Matter of George Miguel Carrari Trust dated November 28, 1979

Case Number

18PR00182

Case Type

Hearing Date / Time

Wed, 02/05/2025 - 09:30

Nature of Proceedings

Respondent's Motion Under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, Subdivision (d), To Vacate Default Judgment And Judgments, Awards, All Orders, And To Dismiss Case With Prejudice Per Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, Probate Code 19103

Tentative Ruling

For Petitioner Linda Kopcrak: Tiffany M. Carrari, TMC Legal                              

For Respondent Angelina Dettamanti: Self-Represented

Additional Parties: See List

RULING

For all reasons discussed herein, the motion of respondent Angelina Dettamanti to vacate default judgments, awards, and all orders, and to dismiss case with prejudice, is denied.

Background

This action is related to Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 18PR00334 (the Carrari Trust Action) entitled Matter of Carrari Family Trust Established February 28, 2002 (the Carrari Family Trust). (Aug. 28, 2018, Minute Order & Nov. 14, 2019, Order on Related Cases.)

In the present proceeding, respondent Angelina Dettamanti (Dettamanti) moves for an order vacating, among other things, judgments entered in this action as further discussed and described herein, on the grounds that these judgments are void. The procedural history of this action, beginning with the filing of an original petition on April 17, 2019, by petitioner Linda Kopcrak (Kopcrak), is lengthy and, for sake of efficiency, will not be recited in full here except as relevant or necessary to determining the present motion.

The first amended petition (the FAP) confirming title to trust assets, compelling an accounting, and for surcharge filed by Kopcrak on April 28, 2018, is the operative pleading. As alleged in the FAP:

Kopcrak is a beneficiary of a trust (the GC Trust) which was established by an agreement made on November 28, 1979, between George Miguel Carrari (George), who is the settlor of the GC Trust, and Ronald Carrari (Ron), the Trustee of the GC Trust. (FAP, ¶¶ 1, 3 & Exh. A.) (Note: Due to common familial surnames, the Court will refer to individuals by their first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended.) George and Ron are brothers, and the children of Joseph Carrari (Joseph). (FAP, ¶ 3.) George, who was a mentally disabled adult and the subject of a conservatorship in which Joseph and his granddaughter served as co-conservators, created the GC Trust to allow a family member to handle his assets. (Ibid.) When Ron resigned as the Trustee of the GC Trust, Joseph was named, and agreed to serve, as the sole successor Trustee. (Ibid.)

In September 2016, Joseph encountered Dettamanti, who quickly established an intimate relationship with Joseph who is 50 years Dettamanti’s senior. (FAP, ¶ 4.) Dettamanti began systematically excluding Joseph’s children from Josephs’ life, among other things, and was financially supported by Joseph. (Ibid.)

In October 2017, Joseph purchase a residence located at 1108 Fairway Vista Drive in Santa Maria, California (the property). (FAP, ¶ 5.) The purchase price for the property was paid for with all or a portion of funds of the GC Trust. (Ibid.) Title to the property was taken in Dettamanti’s name. (Ibid.) George never lived at the property, and neither Joseph nor Dettamanti had any plans to transfer any portion of the property to the GC Trust or its beneficiaries. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)

George passed away on December 25, 2017. (FAP, ¶ 7.) Ron, Kopcrak, and Christina Carrari (Christina), who is Joseph’s daughter, are entitled to equal shares of the assets of the GC Trust pursuant to its terms. (Ibid.) Notwithstanding a request made by Kopcrak to Joseph’s counsel, Joseph has not provided an accounting for the GC Trust. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

In the FAP, Kopcrak requests an order declaring that the property is an asset of the GC Trust, tracing property of the GC Trust, enjoining Dettamanti from disposing of any assets of the GC Trust including the property, surcharging Joseph in an amount necessary to redress any breach of the GC Trust, and requiring an accounting from Joseph. (FAP, ¶¶ 2, 15-16, 18, 20-24 & p. 5, ¶¶ 1-5.)

Joseph and Dettamanti separately filed answers to the FAP on, respectively, June 8 and July 17, 2018.

Information appearing in various documents and other records filed in this action show that Joseph died on November 25, 2018.

On March 15, 2019, David Y. Farmer (Farmer), who was appointed in the Carrari Trust Action as the temporary Trustee of the Carrari Family Trust, filed a motion (the intervention motion) for leave to intervene in this action on the grounds that Farmer’s review of the financial records of the Carrari Family Trust revealed that at least $504,000 in funds obtained from a liquidation of securities held by the Carrari Family Trust were paid towards the purchase of the property at issue in this action.

No party to this action filed an opposition to the intervention motion. (See also Notices of Non-Opposition filed Apr. 8, 10, and 16, 2019.)

On April 25, 2019, the Court signed an order (the intervention order) granting the intervention motion, which was entered on April 26, 2019. In the intervention order, the Court directed the parties to file their responses to the complaint in intervention to be filed by Farmer, within thirty days from the date the parties were served with a file-stamped copy of that pleading. (Apr. 26, 2019, Order.)

On May 2, 2019, Farmer filed his complaint in intervention (the Farmer complaint) in this action. In the Farmer complaint, Farmer requests entry of judgment against Kopcrak, Dettamanti, Joseph, and others, declaring, among other things, that the predecessor trustee of the Carrari Family Trust contributed the amount of $514,000 towards the purchase of the property, that the trustee holds an undivided 76.15 percent interest in the property, and that any claim of Dettamanti in the property is secondary and subordinate to Farmer’s interests. (Farmer Compl. at p. 5, ¶¶ 1-5.)

On June 13, 2019, Kopcrak filed a motion (the sanctions motion) for an order imposing monetary and terminating sanctions against Dettamanti, on the grounds that Dettamanti repeatedly failed to submit to a meaningful deposition in violation of court orders, including an order entered on February 26, 2019, in which the Court directed Dettamanti to appear for a meaningful deposition no later than April 30, 2019. (See Feb. 26, 2019, Minute Order.)

On July 16 and August 23, 2019, the Court entered an order and an amended order (collectively, the sanctions order) imposing, among other things, terminating sanctions against Dettamanti, striking the answer of Dettamanti to the FAP, and entering a default judgment against Dettamanti based on Dettamanti’s failure to submit to a deposition despite repeated court orders to do so. (See, e.g., June 13, 2019 Kopcrak Motion For Terminating Sanctions.) The Court further ordered a hearing to be scheduled for a date to be determined, at which Kopcrak would be required to prove up her right to the relief sought in the FAP. (See Jul. 16 & Aug. 23, 2019, Orders.)

Kopcrak filed a notice of entry of the sanctions order on September 24, 2019.

On October 21, 2019, Farmer filed a notice of intention to resign as the Trustee of the Carrari Family Trust.

On November 22, 2019, Farmer filed a request for entry of the default of Dettamanti as to the Farmer complaint. The default as requested by Farmer was not entered as requested by Farmer due to questionable service.

On December 20, 2019, Farmer filed a motion (the default motion) for an order directing the clerk of the court to enter the default of Dettamanti, based on Dettamanti’s failure to respond to the Farmer complaint. Dettamanti did not file any opposition or other response to the default motion. (See also Jan. 17, 2020, Notice Of No Opposition By Dettamanti.)

On January 21, 2020, the Court granted the default motion and entered an order (the default order) directing the clerk of the court to enter the default of Dettamanti for failing to respond to the Farmer complaint. Farmer filed a notice of entry of the default order on January 22, 2020. The default of Dettamanti as to the Farmer complaint was entered on the same date.

On December 18, 2020, Farmer filed a request for court judgment against Dettamanti. Following a default prove-up hearing, on January 19, 2021, the Court entered a default judgment by court (the 2021 Farmer Judgment) in favor of Farmer and against Dettamanti, in the principal sum of $514,000.

On March 3, 2021, Farmer filed a notice of entry of the 2021 Farmer Judgment.

The Court’s records reflect that on March 19, 2021, Dettamanti filed a notice of appeal from the 2021 Farmer Judgment. Dettamanti’s appeal of the 2021 Farmer Judgment was dismissed by Division Six of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District on June 25, 2021, due to a default of Dettamanti under California Rules of Court, rule 8.140. (See Aug. 30, 2021, Appeal Order.)

On November 5, 2021, Kopcrak filed a request for judgment following default as to the claims alleged in the FAP, which was ostensibly based on the sanctions order under which the default of Dettamanti was entered as further described above.

Following a default prove-up hearing, on November 9, 2021, the Court entered an amended judgment (the 2021 FAP Judgment) against Dettamanti and in favor of Kopcrak and Christina as the successor Trustees of the GC Trust, in the amount of $711,924.35, plus interest, and ordering the property be titled in the name of the Carrari Family Trust. (Nov. 9, 2021, Amended Judgment Following Default Hearing, ¶¶ 4-5.) The 2021 FAP Judgment sets forth the Court’s findings that notice of the hearing on Kopcrak’s November 5, 2021, request for judgment following default was given in the matter required by law, that the GC Trust is valid and in existence, that Dettamanti exercised unlawful and undue influence over Joseph from July 2016 through the date of his death, and that title to the property was obtained by fraud and undue influence exerted by Dettamanti over Joseph which caused Joseph to place the property in Dettamanti’s name. (Id. at ¶¶ 1-4.)

Kopcrak filed a notice of entry of the 2021 FAP Judgment on November 9, 2021.

The Court’s records further reflect that on April 23, 2019, with leave of court, intervenor Agro Pismo, LLC, (Agro Pismo) also filed in this action a complaint in intervention (the Agro Pismo Complaint), alleging, among other things, that it entered into a valid contract to purchase the property pursuant to which Agro Pismo paid the amount of $200,000 to Dettamanti without having received valid notice of any active litigation involving title to the property. (See Agro Pismo Compl., ¶¶ 4-9.)

The claims alleged in the Agro Pismo Complaint were resolved by a settlement agreement entered into on July 25, 2022, between Agro Pismo, the appointed trustee of the Carrari Family Trust, Kopcrak, and Christina. (See, e.g., Aug. 1, 2022, Stipulation & Order For Court To Retain Jurisdiction.) The Agro Pismo Complaint was dismissed without prejudice as to Dettamanti on July 26, 2022, and with prejudice as to Kopcrak on August 9, 2022.

On November 4, 2024, Dettamanti filed the present motion (the motion to vacate) for an order vacating the 2021 Farmer Judgment and the 2021 FAP Judgment (collectively, the Judgments), on the grounds that the Judgments are in excess of the relief requested in the FAP and the Farmer complaint, that the FAP and Farmer complaint do not contain a valid cause of action or seek a permissible remedy against Dettamanti, and that no other party was substituted in the action after Joseph died. For these reasons, among others, Dettamanti contends that the Judgments are void and should be or vacated pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473.

The motion to vacate is opposed by Kopcrak.

Analysis

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), authorizes the court to “set aside any void judgment or order.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (d).) Relevant under the circumstances present here, a motion to vacate a default judgment which is void on its face may be brought at any time. (OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1318, 1327.)

“The question of whether a judgment is void is typically framed as a question of whether the court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction.” (Grados v. Shiau (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1050; see also Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 [“[t]he granting of relief, which a court under no circumstances has any authority to grant, has been considered an aspect of fundamental jurisdiction”].) “Essentially, jurisdictional errors are of two types. ‘Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the subject matter or the parties. [Citation.] When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time.’ [Citation.]” (People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660 (American Contractors).)

“However, ‘in its ordinary usage the phrase “lack of jurisdiction” is not limited to these fundamental situations.’ [Citation.] It may also ‘be applied to a case where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]hen a statute authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.’ [Citation.] When a court has fundamental jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable.” (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) A voidable act or judgment is “valid until it is set aside, and a party may be precluded from setting it aside by ‘principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or res judicata.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

Wholly absent from the motion to vacate is any reasoned argument showing why the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action. (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1028, 1034-1035 [general discussion of personal jurisdiction].) For example, Dettamanti offers no reasoned factual or legal argument to show that she was not properly or effectively served with process in this case. (Braugh v. Dow (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 76, 88 (Braugh).)

Dettamanti also fails to offer any reasoned legal or factual argument sufficient to show why the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of action or claims alleged in either the FAP or Farmer complaint, or had no authority over their subject matter. (Guardianship of Ariana K. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 690, 701; see also Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42 [general discussion of subject matter jurisdiction].) As Dettamanti has failed to demonstrate why the Court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction as to the factual or legal disputes raised in the FAP or Farmer complaint, Dettamanti has failed to meet her burden to show that the Judgments are void on these grounds. (Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441; Braugh, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 86 [invalidity of a void judgment appears on its face]; Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200 [moving party bears the burden to prove each fact essential to the relief requested in a motion].)

Dettamanti also appears to contend that the FAP and Farmer complaint fail to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action against Dettamanti, including because George’s testamentary capacity has not been determined in an evidentiary hearing. (See, e.g., Memorandum at p. 2, ll. 16-24 & p. 5, ll. 16-24.) The allegations of the FAP and the Farmer complaint described above include allegations regarding Dettamanti’s alleged conduct with respect to the property, the GC Trust, and the Carrari Family Trust, and are sufficient to apprise Dettamanti of the nature of the claims alleged or relief demanded by Kopcrak and Farmer. (Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 830.) For this reason, Dettamanti has failed to show why the Judgments are void on this ground.

Dettamanti also offers no evidence or information sufficient to show that any extrinsic fraud or mistake deprived Dettamanti of a hearing on the merits of either the FAP or the Farmer complaint. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982 [general discussion].) For example, Dettamanti offers no excuse for failing to present a defense to the Farmer complaint, no reasoned argument to show why the sanctions order was obtained through fraud or mistake or was otherwise improper, or sufficient diligence in seeking to set aside the defaults further described above. (Ibid.) For these additional reasons, Dettamanti has failed to meet her burden to show why the Judgments are void on this ground.

Moreover, the Judgments were entered against Dettamanti only and not Joseph. Dettamanti fails to explain why any purported abatement of any claims alleged in the FAP against Joseph renders either of the Judgments void. In addition, as the FAP was filed prior to the date of Joseph’s death, Dettamanti’s arguments are insufficient to show why the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 366.2, subdivision (a), or Probate Code section 19103, render the Judgments void.

Dettamanti also contends that each of the Judgments are for a greater amount or a different form of relief than what is requested in the FAP and Farmer complaint. For these reasons, Dettamanti argues, the Judgments violate Code of Civil Procedure section 580, and are void on this ground.

Noted above, the default of Dettamanti as to the FAP does not arise from any failure by Dettamanti to answer or otherwise respond to the FAP. Under these circumstances, “the court may grant ... any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).) “The meaning of this language is that the court may grant such relief—but only such relief—as is ‘authorized by the facts alleged and proved or admitted....’ [Citations.]” (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 538 (Ferraro).)

In circumstances where there is no answer, such as with respect to the Farmer complaint to which Dettamanti failed to respond, the relief “cannot exceed that demanded in the complaint”, and is “limited by statute to the specific demands set forth in the prayer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a); Ferraro, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 538, original italics.) Under either circumstance described above, a default judgment which grants relief different in form from that demanded in the operative pleading is void. (Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1182; Ferraro, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 538-539.)

Regarding the 2021 FAP Judgment, the request for judgment following default filed in this action by Kopcrak on November 5, 2011 (the Kopcrak request) shows that Kopcrak and Christina were designated as successor Trustees of the GC Trust. (Nov. 5, 2011, Request, ¶¶ 6 & 14.) Though Kopcrak alleges in the FAP that the purchase price for the property was paid with assets of the GC Trust as a result of the influence exerted by Dettamanti over Joseph, and that the property is an asset of the GC Trust, Kopcrak requested that title to the property be returned instead to the Carrari Family Trust based on the 2021 Farmer Judgment. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Information appearing in the Kopcrak request also shows that, though title to the property was placed in Dettamanti’s name, Dettamanti contributed nothing to its purchase price as alleged or effectively alleged in the FAP. (Id. at ¶ 40.)

Additional information appearing in the Kopcrak request also shows that as of December 31, 2015, the GC Trust had an estimated total value of $711,924.35, and that as of May 2018, all known accounts of the GC Trust were closed, with the proceeds either deposited into accounts titled in the Carrari Family Trust or used to purchase the property with the aid, encouragement, and influence of Dettamanti who Joseph had named as the successor Trustee of the Carrari Family Trust. (Kopcrak Request, ¶¶ 75-80, 86-95 & 118.)

Considering the allegations of the FAP described above, the information and evidence presented in the Kopcrak request and the relief granted in the 2021 FAP Judgment do not deviate in form or substance from the relief demanded in the FAP, nor is the relief granted in the 2021 FAP Judgment wholly outside the scope of the substantive allegations of the FAP. For example, the 2021 FAP Judgment includes judgment against Dettamanti in the amount of $711,924.35, which reflects the monetary value of assets removed from the GC Trust with Dettamanti’s aid or influence, including for the purpose of purchasing the property. The 2021 FAP Judgment also awards additional relief which is expressly requested in the FAP. (See FAP at p. 5.) For these reasons, Dettamanti has failed to show why the relief granted in the 2021 FAP Judgment is inconsistent with or different from the case made or issues embraced within the FAP. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).)

The Farmer complaint includes similar allegations with respect to assets of the Carrari Family Trust that were allegedly used to purchase the property ostensibly for Dettamanti and not the trustee of the Carrari Family Trust (See, e.g., Farmer Compl., ¶ 7.) The 2021 Farmer Judgment also includes a money judgment against Dettamanti, who is alleged to hold sole title to the property, in the amount expressly alleged in the Farmer complaint, and which reflects that portion of the purchase price that was paid for with assets of the Carrari Family Trust as also alleged by Farmer in the Farmer complaint. (Id. at ¶ 8.)

The same reasoning and analysis apply. The 2021 Farmer Judgment awards a principal sum against Dettamanti which does not on the face of the record exceed the demand in the Farmer complaint, or the scope of its allegations. For this and all reasons further discussed above, Dettamanti has failed to meet her burden to show why the 2021 Farmer Judgment is void on its face or violates Code of Civil Procedure section 580, subdivision (a). (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 863.)

To the extent a judgment is valid on its face but voidable, a motion to vacate that judgment must be made within a reasonable time, and may be supported by extrinsic evidence. (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228; Strathvale Holdings v. E.B.H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249.)

Dettamanti does not appear to contend that the Judgments are voidable. Further, as the Judgments were entered more than three years prior the filing of the motion to vacate, to the extent Dettamanti effectively also intends to assert that the Judgments are voidable, Dettamanti has not demonstrated “the diligence necessary for equitable relief.” (Lee v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 558, 565-566.) Therefore, and for all reasons discussed herein, the Court will deny the motion to vacate as to the Judgments.

Dettamanti also asserts a blanket request that the Court vacate all other orders entered in this action. Apart from the Judgments further discussed above, Dettamanti fails to identify, with specificity, any other orders to which the motion to vacate is directed, and provides no reasoned argument showing why each of these orders are void. For this reason, the Court will also deny the motion as to any additional orders which Dettamanti asserts are void or voidable. (See Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409; Chavez v. Netflix, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 52 [trial court may deny motion on procedural grounds based on deficient supporting memorandum].)