number

19CV06268

Case Type

Civil Law & Motion

Hearing Date / Time

Mon, 06/03/2024 - 10:00

Nature of Proceedings

Quaid Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling

R. Scott Turicchi, et al., v. Randy Quaid, et al.

Case No. 19CV06268

Hearing Date: 6/3/2024

HEARING: Quaid Motion for Summary Judgment

ATTORNEYS: Craig S. Granet / Claire K Mitchell of Rimon, P.C. and Andrew W. Zepeda of Lurie, Zepeda, Schmalz, Hogan & Martin for plaintiffs R. Scott Turicchi and Lannette C. Turicchi

Defendants Randy Quaid and Evgenia Quaid are currently in pro per

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion for summary judgment will be denied.

Background: This action was commenced on November 25, 2019, by the filing of the original complaint by plaintiffs R. Scott Turicchi and Lannette C. Turicchi. At that time, the complaint alleged a cause of action to quiet title in plaintiffs in property located at 1355 East Mountain Drive in Santa Barbara (¶¶ 6-10), alleging that the Turicchis obtained title to the property pursuant to a Grant Deed Recorded on August 21, 2007 (¶¶ 2, 7), that the Quaids claimed an interest in the property (¶¶ 3, 8), and sought to quiet the Turicchis’ title in the property. (Prayer, ¶ 1.) The complaint also alleged a cause of action for declaratory relief (¶¶ 11-14), seeking a declaration that the Quaids had no interest in the property. (¶ 13, Prayer ¶ 2.)

The Turicchis filed their operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) on February 14, 2022. The FAC continued to allege causes of action to quiet title and for declaratory relief, adding allegations that the Turicchis owned the property based both upon the Grant Deed, and upon the adverse possession of the property both by the Turicchis, and by the Bermans, from whom they purchased the property in 2007. (FAC @ ¶¶ 7-8, 11.) The FAC added a cause of action for slander of title, which alleged that commencing at least as of November 26, 2016, and continuing thereafter, the Quaids had “willfully, maliciously, and without privilege or justification published false and disparaging statements concerning Plaintiffs’ title to the Turicchi Property, including that Defendants, and not Plaintiffs, were the rightful owners of the Turicchi Property.” (FAC @ ¶ 17.) The cause of action then alleged that such publications impaired the marketability of the Turicchi Property, and was motivated by defendants’ malice and oppression, entitling plaintiffs to punitive damages. (¶¶ 18-19.) It prayed for damages to the marketability of the property, punitive damages, and an injunction to preclude defendants from continuing to make statements that they are the owners of the property. (FAC @ Prayer, ¶ 3.)

The Turicchis’ first and second causes of action to quiet title and for declaratory relief, as alleged in their FAC, were summarily adjudicated in their favor after hearing on March 27, 2023, leaving the cause of action for slander of title as the sole remaining claim in this action.

Subsequent to this Court’s grant of summary adjudication in the Turicchis’ favor with respect to their first cause of action to quiet title, and their second cause of action for declaratory relief, the Quaids—who had previously represented themselves in the action—on April 10, 2023, substituted in attorneys from the law firm of Duane Morris LLP to represent them. The Duane Morris firm represented the Quaids through the remainder of 2023, and into early 2024.

On January 16, 2024, the Duane Morris firm filed a special motion to strike the Turicchis’ remaining cause of action for slander of title, under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, setting the hearing on the motion for March 18, 2024. On February 16, 2024, the Duane Morris firm substituted out of the action on the Quaids’ behalf, and attorney John Pierce substituted into the case on the Quaids’ behalf.

Subsequent to its substitution out of the lawsuit on behalf of the Quaids, and attorney Pierce’s substitution into the case on the Quaids’ behalf, the Duane Morris firm proceed to file two separate motions for summary judgment (on March 7 and March 8, 2024, respectively), setting their hearings for May 20, 2024, and June 3, 2024, respectively. On March 11, 2024, the Duane Morris firm also filed reply papers with respect to the special motion to strike, again after they had substituted out of the case and no longer represented the Quaids.

On March 12, 2024, attorney Pierce substituted out of the case on behalf of the Quaids, and the Quaids substituted back into the case on their own behalf.

The March 18, 2024 hearing on the special motion to strike was continued by the trial court to April 8, 2024, at which time it was stricken by this Court because of its extraordinary untimeliness. In striking the motion, the Court found that hearing the motion on its merits would be an abuse of its discretion which would thwart, rather than promote, the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statutory scheme, and explained in detail why this was true.

At an April 12, 2024, ex parte hearing, the Court vacated the May 20, 2024 summary judgment hearing and struck the motion. It allowed the June 3, 2024, summary judgment hearing to remain on calendar, but noted that all grounds for opposition may be raised by the Turicchis in opposition to the motion, including that the motion was improperly filed by the Quaids’ former counsel after they had substituted out of the case, and that the hearing was improperly set at a time less than 30 days before trial, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.

A single separate statement of material facts has been submitted in support of the motion as a whole, which was not altered in any way to reflect that the facts material to resolution of the motion on one of the identified issues might not be the same as the facts material to the resolution to other of the issues. The single set of facts was presented as to all theories underlying the motion.

The motion was supported by the virtually identical declarations of Evgenia Quaid and Randy Quaid, which discuss their wedding, purchase of and care for the property, that Bruce Berman viewed the property in 1992, and a few weeks later Mr. Grant informed them that he sold it to Mr. Berman, who also wanted to buy the furniture. They left the mechanics of the sale to Grant and their attorney (Lloyd Braun), who was negotiating a television series deal for Randy, one of the key points of which would be that Randy would get a 0% loan should they decide to purchase a residence in Los Angeles. They believed the property had been soled for the next 18 years, until a meeting in April of 2010 in which Mr. Grant told them he “never sold the Montecito property,” which was a shock to them, but they then realized the could not remember signing the documents that would have been required, or recall receiving any money for the home. They are certain they did not make any signatures on the grant deed, nor do they recognize each others’ signatures on the deed, and contend that Randy could not have signed it on that date because he was on set in Studio City on that date. They did not authorize anyone to sign documents related to the property on their behalf. They were informed by three fraud or forensics experts that the signatures on the Grant Deed were not theirs, and attach copies of the letters/reports. Each then concludes that they reasonably believed the Grant Deed was forged and they were therefore the legal owners of the property, and continue to believe that the deed was forged.

The motion was supported by the declaration of Grant Puleo (former counsel for the Quaids, but who represented in his declaration, filed after his substitution out of the case, that he was “counsel of record” for the Quaids), which authenticated documents produced by the Turicchis in discovery, contended that they had refused to verify that these are the only examples of purported slander of title that they intend to pursue at trial, to produce the native files for the screenshots or explain where they came from, or explain how they have suffered damages. It attaches excerpts from the depositions of Lannette Turicchi and Dennis Quaid.

The motion is further supported by a request for judicial notice of documents contained in the federal district court file in R. Scott Turicchi v. Randal Quaid, Case No. 2:18-CV-05082-PA-AFM, and a Settlement Agreement from that case which was publicly filed in Scott Turicchi v. Mark B. Scott (Case No. 20STCV41937), in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

Opposition: The Turicchis have opposed the motion on multiple grounds, both procedural and substantive. Procedurally, the Turicchis object that the motion was filed by the Duane Morris law firm at a time when they no longer represented the Quaids, and was set within 30 days of trial without having obtained leave of court to do so, on a showing of good cause.

Substantively, the Turicchis contend that there are numerous disputed issues of material fact which preclude entry of summary judgment. They argue further that the Quaids have not met their initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact, and the burden has therefore never shifted to the Turicchis. The Turicchis assert that the Quaids have not met their burden of proving a complete defense to the slander of title cause of action, noting that they published numerous statements slandering the Turicchis’ title to the Mountain Drive property, and the fact that some of the statements were couched as “opinions” does not render them unactionable, since the opinions implied the assertion of objective facts.

In their response to the separate statement, the Turicchis contend that while some references on identified videos shows views 7 or 8 years ago, they also show the video was still being published years later. They further contend that a letter dated 2013 was not sent to the Turicchis until February 15, 2018. They dispute dates of particular publications set forth by the Quaids, including that certain show publication dates beyond those claimed by the Quaids, including into 2019-2021 (including some publications that the Quaids contend contained illegible or incomplete dates). The Turicchis dispute the Quaids’ contention that certain publications did not slander any title, contending they referenced “my stolen property.”

The Turicchis assert there was no justification of the slanderous statements, given the substantial evidence that the Quaids in fact sold the property to the Bermans in 1992, including the deposition testimony of Dennis Quaid that he loaned money to the Quaids for the purchase and was repaid when the property sold in 1992, and the declaration of the Quaids’ former business manager that the Quaids in fact sold the property in 1992, and he never told them that the property had not been sold. Further, they did not list the property on their schedule of real property assets when filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in 2000. The Turicchis similarly assert that the Quaids’ claims of ownership of the property, and that the deed transmitting it to the Bermans had been forged, were false. Whether or not the deed transferring the property from the Quaids to the Bermans was forged is an issue for the jury to determine, and the notarization is prima facie evidence of the genuineness of the Quaids’ signatures, Berman denies forging the signatures, and Dennis Quaid confirmed that the property was sold by the Quaids in 1992.

The Turicchis assert they have suffered direct pecuniary loss as a result of the slanderous statements. While the Quaids try to invoke judicial estoppel to prevent the Turicchis from asserting they sustained damage, the statements in question were not made by the Turicchis, and were made by an adverse party in other litigation. The Quaids further argue that Mrs. Turicchi admitted she had not tried to sell the property, and there is therefore no evidence of damages from lack of marketability, but she testified that the property couldn’t be sold because of the disclosure of the Quaids’ claims against the property. They deny they are claiming damages from the fact that the Quaids recorded a lis pendens against the property. The Quaids argued that there is no damage because the real estate market has appreciated, but provide no support for that contention, which is an issue for the jury in any event. Finally, they argue fees are not recoverable to remove the cloud on a title unless the cloud is in a recorded document, citing Sumner Hill Homeowners’ Assn., Inc. v. Rio Mesa Holdings, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 999, but that case made no such holding, and is inconsistent with existing law, as reflected in Phillips v. Glazer (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 673, 678, and Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 412, 417.

The Turicchis contend their slander of title claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, first noting that the Quaids’ answer does not assert a statute of limitations affirmative defense, and they have therefore waived the defense. Further, while they contend the statute runs from the filing of the FAC rather than the original complaint, the slander of title cause of action was made based upon the same allegations as were made in the original complaint (i.e., the Quaids wrongful claim of ownership of the property), and therefore relate back to its filing, pursuant to Grudt v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 2 Cal.3d 575, 583-584. Even if some of the statements are barred by the statute, the Turicchis could introduce evidence of them as the reason for damages incurred within the statutory period.

The opposition is supported by the declarations of Lannette Turicchi, Warren Grant, and Craig Granet. Mrs. Turicchi’s declaration describes their acquisition of the property in 2007, and their subsequent maintenance and control over it. She authenticates a letter sent by the Quaids to Title Resource Group and the Turicchis, contending the Turicchis were not the lawful owners of the property which, while dated April 12, 2013, was not mailed to the Turicchis until February 15, 2018 (postmarked envelope provided) , and received sometime thereafter; authenticates a letter dated April 12, 2016, sent by the Quaids to the Turicchis’ lender, Deutsche Bank, claiming the Turicchis were not the lawful owners of the property; and authenticates copies of internet postings by the Quaids which she found with, where available, time stamps indicating the time and date when she took the screenshots. She declares that she did not attempt to sell the property because she was advised by realtors that she could not sell as long as the Quaids were continuing to assert they owned it, because that would have to be disclosed to any potential buyers. As a result, they have continued to pay carrying costs for the property, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs to pursue remedies to remove the cloud on their title caused by the Quaids’ claims. She further authenticates documents reflecting mortgage payments, insurance costs, property taxes, security costs, utility costs, maintenance and upkeep costs, and notes that their attorneys’ fees are currently in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, if not more, and estimates they could exceed $1 million through trial of the action.

The Grant declaration establishes that Mr. Grant was business manager for Randy and Evgenia Quaid in the 1991-1992 time frame, but has not acted in that capacity since 1996. He is aware of their contention that he told them that he never sold the Montecito property. He recalls they showed up at his office sometime in 2010, and demanded their files. He responded that the files had been inventoried and packed when his representation of them terminated, and they were messengered and turned over to them at their rental house in Beverly Hills. He provided them a copy of the 1996 letter turning over their files, which they threw back at him before storming out. He recalls that they sold their Montecito property in or about 1991/1992. He would never have said he didn’t say the house, with any statement meaning that the house was not sold. If any similar statement was ever made—which he does not recall and does not sound like anything he would have said—it would have meant that he was not responsible for the sale and that they sold it themselves. He does not recall the specifics of the sale, but recalls that they sold the Montecito house, and the loan was paid off through closing, since his office forward escrow papers for their signatures, and they had records of that occurring. Any involvement by him would have been incidental to their sale of the property. Their files were long since turned over to them; the documents he attaches as Exhibits A (letter regarding escrow papers to sign) and B (transmittal his firm received form the escrow company, and check payable to the Quaids, representing their portion of the net proceeds after mortgage loan payoff), were provided by the Turicchis counsel for his review, recollection, and authentication, and he believed had been obtained in discovery.

The Granet declaration authenticated excerpts from the depositions of Lannette Turicchi, Dennis Quaid, and Bruce Berman, the Quaids’ Amended Answer to the FAC, the Turicchis’ original complaint and FAC, and the substitution of attorneys forms through which the Duane Morris firm substituted out of the case.

The opposition was also supported by a request for judicial notice of a 2002 document in the Quaids’ Chapter 7 Bankruptcy case (LA-00-10422-TD).

Reply: In their reply, filed in pro per, the Quaids dispute any procedural obstacle to hearing the motion on its merits, contending there is “ample justification” for hearing the motion within 30 days before trial. Further, while the motion was filed after counsel withdrew, it has been endorsed and adopted by “current counsel.”

The Quaids contend that the Turicchis’ claims that they have disputed 36 of the 55 material facts is misleading, since their disputes are either irrelevant to the core issues or based on misinterpretation of the facts.

The Quaids contend that the opposition relies on inadmissible evidence, in relying on screenshots and scans of “fabricated” social media posts without authentication or verification, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1400-1401. The screenshots lack the metadata and chain of custody to establish their authenticity, which the Quaids contend s necessary under People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429 (no page cite given). The Quaids also argue that the opposition includes statements made by persons calling themselves the Quaids on social media platforms, but there are 64 illegitimate Randy Quaid accounts on X (former Twitter) accounts, and hundreds of others on other social media platforms, and the lack of direct records from the platforms undermines the credibility of the evidence presented.

The Quaids contend that the Turicchis “fail to establish” the elements of slander of title. The statements made by the illegitimate Quaid accounts were expressions of opinion and satire protected by the First Amendment, and did not imply provably false assertions of fact; the evidence was not authenticated to meet their burden of proof to establish their claims, unlike what was the case in Overstock.com, cited by the Turicchis. Further, the Quaids contend they had a reasonable basis to believe in their ownership claims, including the forgery reports, circumstances surrounding the grant deed, that his former accountants had history of client embezzlement “and his stolen missing files,” that the notary in question claimed she never met the Quaids, that the Berman divorce made no mention of the property, that the Quaids paid a housekeeper to clean the house until 1996, and evidence of mortgage payments in 1995.

The Quaids dispute the Turicchis’ contention that the issue of forgery is one for the jury to determine, arguing that the evidence of forgery, document discrepancies, and expert testimony collectively rebut any presumption of genuineness, necessitating that this court determine the issues rather than deferring them to a jury to determine. They argue that the court should grant summary judgment because the plaintiffs “have failed to provide incontrovertible evidence” to support their claims.

The Quaids argue that the plaintiffs failed to show they acted with malice or reckless disregard for the truth in their comments. Their actions were motivated by genuine concern for their property rights and not by an intent to harm plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, but have not presented any evidence to suggest defendants had knowledge of falsity or exhibit reckless disregard for the truth.

The Quaids argue further that plaintiffs’ losses are speculative and unsupported by evidence, that the property value has not diminished, and their inability to sell the property is not causally linked to the Quaids’ alleged statements. They have not provided any “substantial evidence” of actual damages. They quote emails from Lannette Turicchi with respect to her lack of desire to sell the property, a real estate agent’s statement that there is a pickup in the market and he was confident they could “get around the Quaid issue” with proper disclosure, and her asking what the realtor could list the property for, which the Quaids contend demonstrate “fraud on to this court,” contending that it contradicted her statement that she did not attempt to sell the property due to the Quaids’ claims.

With respect to the statute of limitations, they again assert that the claims are barred. While the Turicchis argue they waived the defense, they argue that a statute of limitations defense need not be asserted in an answer, but can be preserved if it is raised in an attack on a pleading (citing Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824, 842), and contending they preserved the defense by raising it in their August 23, 2023 motion for judgment on the pleadings. They reference a supposed “Supp.Puleo Decl.” to support their contention that they sufficiently alleged a statute of limitations defense. [Note: No such declaration was submitted with the motion or reply. Further, the reference is undated, and the Court has not located any such declaration.] They also said they reserved the right to amend their answer. They reassert that the date of accrual for a claim based on published slander is the date of publication, and contend the Turicchis did not set forth any alleged slanderous statements published before the statute of limitations expired.

In their declarations submitted with respect to the reply (“amended corrected exhibits,” filed May 24, 2024), the Quaids, among many other things, reiterate that there are illegitimate social media accounts impersonating Randy Quaid; accuse Lannette Turicchi of creating evidence “solely created from her own mind, in her own time, and in her own parallel internet universe”; contending none of it can be attributed to them; accuse Lannette Turicchi of committing fraud on the court by falsely claiming to have suffered pecuniary loss due to the statements she cannot prove they made; again contend that Berman sole Randy Quaid’s identity and property; contend that the Berman divorce papers do not mention the property, contend they have “conclusive forensic evidence” that the Bermans created and recorded the grant deed with Randy Quaid’s “inauthentic signature” to seal their property; contend that Lannette Turicchi in 2010 posted a sign on the front gate threatening to kill the Quaids on sight; dispute that Warren Grant ever had any power of attorney for them; accuses attorney Granet of stealing their mail including a 1991 letter and check from Warren Grant that they contend they never saw and which Grant states he received from Granet; argue that the Grant declaration should be stricken because his attorney represented to them that he has “no recollection, no knowledge and no information or documents related to the current third-party action, the property at-issue, or relevant thereto”; attributes Dennis Quaid’s deposition testimony to his drug abuse and hatred for Randy Quaid; contends that the loan referenced by Dennis Quaid was actually with respect to property Randy purchased for his ex-wife as part of his divorce agreement; contends another deed of trust was fraudulently notarized; contends that Dennis Quaid only said what plaintiffs asked him to say; that “in 1989 onward Randy worked pretty much non stop while Dennis was laying in drug rehab weaving twig baskets; that Warrant Grant’s declaration was “nothing short of self-interested perjury,” and “I should have known he was a crook and a negligent person”; that there were (unidentified) witnesses to his telling them in 2010 that he had nothing to do with the sale of their house; and notes they are currently suing Warren grant which explains why he would lie for plaintiffs.

Separately filed evidentiary objection: On May 30, 2024, the Turicchis filed a formal objection to new evidence submitted by the Quaids for the first time in their reply papers, citing Balboa Ins. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [new points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before], and Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 [ne evidence is not permitted with reply papers]. Specifically, they object to the Quaids’ submission of Reply Exhibit B [purporting to be Randy Quaid’s divorce agreement with ex-wife Ella Quaid]; Exhibit C-1-2-3 [communications between the Quaids and Warren Grant and his attorney]; Exhibit E [documents purportedly related to Bruce Berman’s divorce]; and Exhibit B-1-2-3 [documents purporting to reflect reports by Doug Cobb], as well as all references to those documents within the Quaids’ declaration.

ANALYSIS: The papers before the court illustrate the existence of numerous triable issues of material fact, as well as the failure of the motion to meet its initial burden in some respects, requiring that the motion be denied.

1. Requests for judicial notice.

In support of their motion, the Quaids have sought judicial notice of three documents: (1) Lannette Turicchi’s May 19, 2016 application for restraining order, attached as Exhibit Q to an April 19, 2019 Motion for Summary Judgment in R. Scott Turicchi, et al. v. Randall Quaid, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-05082-PA-AFM (U.S. Dist. Central Cal. 2018); (2) a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on April 15, 2019 by Fidelity National Title Insurance Company in R. Scott Turicchi, et al., v. Randall Quaid, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-05082-PA-AFMx (U.S. Dist. Central Cal. 2018); and (3) a document entitled “Settlement Agreement,” dated May 9, 2019, between Fidelity National Title Insurance Company and the Turicchis in R. Scott Turicchi, et al., v. Randall Quaid, et al., Case No. 2:18-cv-05082-PA-AFMx (U.S. Dist. Central Cal. 2018);

The Quaids contend that judicial notice of the court records are appropriate pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d).

In support of their opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the Turicchis have sought judicial notice of a Notice of Motion and Motion for Judgment and Order Authorizing the Trustee to Compromise Controversy and to Declare Certain Debts Fully or Partially Non-Dischargeable with attached Settlement Agreement signed by the Quaids and attached Bankruptcy Schedules signed by the Quaids, filed February 25, 2002, in their Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, In re Randy Quaid and Evi Quaid, Case No. LA-00-10422-TD, in the United States Bankruptcy court for the Central District of California, Los Angeles Division.

While it is permissible for a trial court to take judicial notice of the records of other courts (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)), not all matters contained in court records are indisputably true. While the existence of any document in a court file may be judicially noticed, the truth of the matters asserted in such documents in not necessarily subject to judicial notice. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1569.) A court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations as being true, simply because they are part of a court record or file. (Bach v. McNelis (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 852, 864-865.) A court may judicially notice a party’s admissions, but only if the admission cannot reasonably be controverted. (See Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 485.) Judicial notice may be taken of court records offered for purposes other than the truth of their contents, i.e., nonhearsay. (Magnolia Square Homeowners Association v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1049, 1056.)

The Court will take judicial notice of the existence of these court records, and will judicially notice them for non-hearsay purposes, but will not take judicial notice of the truth of their contents.

2. Standards for summary judgment

A defendant’s motion for summary judgment asks the court to determine that the entire action has no merit, and to terminate the action without the necessity of a trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(a).) The procedure enables the court to look behind the pleadings to determine whether the party against whom the motion is directed has evidence to back up the claims. The court must determine from the evidence presented that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c).)

The pleadings play a key role in a summary judgment motion. (Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.) It is the allegations of the complaint to which the summary judgment must respond (Todd v. Dow (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 253, 258), and the pleadings serve as the measure of materiality for the motion. (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.) The moving party’s evidence must therefore be directed to the claims or defenses raised in the pleadings. (Keniston v. American National Insurance Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 803, 812.) The moving party bears the burden of persuasion that that there is no triable issue of material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 235 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Consequently, a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the cause of action in question cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Ibid.) The motion must be supported by evidentiary facts, not merely the ultimate facts. Further, conclusions of fact or law are not sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment. (Snider v. Snider (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 741, 751.)

All facts that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion must be set forth in the separate statement of material facts which is required to accompany the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(c)(2) and (d)(1)(B) and (C).) “Material facts” are facts that relate to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).) A separate statement should include only those facts which are truly material to the claims or defense involved, because the “separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included. Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in your separate statement, the motion must be denied!’” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 [emphasis added], quoting Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 10:95.1, p. 10-35 (rev. # 1, 2009).) Facts which are stated in a place other than the separate statement need not be considered by the court in resolving the motion. (Fleet v. CBS, Inc. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1911, 1916, fn. 3.)

Once a moving defendant meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence to prove the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding that element of its cause of action or the defense at issue in the motion, and if plaintiff is unable to do so, defendant will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 35 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.) However, the moving party’s burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra), is not affected by the opposing party’s failure to oppose the motion or controvert the facts set forth in the motion, since there is no obligation by the opposing party to establish anything unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated facts establishing every element necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c)), and must view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at 843.) In examining the sufficiency of the affidavits filed in connection with a summary judgment motion, those filed by the moving party are strictly construed, and those of the opposing party are liberally construed. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20-21.)

In resolving the motion, the court may not weigh the evidence. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Rather, the role of the trial court in resolving a summary judgment motion is to determine whether issues of fact exist, not to decide the merits of the issues. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107; see also Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) § 10:270.) A triable issue of material fact exists only if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 850.) Any doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra.)

3. The Turicchis’ procedural objections to the motion for summary judgment.

The first procedural objection which the Turicchis made to the Quaid motion for summary judgment is that it was filed by their former counsel, at a time after counsel had substituted out of the action and no longer represented the Quaids. While the motion was certainly filed by attorneys who no longer had any legal authority to file anything in the case, that fact does not invalidate the motion, as far as the Turicchis are concerned. Rather, it is up to the Quaids to ratify that they wish to adopt the motion as their own, and prosecute it through hearing. In filing their reply papers, they have done so. Consequently, the fact that the motion was filed by former counsel does not provide a reason to either strike the motion or deny it on procedural grounds, without reaching the merits.

Second, the Turicchis object that the motion was set for hearing within 30 days before the date of trial, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 437(a)(3), which requires that a motion for summary judgment be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. The motion was set for hearing on June 3, before a scheduled June 24 trial date, without seeking leave of court, and without any showing of good cause. In support of their objection on that ground, the Turicchis cite Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268. In Robinson, the party moving for summary judgment had filed the motion on with four days’ notice less than that required by Section 437c, and within 30 days of the trial date, without court approval. The trial court then continued the hearing for 4 days, at which time it ruled that there was good cause to have the hearing within 30 days of trial, and granted the motion. The bulk of the decision was dedicated to the principle that a trial court has no authority to hear on the merits a motion for summary judgment that was filed with insufficient notice, and that the only way to cure that deficiency was to continue the hearing for a full 75-day notice period. Given how strictly the summary judgment notice period has been treated by the courts (i.e., in finding that the notice period cannot be shortened by the court, absent agreement or stipulation of the parties), that argument alone justified the court’s ruling in Robinson; the failure to show good cause to hear the motion within 30 days was at best an add-on argument.

The current motion was filed with sufficient notice. While the Quaids’ former counsel failed to obtain leave of court to have the motion heard within the 30 days before trial, upon a showing of good cause to do so, the Court is unwilling to penalize the Quaids for the failings of their prior counsel—who were charged with knowing the requirements of Section 437c, but failed to comply with them. The Court will proceed to address the motion on its merits.

4. Slander of title

A basic understanding of a claim for slander of title is required to evaluate the merits of the motion. This recitation is neither definitive nor exhaustive, and merely sets forth the basic concepts which arise in the context of a slander of title claim.

To establish slander of title, a plaintiff must show (1) a publication (2) made without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and 94) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss. (Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) The “publication” need not be through recordation of a document, and need not create a legal “cloud” on the title to constitute disparagement or slander of title. (Seeley v. Seymour (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 844, 858.) In fact, the tort may be committed through use of oral statements, or the posting of signs, neither of which involve any recordation. (Ibid.) All that is required is that there be a communication of the disparaging matter to a third person other than the party whose interest is disparaged. (Southcott v. Pioneer Title Co. (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 673, 676; Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2023) § 10:44.) A publication is actionable if it either directly or indirectly disparages the title to the property, and may be any unfounded claim of an interest in real property that throws “doubt” on its ownership. (Ibid; see also, Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2023) § 10:43.) A party’s making of an assertion of an inconsistent title in himself suffices as a disparagement of title. (See Phillips v. Glazer (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 673, 677; see also, Miller & Starr, supra.) However, a rival claimant of property is conditionally privileged to disparage or is justified in disparaging another’s property in land by an honest and good faith assertion of an inconsistent legally protected interest in himself. (M.F. Farming Co. v. Couch Distributing Co., Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 180, 198, disapproved on other grounds in Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376,

The thrust of the tort is protection from injury to the salability of property. (Seeley v. Seymour, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 858.) The key to whether the defendant’s conduct is actionable is not whether he has succeeded in casting a legal cloud on the plaintiff’s title, but whether he could reasonably foresee that the conduct of a third person as purchaser or lessee of the property might be determined thereby. (Ibid.) While the owner of the property has the burden of proving that the statement that slanders or disparages title was not true, it is not necessary that the publishing party have known or believed the statement to be false. (Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (4th ed. 2023), § 10:45.)

When the conduct or communications of the defendant are subject to a qualified privilege, the presence or absence of malice is relevant. (Gudger v. Manton (1943) 21 Cal.2d 537, 545-546.) Actual malice exists when the defendant is motivated by hatred or ill will toward the plaintiff, or lacks reasonable grounds for its belief in the truth of the publication, and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. (Schep v. Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1337, quoting Sanborn v. Chronical Pub. Co. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 406, 413.) Malice may be actual in fact, or it may be implied in law from the facts. (Grudger v. Manton, supra, 21 Cal.2d at pp. 543-544.) However, there is no malice when the defendant acted honestly and in good faith. (Hill v. Allan (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 470, 490.)

In an action for slander of title, the plaintiff may recover as damages (1) the expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove the doubt cast by the disparagement, (2) financial loss resulting from the impairment of the vendibility of the property, and (3) general damages for the time and inconvenience suffered by the plaintiff in removing the doubt cast upon the property. (Seeley v. Seymour, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 865.) A slander of title plaintiff may not recover damages for emotional distress or for the loss of advantageous use of the money which would have been realized form the sale of the property. (Ibid.) The attorneys fees and litigation expenses reasonably necessary to remove the cloud on the title are recoverable as damages arising from the tort of another; those fees incurred merely in pursuing damages against the defendants are not recoverable. (Id. at pp. 865-866.) Punitive damages may be awarded in a slander of title action where malice, oppression, or fraud are shown by the evidence. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Seeley v. Seymour, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 866.)

The statute of limitations for slander of title is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (g).) The cause of action accrues, and the statute begins to run, when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim. (Stalberg v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1230; Arthur v. Davis (1981) 12;6 Cal.App.3d 684, 691-692.) [Note: The Court notes that the motion and reply papers both contended that the statute of limitations runs from the date of publication; while that may be true for the tort of slander of the person, it is not true of the tort of slander of title.]

5. The presence of triable issues of material fact requires denial of the motion.

The motion is entitled one for summary judgment. It essentially seeks adjudication of the sole remaining cause of action for slander of title in favor of the Quaids, but does so on multiple grounds. It contains a single Separate Statement of Material Facts for the entire motion, and each and every basis for the motion, rather than separately setting forth facts which might be relevant to each of the bases for the claim of entitlement to entry of judgment on the slander of title cause of action. In doing so, the motion effectively concedes that each and every fact in the separate statement is material to the resolution of the motion on each and every ground which is raised. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, and Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶ 10:95.1, p. 10-35 (rev. # 1, 2009), both cited in Section 2 of this analysis, above.) As a result, if the Turicchis succeed in raising a single triable issue as to any of the 55 facts set forth in the Quaids’ Separate Statement of Material Facts, the motion must be denied.

In fact, the Court finds that multiple triable issues of material fact exist, which prevent the motion from being granted. They include, but are not limited to, the following:

First, the Turicchis have sustained pecuniary loss from the alleged slander of title. They were engaged in litigation to quiet their title to the property from November 2019 when this action was originally filed, through March 27, 2023, when their quiet title cause of action was adjudicated in their favor. While the Court does not know the total amount of fees which were incurred by the Turicchis in achieving that decision, it is well aware of the manner in which this case has been litigated over the years since it was filed, and would not be surprised if that number was significant. Because no judgment has been entered in this action as a whole, and the summary adjudication decision could still be appealed by the Quaids once judgment is ultimately entered, there exists the possibility that further fees will be incurred by the Turicchis in quieting the title to the property. While the Quaids’ motion contended that fees were only awardable if the recordation of a document clouded the title, that is not the law. Both oral and written publications can constitute slanders of title; slander of title can exist in the absence of a recorded documents. Further, the attorneys’ fees awarded for slander of title are not post-judgment fees, but rather are awarded as damages incurred as the result of a tort of another. That tort has the potential of causing damages in the form of clearing the title of property, no matter if it is oral, written, or in the form of a recorded documents. As long as the other requirements for slander of title are met, the fees incurred in clearing title are properly awardable as damages, no matter the form of the original slander of title. As a result, whether or not the Turicchis have sustained any other damages arising from the slander of title, there is sufficient evidence before the court to establish a triable issue of material fact with respect to their suffering of pecuniary loss from the slander of title.

Further, while the motion claims that the Turicchis are judicially estopped from arguing that the slanderous statements affected the marketability of the title, based upon documents contained in a summary judgment motion filed against them by Fidelity National Title Insurance Company in federal litigation in which the Turicchis and Fidelity were adversaries [Material Fact 54], even the sole authority relied upon by the Quaids’ motion (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171) makes clear that the doctrine is inapplicable.

Judicial estoppel prevents a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding, contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier proceeding, and serves the purpose of protecting the integrity of the judicial process. (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra.) Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts. It is an extraordinary remedy that is applied with caution. (Miyahara v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 687, 697.) It applies when (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position; (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986-987, quoting Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 183.)

As these authorities make crystal clear, there is no possibility that a party can be judicially estopped based upon a position taken by an adverse party in earlier litigation. The Jackson decision—relied upon by the Quaids in making the argument—itself makes crystal clear that judicial estoppel can only be applied when the same party takes inconsistent positions in the same or an earlier litigation and has achieved an advantage in having earlier asserted it. Counsel’s making of the argument at all, and its citation to the Jackson decision in support of it, was patently wrong.

For all of those reasons, the motion both fails to meet its initial burden of establishing that the Turicchis did not suffer pecuniary damage from the Quaids’ allegedly slanderous statements, and there also exist triable issues of fact with respect to their suffering of pecuniary harm, requiring that the motion for summary judgment be denied.

Second, the motion contends that the slanderous statements, i.e., that they were the owners of the Mountain Drive property, had not sold the property to Bruce Berman in 1992, and that the property had been stolen from them when Bruce Berman forged their signatures on the Grant Deed, were substantially true—which has relevance both to the existence of slanderous statements, and to the presence or lack of justification by the Quaids in making them. In support of that contention the Quaids pointed to the 2010 statement made to them by their business manager, Warren Grant, that he never sold the Montecito property, after which they realized they could not remember signing the documents that would have been required, or receiving the money from the sale. They contend Randy could not have signed the deed on that date because he was on set. They did not authorize anyone to sign documents related to the property on their behalf, and were informed by three forensics experts that the signatures on the deeds were not theirs. They therefore concluded their signatures had been forged.

The Court notes that although the motion attached letters/reports which purported to be from handwriting experts, it was not accompanied by any declarations or other testimony under oath by any of the experts. Consequently, there was no admissible evidence before the Court to support the forgery claim. While the Quaids themselves attempted to present a declaration from one of the experts, bearing a date of August 24, 2022, evidence upon which a motion relies cannot be submitted to the court for the first time in reply papers, unless good cause is shown for a failure to earlier present it—which cannot be established here given the date of the declaration, from which the Court infers that the Quaids at all times possessed the declaration and there is no good reason why it could not earlier have been submitted.

In opposition to the motion, the Turicchis presented the declaration of Warren Grant, who confirmed that he never made any statement to the Quaids that he had not sold the Montecito property, or anything that would have had the meaning that the property had not been sold, and that he in fact knew they had sold it during the relevant time period. He does not recall the specifics of the sale, but recalls that his office forwarded escrow papers to the Quaids with respect to the sale. Additionally, Bruce Berman testified at deposition that he did not forge the Quaids’ signatures on the deeds. Further, Dennis Quaid testified at deposition that he loaned Randy and Evgenia Quaid the motion for the purchase of the Mountain Drive property (through a trust), which was repaid when they sold the property in 1992. They further note that the signatures on the Grant Deed were notarized, which constitutes prima facie evidence of the genuineness of the Quaids’ signatures on it.

This evidence creates at a minimum triable issues of material fact with respect to whether the property was in fact sold by the Quaids in 1992, and whether in fact the Grant Deed to the Bermans was forged. While the Quaids make quite a number of assertions in their reply papers in an attempt to call into question the credibility of the evidence presented by the Turicchis (e.g., accusing Warren Grant of wrongdoing and having reason to lie on the Turicchis’ behalf, assailing Dennis Quaid’s testimony by contending he was a drug abuser during the relevant time period, etc.), and contend that the court should not consider such evidence, their contentions reflect a lack of understanding of the authority of a trial court in resolving a motion for summary judgment.

As articulated above, a trial court is prohibited from weighing the credibility of evidence in resolving a motion for summary judgment. Its only function is to determine whether the moving party has met its burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on undisputed facts and, if so, whether the opposing party has submitted sufficient evidence to create a “triable issue of material fact” with respect to the issues raised by the motion. The trial court is prohibited from determining whose evidence is more credible, or from weighing the evidence to determine which side’s evidence is of greater weight and should prevail. That is solely the function of the “trier of fact,” i.e., the jury in the context of a jury trial, or the trial court after a court trial. Because the conflicting evidence creates triable issues of material fact, this Court has no authority to do anything other than deny the motion for summary judgment, so as to permit these triable issues of material fact to be properly resolved through the trial of the slander of title claim.

6. Other issues.

Having found that the existence of triable issues of material fact precludes entry of summary judgment or adjudication on the slander of title cause of action, the Court need not reach any of the individual issues argued by the Quaids in support of their motion. However, the Court notes that there are additional problems or issues which emphasize that the grant of the motion, as presented to the court, would be improper.

First, the Court notes that the motion was drafted to contend that no allegedly slanderous statements exist because some are barred by the statute of limitations, some related to J2 Global or have nothing to do with slander of title, some are illegible and cannot be read, and some contain illegible or incomplete dates. In opposition to the motion, the Turicchis dispute that dates on some publications are illegible or incomplete, setting forth the dates of the publications—some of which are will within the three year statute of limitations, including in the 2019-2021 time period. That creates an additional triable issue of material fact.

Second, in making the statute of limitations argument, the Quaids’ motion simply concludes—without citation to authority or the making of any argument as to why it is necessarily true—that any publications more than three years prior to the filing of the First Amended Complaint on February 14, 2022, are barred by the three year statute of limitations. As the Turicchis note in their opposition to the motion, the original complaint in this action was filed on November 25, 2019. While the FAC was the first pleading to allege a cause of action for slander of title, the cause of action was essentially based upon the same facts as were asserted in the original complaint which alleged causes of action to quiet title and for declaratory relief, i.e., the Quaids’ making of wrongful claims of ownership of the property. As such, the Turicchis contend that the slander of title cause of action alleged in the FAC related back to the date of filing of the original complaint for statute of limitations purposes, citing Grudt v. City of Los Angeles (1979) 2 Cal.3d 575, 583-584.

It is not necessary for this Court to resolve that issue in the course of resolving the motion for summary judgment. Rather, in failing to make any effort to establish the date of filing of the First Amended Complaint as the proper date for resolving a statute of limitations bar, even while addressing a number of allegedly slanderous statements which were made in 2017 and 2018 (i.e., within 3 years prior to the filing of the original complaint in 2019), the motion for summary judgment itself failed to meet its burden on the statute of limitations issue.

The Court notes that both the Quaids and the Turicchis made erroneous statements with respect to the statute of limitations in their respective briefs. The Quaids misrepresented the application of the 3-year statute of limitations, by misapplying the period as it applies to slander of the person (i.e., as running from date of publication), rather than as it has been applied by the courts to slander of title (i.e., running from the time when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim). The Turicchis’ opposition also attempted to contend that the statute of limitations had not run as to even those statements outside of any relevant 3-yeaar period, because they were continuing to sustain damage from those publications within the three year period. The critical time period is when plaintiff could reasonably be expected to discover the existence of the claim arising from the posting. Given that the Turicchis sought a restraining order in 2016 based upon postings which had been made in that time frame, they were clearly aware of their claim arising solely from those postings, and their slander of title cause of action would be barred three years thereafter. Where successive slanderous postings have continued to have been made over a period of years after that time, however, the issue of whether or not the Turicchis’ slander of title claim based upon the later postings is barred by the three year statute of limitations would depend upon when they could reasonably have been able to discovery the existence of the claim(s) arising from each such posting would be an issue for resolution at trial. (The Court notes that while the Quaids’ answer to the FAC currently does not allege a statute of limitations defense, they have a pending motion for leave to file an amended answer asserting such a defense.)

Additionally, in their reply papers, the Quaids contend for the first time that they did not make the allegedly slanderous statements, which were instead made by “illegitimate” X (formerly known as Twitter) and other social media accounts made in Randy Quaid’s name by persons impersonating Randy Quaid. No evidence is provided to support the contention; the statement is purportedly supported by the reply declarations of the Quaids, but those declarations provide no foundation for the statements. Even if the Quaids had presented competent and admissible evidence of the allegedly numerous imposter accounts, and provided evidence that one or more of these imposter accounts made the slanderous statements, and not the Quaids themselves, all evidence and arguments in support of a motion for summary judgment must be presented in the original moving papers, which must provide at least 75 days’ notice in order to permit the opposing party to respond to the evidence and arguments. The Court has therefore disregarded all new evidence and arguments presented in the Quaids’ reply papers, including their evidence of the numerous purported impersonator social media accounts.

Further, the Quaids argue that the evidence of the allegedly slanderous statements attached to Lannette Turicchi’s declaration do not contain metadata for the screenshots, showing the time, date, and author of the posts, nor any “chain of custody” evidence, and that the screenshots are therefore inadmissible and unreliable, citing and relying on People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1429, and People v. Beckley (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 509. [Note: The Court notes that the Quaids failed to note the specific page(s) within either of these cases upon which they were relying for their contentions.] People v. Beckley relates to a photograph taken from the internet, noting that a photograph is a writing, which may be authenticated by the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is, citing Evidence Code section 1400, and that the testimony of a person who was present at the time a film was made that it accurately depicts what it purports to show is a legally sufficient foundation for its admission into evidence. People v. Valdez related to a printout from a criminal defendant’s Myspace page, and noted that the proponent’s burden of producing evidence to show authenticity is met when sufficient evidence has been produced to sustain a finding that the document is what it purports to be, that the author’s testimony is not required to authenticate a document, and its authenticity may be established by the contents of the writing or by other means. In that case, the court found that the information on the page matched what was known about the defendant’s interests, suggesting that it belonged to him rather than someone who looked at him, and a posting on the page by his sister also tended to show it was his page. The court found that the trial court did not err in admitting the page, and allowing the jury to determine whether he had authored it.

Here, Lannette Turicchi has declared that she personally found the social media postings on the internet, and where available, each provided the time stamps indicating the time and date when she took the screenshots of the postings. The contents of those social media postings reflect the names and photographs of Randy Quaid and Evgenia Quaid, and reflect the same contentions that they have made in other forums and formats, including in this action. While their allegations in the now-dismissed cross-complaints cannot form the basis for any slander of title claim, their tremendous similarity to the posted materials presented by Mrs. Turicchi would, at a minimum, tend to show that the postings could well be what the Turicchis claimed them to be (an issue this court neither reaches nor determines at this time), such that the issue of their authenticity would become an issue for the jury to determine at trial—just as was the situation in the Valdez case upon which the Quaids’ reply relies.

Finally, the Quaids argued in their reply that their motion should be granted because the Turicchis had failed to provide incontrovertible evidence to support their claims. As the standards on summary judgment make clear, the Turicchis had no obligation to provide “incontrovertible evidence” in order to defeat the summary judgment motion. All they needed to do was present sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of material fact with respect to those issues for which the Quaids’ original motion had met its burden.

Even though the Court opted to proceed to resolve the motion for summary judgment on its merits, the motion itself was insufficient to meet its burden in various respects (some of which have been discussed herein), was wrong on the law in various respects (as discussed herein), and there exist a plethora of triable issues of material fact, which this Court has no authority to resolve in the context of a motion for summary judgment. For all of these reasons, the Court has no authority to do anything other than deny the motion in its entirety.

# 19CV06268 R. Scott Turicchi, et al., v. Randy Quaid, et al.,

Hearing Date: 6/3/2024

HEARING: Quaid motion for summary judgment

ATTORNEYS: Craig S. Granet / Claire K Mitchell of Rimon, P.C. and Andrew W.

Zepeda of Lurie, Zepeda, Schmalz, Hogan & Martin for plaintiffs

R. Scott Turicchi and Lannette C. Turicchi